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Abstract 
This thesis provides a critique of the social and ideological processes 
that underpin the production, consumption and disposal of toys. In 
particular, it examines two high-profile cases involving toys containing 
lead and magnets. These cases are contextualized by a spate of global 
toy-related recalls between 2006 and 2008, peaking in 2007. The cases 
focus on four toy companies, one headquartered in Canada and three in 
the United States. This study examines the responses to unsafe toys, by 
toy companies in the west and their supply chain partners in China, 
through the lens of deviancy theory and critical criminology. The study 
found that there appears to be a scripted set of responses and strategies 
on the part of those doing the harm. 
This research is concerned with conceptualizing, observing and 
mapping global harms, in particular toxic harms, within the broad 
theoretical framework of ‘green criminology’, where a key precept is 
conceptualizations of harm that go beyond conventional legal 
definitions of crime. Informed by an environmental justice perspective, 
it asks which toxins affect which people, which places and whose 
natural landscapes and why? It engages with eco-global criminology’s 
concerns with the ecological (environmental toxins), the global 
(worldwide movement of toxic harms) and issues of justice (biological, 
social and ecological consequences of those trajectories for people, 
places and nature). 
The study examined the flow of toxic harms across geographical and 
jurisdictional borders through the concept of transference. Transference 
refers to the movement of something (e.g. substance, activity) from one 
place or person (entity) to another. The research located transference 
within the growing interconnection of markets and the expanding flow 
of goods where different supply chain activities are located in particular 
countries and where human and ecological harms are also transferred. 
Denial and the use of particular techniques of neutralization on the part 
of those who produced and perpetuated harm in the production, 
consumption and disposal of toxic toys was a major concern and 
finding of this thesis. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of what this thesis is about, how this 
study originated and how it evolved over time. It answers the question 
why toys? and signals the centrality of the global supply chain as the 
conduit or mode of transference for these harms. It situates the primary 
case series (toxic toys) in a cluster of global toy-related recalls that 
occurred between 2006 and 2008, peaking in 2007 and in the wider 
political and economic context of US-China relations at the time, the 
two regions in the world where these events primarily played out. It 
answers the questions which toxins?, which perpetrators? and which 
offence? The chapter concludes with an outline of thesis chapters. 
Every day toxic harms flow across the increasingly porous borders of a 
globalised world. They are carried by wind and sea currents (e.g. 
pathogens, acid rain, plastic gyres), in the bodies of migratory birds 
(e.g. bird flu), in the ballast water of ships (e.g. invasive species like the 
northern pacific sea star) and in the global supply chain and 
distribution network that moves products around the world (see 
Heckenberg 2010). Sometimes these products harbour invisible hazards 
and toys are no exception.  
Each year, thousands of children around the world are killed or injured 
by their toys and trinkets. They choke on small parts, ingest heavy 
metals like lead and cadmium, swallow tiny powerful magnets that 
damage their intestines or are exposed to dangerous chemicals used to 
‘soften’ their bibs, teething rings and bath toys. But the toxicity of toys 
extends beyond the victimisation of children. Toxic toys also have 
consequences for the foreign workers who were exposed to lead and 
other supply chain toxins in off-shore locations, in this case china. This 
chain of harm also extends to the pollution of places (factories, homes) 
and natural spaces (air, soil, water) in the specific regions of the world 
where different supply chain activities (extraction, manufacturing, 
2 
consumption and disposal) are carried out. For a green criminologist, 
cases of harm like these ought to be important. 
Some of these toxic contaminants (e.g. chemicals like phthalates) are 
suspected of being endocrine disrupters (i.e. interfere with body’s 
hormone systems). Their effects may only manifest over time (e.g. in 
reproductive disorders) so that making the links between cause and 
effect is problematic. Others like lead are known to have caused death 
(e.g. an American child died after ingesting a lead-contaminated 
jewellery item), however they are more likely to manifest in health 
concerns over time (e.g. reduced IQ, behavioural disorders). Lead is 
especially problematic for the unborn and developing child. Some 
industrial chemicals such as diethylene glycol (found in toothpaste and 
teething mixture), have left victims with lingering life-long-effects that 
significantly impeded quality of life, deprived people of their livelihood 
and/or retarded the capacity of victims to reach their full potential (see 
examples Chapter 3).  
The production and distribution of toxic products is typically labelled a 
‘crisis’ by offenders, but it is also a significant human and 
environmental health issue. These are harms generated in response to 
the demands of global markets, sanctioned by the marketplace, rather 
than prohibited by criminal law. In their trajectory across the world 
toxic products leave behind a chain of harm, the invisibility of which is 
not only reflected in the contaminants themselves (colourless, tasteless 
and odourless) but also in their pattern of victimisation. For instance, in 
a critical appraisal of economic crime and its victims Croall (2010: 169) 
notes that ‘on the basis of existing information about these crimes, 
victimisation is widespread and most probably exceeds that for 
‚conventional‛ crime < furthermore patterns of victimisation can be 
related to broader patterns of global socio-economic, gender and age 
inequalities’. 
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A perspective that fits well with this study is eco-global criminology 
(See White 2008; 2010; 2011) where key concerns include the 
ecologically harmful (e.g. heavy metals, chemicals and rare earth 
magnets in toys) and the global (the worldwide distribution and 
redistribution of toxic harms). It is eco-global criminology’s ‘emphasises 
on the essential interconnectedness of issues, events, people, places and 
the natural landscape’ (See White 2009: 18) that is so important here. 
These concepts resonate with key elements of this study, such as the 
movement of harm across borders (transference), the connection 
between different forms of harm and environmental concerns (e.g. 
heavy metals and the pollution of bodies, places and nature) and the 
recognition that such crimes occur within specific geographical, 
economic and social contexts. Eco-global criminology directs the 
criminological gaze to the global, as well as conceptualising the topic 
(toxic products) in relation to legal, ecological and justice criteria (White 
2011).  
For me, toxic toys (and other adulterated products) are as much an 
ecological issue as they are a public health issue because it is inevitable 
that these products (as well as what they contain and release) will end 
up in the environment. This approach is consistent with Walters (2009: 
9) reference to ‘contemporary discourses in green criminology *that+ 
continue to engage with and critique acts that damage and destroy the 
environment’ (See also Beirne and South 2007; White 2011). As green 
criminologists it is important to also be mindful of how the production 
distribution and disposal of toxic products (including what is in a 
product and what can potentially migrate from that product) ultimately 
contribute to greenhouse gas emissions and global climate change.  
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Background 
The discovery of a warning label for a toxic chemical inside a toy 
purchased for one of our grandchildren in late 2006 was the catalyst for 
this research. Called a ‘laugh-a-ball’, the toy (See Photo 1.1) was bought 
from a ‘hawker’ in a government office in Hobart. 
Photo 1.1: ‘Laugh-a-ball Toy’ 
 
After playing with one of the toys intermittently over the ensuing 
weekend it stopped ‘laughing’ and on unzipping the fluffy outside 
cover, we discovered a toxic warning label (See Photo 1.2) attached to 
the rigid plastic ball that gave the toy its shape. 
Photo 1.2: Toxic Warning Label 
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A green cardboard tag (See Photo 1.3) on the outside of the toy was 
environmentally friendly (in colour and content), displaying the words 
‚non-toxic materials‛ in bold underscored font. It also bore the CE 
stamp of approval, indicating the toy had passed European Union 
standards of quality and safety, some of the most stringent at the time. 
Photo 1.3: Non-toxic Tag 
 
 
The toys, recommended for children age three and above, were 
distributed by a second company, Innovage Inc. (See Photo 1.4) 
Photo 1.4: Distributor of Toy 
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A cloth tag sewn into the toy (See Photo 1.5) stipulated the country of 
manufacture (China), the materials the toy was made of (new materials 
only) and the name of a Teddy Bear company in California 
Photo 1.5: Cloth Tag 
 
 
I emailed both companies (in 2007) to see if I could determine what the 
toxic chemical was, but received no reply from either. 
The toys packaging was also toxic, bearing as it did a ‘danger of 
suffocation’ warning (See Photo 1.6) for small children. This is an 
important area for further research. 
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Photo 1.6: Toxic Packaging 
 
 
For me, the nagging questions were - what exactly is the chemical of 
concern? How did a carcinogenic toxin from California end up inside a 
toy in Australia? Who put it inside the toy and why? How did it move, 
undetected, across geographical and jurisdictional borders? (United 
States to China to Australia) and more importantly, why is it OK for 
Australian children but not for American children? It immediately 
raised questions about the distribution (and re-distribution) of toxic 
risks and issues of social and environmental justice. The sense of 
outrage I felt at the time was balanced against a desire to understand 
what happened, how it happened and why? 
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Why Toys? 
So in June 2007, when lead was detected in the surface paint of Thomas 
& Friends™ wooden railway sets, these events coincided with my PhD 
candidature and a growing interest in green criminology and the study 
of environmental crimes and harms. Green criminology is an umbrella 
term for a range of ‘contrasting perspectives’ (see Lynch and Stretesky 
2003: 217) that examine different types of transgressions against nature 
from a criminological perspective. Green criminology too, is concerned 
with human rights issues and global governance (See for example 
Beirne and South 2007), topics very relevant to a consumer’s right to 
know what is in products and what could potentially migrate from a 
product,, as well as calling companies to account for the production of 
risk in their extended supply chains. 
The recall of Thomas & Friends™ wooden railway sets by American 
company RC2 Corporation served to connect toys and toxicity in the 
public imagination. It triggered a spate of similar recalls by companies 
large and small for lead-contaminated children’s toys and jewellery. 
The events captured global media headlines for well over a year, 
peaking in 2007, dubbed by U.S. House Speaker, Nancy Pelosi and 
Consumers Union Director, Don Mays, as ‘The Year Of The Recall’ 
(Grabowski, FoodSafety Magazine, February/March 2008). As the toy-
related recalls escalated, I immediately began collecting what would 
become a steady stream of information and data about toxic toys. An 
interest in children’s jewellery also developed alongside toys, as cases 
of lead (and later cadmium) emerged as hazards in these products.  
Political Context 
Toxic harms are never produced in an economic and political vacuum 
(See Pellow 2007), but in the context of a world dominated by the 
imperatives of capital accumulation and free trade and against the 
backdrop of prevailing political and economic issues. In this case these 
longstanding issues were sensitivities between China and the United 
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States that resurfaced during the global toy-related product recalls. 
These included:  the transfer of American manufacturing jobs to 
developing economies like China, trade imbalances between the two 
countries, and tensions over the value of the Chinese Yuan (see for 
example Teagarden 2009). This fuelled political and public concerns 
that the quality of toys had been compromised for a cheap off-shore 
manufacturing location. 
There was widespread political and public outrage at the fact that lead 
(a substance that had been banned for over three decades), was turning 
up in excessive quantities in children’s toys and jewellery. As Schmidt 
(2008: A72) notes in an article in Environmental Health Impacts, in the 
aftermath of the recalls: 
Lead contaminated toys became one of the biggest environmental 
health stories of recent times. It was shocking to think of children 
being poisoned while playing, and by lead no less, a toxic metal 
that consumers assumed had been purged from products long 
ago. Now lead was back, sparking a furore over toy safety 
Consumers felt betrayed, especially by the big toy companies and the 
high-profile brands they had put their trust in: 
 It made me sick to my stomach to think that from the time [my 
five year old son] was a year and a half, he had his Thomas the 
Tank Engine in his mouth and could have lead in his system 
(Leean Anderson, quoted in Connell, The United Steelworkers 
Union quoted in Connell, Women of Steel Take Action,  29/11/2007). 
Similarly, during a U.S. Senate Hearing into the safety of toys, held on 8 
June 2007, Senator Durbin (Illinois) asked the President of the Toy 
Industry Association: 
 So can you explain to me how a Thomas the Tank train could 
have lead paint on it and be sold in the United States when we 
have known for decades that lead ingested by children is a 
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danger? (Senator Durbin, US Senate Committee of 
Appropriations 2009: 51). 
The advent of so many dangerous toys reinforced public perceptions 
that big companies were putting profits before people. In these cases, 
the at risk group was one of the most vulnerable in society - children - 
albeit the focus was primarily on the victimisation of children in the 
developed world 
These events not only focused attention on the quality and safety of 
toys more widely, but also exposed the vulnerability of the off-shore 
sector of toy companies extended supply chains, in these instances, 
located in China. That is not to say that China was responsible for all 
these toy hazards and as the crisis evolved, subsequent events would 
cast a shadow over certain western toy companies who produced 
millions of defective magnetic toys, for which China was prematurely 
blamed, but not responsible.  
Key concerns arising from the crises were product quality and safety, 
the appropriateness of self-regulation in the toy sector and the capacity 
of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (USCPSC) to protect 
America’s children from unsafe products. The Commission was 
subjected to domestic and global scrutiny and was widely criticised by 
different groups (e.g. media, consumer advocates, and politicians) as 
being under-resourced, under-funded, ineffective and having a poor 
presence at the border. For instance, a critique by the American 
Association for Justice (2009: 3), citing Mantell (2007) notes: 
 The CPSC is woefully under-resourced to cope with the flood of 
products entering the U.S. marketplace. Until 2007, the CPSC had 
only 15 inspectors to monitor all ports in the United States for all 
products, and only one employee to conduct safety tests on toys 
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The agency was also criticised for being too close to the industries they 
regulated, leading to calls for the Acting Chair of the USCPSC to resign 
(see Drawbaugh and Barz, Reuters, U.S. 30/10/2007). This came amidst a 
furore over allegations that senior executives of the agency had taken 
trips paid for by Industry groups (Williamson, The Washington Post, 
2/11/2007).  
The agency’s antiquated testing laboratory also attracted criticism (see 
Lipton, The New York Time, 2/9/2007). In a written statement to a U.S. 
Senate Committee in September 2007, then USCPSC Commissioner, 
Thomas Moore made reference to this: 
 I can’t tell you how troubling the picture of our toy testing 
facility in the New York Times article was to me. We have been 
trying to obtain funds to modernize our lab since before I arrived 
at CPSC in 1995, yet we have never received any significant 
funding for that goal (Moore 2007: 6) 
Which Toxins? 
The toy toxins were four-fold: 
1. unlawful use of lead in the surface paint of wooden and metal 
toys and/or components of toys 
2. lawful use of rare earth magnets that dislodged from certain 
poorly designed toys, causing awful injuries to children when 
two or more were swallowed  
3. lawful use of phthalates (thall-eights) suspected endocrine-
disrupting chemicals (that is they interfere with the body’s 
hormone system) used to soften plastic toys 
4. unlawful use of a toxic industrial chemical in Bindeez™ art and 
craft beads (marketed as Aqua Dots™ in North America), that 
metabolised in children’s bodies as the date-rape drug GHB and 
caused serious harm to children 
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Toxic contaminants like lead migrated from the surface of painted 
wooden and metal toys. In some instances, the threat was two-pronged. 
For instance, PVC toys contain both phthalates (plasticisers) and 
sometimes also lead and cadmium (where these are used to stabilise the 
plastic). Children’s propensity to explore the environment with their 
mouths took care of the rest and saliva acted as a pathway for these 
chemicals and heavy metals to enter children’s bodies. 
Deadly components like rare earth magnets dislodged from poorly 
designed toys and were swallowed by unknown numbers of children, 
who sustained awful injuries including bowel blockages and intestinal 
perforations (see Chapter 5). In one case a twenty month old American 
boy died after ingesting magnets from a sibling’s Magnetix™ building 
set. Aside from upstream emissions in the creation and processing of 
lead and rare earth magnets, and in their migration during 
consumption, both are problematic at disposal. 
This study argues that the narrow focus on toy safety needs to be 
extended to the wider context of sustainable humanitarian and 
environmental practices both at home and abroad by considering: 
 the lifecycle harm(s) associated with what goes into toys (e.g., 
chemicals to make plastic soft);  
 how the processes involved in extracting, and processing of 
some of these hazards  (e.g. chemical extraction of rare earth 
materials used to make magnets)  contribute to biological, social 
and environmental harm 
 life-cycle emissions from the production of specific toy materials 
(e.g. the PVC manufacturing process);  
 the behavior of substances during consumption (e.g., migration 
of phthalates and heavy metals from PVC toys);  
 the effects on children (e.g., potential poisoning, reproductive 
and developmental disorders; intestinal perforations);  
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 the fate of the substances and the toys themselves at disposal  
(e.g., incineration, landfill) and the toxic legacy for current and 
future generations (e.g., emissions to air, water and soil). (See 
Heckenberg 2013: 183). 
Toxic toys pollute children’s bodies, the places where they live, learn 
work and play, and the spaces of nature (air, soil, water) in 
unsustainable ways. As green criminologists, we also need to make the 
links between the production, distribution and disposal of toxic 
products and how these processes contribute to greenhouse gas 
emissions and ultimately global climate change.  
Which Perpetrators? 
The offenders in these case studies are predominantly larger toy 
companies headquartered in the developed world and their supply 
chain partners in China. Those companies directly implicated in the 
lead-related toy recalls included American toy companies RC2 
Corporation for Thomas & Friends™ wooden railway sets, Schylling 
Inc for Thomas™, Curious George™ and Circus™ spinning tops and 
pails and Fisher-Price, a Mattel Inc wholly owned subsidiary, for Dora 
the Explorer™ and other character toys. The two major companies 
involved in the magnet-related recalls were Canadian toy giant Mega 
Bloks (now Mega Brands Canada) and its American arm Rose Art 
Industries (now Mega Brands America) for Magnetix™ construction 
sets and the world’s largest toy company, Mattel Inc, for Polly Pocket™ 
play sets and other toys. Mattel Inc was the only company implicated in 
both lead and magnet-related recalls. 
Which Offence? 
The production and distribution of unsafe toys comes into a category of 
offences identified by Croall (2009: 128) as ‘economic crimes against 
consumers’. They might also be categorised as ‘safety crimes’ (see 
Tombs 2006; Tombs and Whyte 2007). However they are categorised, as 
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Croall (2010: 172) notes, ‘while less high profile than the mass deaths 
associated with work, and not systematically counted, crimes which 
victimise consumers involve a range of commercial activities’. In the 
case of the toy supply chain these commercial activities and their 
victimisation is dispersed across different countries where different 
supply chain activities are carried out. 
Typically, these types of transgressions fall outside conventional 
definitions of crime and are usually ‘policed’ by a more lenient civil and 
administrative justice system. Nevertheless, they do result in 
considerable harm. For instance, in 2011, in the United States alone: 
thirteen children died from toy-related injuries, twelve of them 
under 12 years of age. An estimated 262,300 children of all ages 
were treated for toy-related injuries in U.S. hospital emergency 
departments, 193,200 younger than 15 years of age, 184,100 12 
years of age or younger and  92,200 younger than five years of 
age (Yongling: 2011: 3)  
In the United Kingdom, Croall (2010: 172), cites the U.K. consumer 
association ‚Which?‛ (2004), reporting that ‘seven people each year are 
killed by unrecalled unsafe products.’ Consistent with Croall’s 
observation above, that these types of crimes ‘are not systematically 
counted’, the paucity of global data on lead and magnet related injuries 
and deaths from toys (and jewellery) remained an ongoing and 
important concern throughout this study. We simply do not know with 
any accuracy how many children were affected by toxic toys and what 
we do know is likely to be the tip of the iceberg. 
The tendency is for companies to downplay concerns about the toxicity 
of products, to ‘claim that chemicals are used in tiny amounts and pose 
no health threat’ but the greater concern is ‘the ‘cocktail’ effect of 
combinations of chemicals’ (Croall 2009:134; See also Smith and Lourie 
2009). However, as Croall (2010: 128) again, points out: 
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The long term health of consumers is endangered by the use, in 
foods and other consumer products, of a vast range of chemicals 
and other substances which, while associated with long term 
health risks, do not result in immediate harm 
For these reasons, this study is concerned with the whole chain of 
toxicity from origin to disposal (and beyond) and the consequences for 
bodies, places and nature. 
This Thesis 
This thesis examines the global transference of toxic harms across 
geographical and jurisdictional borders. The primary concern is with 
conceptualising, observing and mapping this mobility within the broad 
theoretical framework of ‘green criminology’, where a central precept is 
conceptualisations of harm that go beyond conventional definitions of 
crime (Hillyard and Tombs 2004; Lynch 2003; White 2008; 2009; 2011). It 
explores different forms of harm, conduits or modes of transference, 
and the repercussions for the internal environment of the body (all 
species), and the external environments of the places of habitation 
(where we live, learn work and play) and nature (soil, water and air) 
(Heckenberg 2010: 38) It is less concerned with how harm is regulated 
in the legal sense and more concerned with the question of what social 
and ideological processes normalise and legitimise harm in a global 
context.  
More specifically, this thesis focuses on the toxic contaminants and 
deadly components that move around the world inside everyday 
products, with a particular emphasis on children’s toys. In their 
trajectory across the world, these contaminated products (and what 
they contain and release en route) leave behind a trail of harm that has 
consequences for people, places and nature in the different 
geographical locations where specific activities (production, 
consumption, distribution and disposal) take place along  the extended 
supply chain.  
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This thesis is divided into ten chapters as follows: 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter One: Introduction and Background provides an overview of 
what this thesis is about, how this study originated and how it evolved 
over time. It answers the question why toys? and signals the centrality 
of the global supply chain as the conduit or mode of transference for 
these harms. It situates the primary case series (toxic toys) in a cluster of 
global toy-related recalls that occurred between 2006 and 2008, peaking 
in 2007 and in the wider political and economic context of US-China 
relations at the time, the two regions in the world where these events 
primarily played out. It answers the questions which toxins?, which 
perpetrators? and which offence? The chapter concludes with an outline 
of thesis chapters. 
Chapter Two: The Study is divided into three sections, each of which 
details a different aspect of the research process. Section 1: 
Methodology: outlines Research Questions, Aims and Objectives, 
Perspective and Approach, Context, and Key Concepts. This section 
also summarises the guiding literature that informs the Theoretical, 
Conceptual and Analytical Frameworks that underpin this study. 
Section 2:  Method: outlines the key challenges and opportunities 
associated with the case study as the primary research method. In 
Section 3: Researcher Reflections I situate myself in the research project 
and reflect on how this has shaped both topic selection and worldview. 
Chapter Three: Transference and Toxic Harms grounds the key 
concept of transference in concrete examples of different forms of harm, 
modes of transference and the biological, social and environmental 
consequence of these trajectories. The chapter begins with an 
introduction to the concept of transference, in the context of the political 
and economic dimensions in which toxic harms are created, defined 
and redefined. The chapter concludes with four pilot cases illustrating 
the movement of toxic harms across geographical and jurisdictional 
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borders, where the primary mode of transference is the global supply 
chain and distribution network. These include 1) diethylene glycol in 
medicines (over time), 2) melamine in infant formula and pet food 3) 
counterfeit pharmaceuticals (circuitous routes) and the reprocessing of 
lead from e-waste into children’s jewellery (the boomerang effect). 
Chapter Four: The World of Toxic Toys sets the scene for the primary 
case series on toxic toys. It begins by defining a toy for the purposes of 
this study; provides a short history of toys, explores the social aspects of 
toys, and the relationship between toys, play and child development. It 
answers the question what is a toy? The discussion then turns to the 
questions of: who makes toys? Who are the key players in the toy 
sector? What is the value of the global toy sector? Where are toys  
made? and reflects on the nature of toys as commodities. The closing 
section is devoted to the question of What is in a toy? one of the most 
compelling questions for this study. 
Chapter Five: Toxic Contaminants and Deadly Components begins 
with a brief overview of the key toxins found in children’s toys 
including patterns of exposure and the consequences of those hazards 
for humans. More specifically it examines two of the most prolific toy 
hazards (rare earth magnets and lead) that migrated out of certain 
children’s toys and were the subject of global recalls between 2006 and 
2008. Each hazard (the trouble with magnets; the trouble with lead) is 
examined through the lens of transference where the key questions are: 
where is this (contaminant, component) coming from? where is it going 
to? and what are the consequences for human (e.g. children) and 
ecological health. The closing section presents a quantitative snapshot 
of lead-related deaths, incidents and, injuries in the United States and 
magnet-related deaths, incidents and injuries in the United States and 
Australia. This is followed by case reports (medical accounts of victim 
suffering) and case vignettes (accounts of victim suffering) of children 
injured by lead and magnets in their toys. 
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Chapter Six: The ‘Global’ Supply Chain explores the dynamics and 
dimensions of the global supply chain and distribution network. It 
begins with a discussion of the ‘global’ supply chain and the risks 
inherent in extended supply chains that span geographical and 
jurisdictional borders. The discussion then narrows to a focus on the toy 
supply chain, with a particular emphasis on the China supply chain 
where these particular toys were made. This chapter challenges the 
notion of the ‘global’ in the supply chain, instead arguing for a more 
focused approach on the ‘local’, one that recognises the specificity of 
harm in view of the fact that the impact of supply chain activities is 
dispersed across different countries. Thus the health and ecological 
impacts are experienced by different people in different localities. 
Chapter Seven: Case Study 1 - The Trouble with Lead – RC2 and 
Thomas™ wooden railway sets describes the key players and events 
leading up to and following the recall of millions of lead contaminated 
Thomas & Friends™ toys by American company, RC2 Corporation and 
distributor, Learning Curve. This case study spans the period from 
March 2007 (when lead was first discovered on a Thomas™ wooden 
railway toy) to December 2009 (when RC2 incurred a civil penalty from 
the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission. Key questions guiding 
this narrative are what happened?, how did it happen?, who knew and 
when? and what did they do with that knowledge? 
Chapter Eight: Case Study 2- The Trouble with Magnets, Rose 
Art/Mega Brands and Magnetix™ construction sets describes the key 
players and events leading up to and following the recall of millions of 
poorly designed magnetic toys by Canadian toy giant Mega Brands 
(formerly Mega Bloks) and its American Arm Mega Brands America 
(formerly Rose Art Industries). This case overlaps with that of Mattel 
Inc and Polly Pocket™ and as such, both companies are referred to in 
the context of the narrative. Key questions guiding this narrative are 
what happened?, how did it happen?, who knew and when? and what 
did they do with that knowledge? 
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Chapter Nine: Recalling Toxic Toys uses the concept of corporate 
social responsibility as a catalyst for examining how different sized toy 
companies responded to some of the more high-profile recalls involving 
lead, magnets and a dangerous chemical in Bindeez™ beads. It 
examines the nature of the recall process and identifies windows of 
harm in that process, specifically a series of time lags that contributed to 
children being exposed to toxic toys for longer than necessary. It raises 
questions about the power of large organizations, in particular, to 
influence the recall process, in turn affecting the timely disclosure of 
those hazards to the public. This chapter links the product recall 
process directly to notions of corporate social responsibility (and 
irresponsibility) and by association corporate environmental citizenship 
(a key aspect of CSR). This also brings into the discussion the negative 
ecological consequences flowing from the disposal of contaminated raw 
materials (e.g. lead paint in China) and contaminated finished toys (e.g. 
countries of import) in the locations where these activities took place. 
Chapter Ten: Denying and Mitigating Toxic Harms draws upon Sykes 
and Matza (1957) techniques of neutralisation and similar strategies 
from other disciplines (e.g. Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
(SCCT; image restoration strategies (Benoit 1995); and strategies of 
conflict resolution), to explore and analyse the strategies used by toy 
companies (in the west) and their supply chain partners (in China) to 
rationalise their actions and ‘neutralise’ the harms they caused. A 
related concern here was to try and understanding how differing 
business cultures (e.g. Guanxi versus Western) may have contributed to 
the production and distribution of unsafe products. 
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Chapter 4: The World of Toxic Toys 
Introduction 
This chapter sets the scene for the primary case series on toxic toys. It 
begins by defining a toy for the purposes of this study; provides a short 
history of toys, explores the social aspects of toys, and the relationship 
between toys, play and child development. It answers the question 
what is a toy? The discussion then turns to the questions of: who makes 
toys, an overview of the key players and value of the global toy sector, 
where toys are made and the nature of toys as commodities. The closing 
section is devoted to the question of what is in a toy, including the 
materials toys are made of, and the contaminants and components 
contained in and released by recalled toys. 
What is a Toy? 
For the purposes of this study a toy is an object used in play by adults, 
adolescents, children or pets. The focus is on toys for children under 15 
years of age (the age cut-off used by the United States Consumer 
Product Safety Commission for statistics on toy-related injuries and 
deaths). Varying legislative age cut-offs protect children of different 
ages (e.g. under 3, up to six, under 14), from different hazards (e.g. 
heavy metals, magnets, phthalates,) according to product type (e.g. 
toys, jewellery). Table 4.1 shows examples of this in the Australian 
context. 
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Table 4.1: Australian Age Ceilings by Product and Hazard Type 
Product Hazard Age Harm Standard/ 
Effective 
Date 
 
Toys and 
finger 
paints 
Accessible 
lead and other 
elements 
Up to 6 
years 
 
permanent 
damage to 
physical 
and mental 
health 
Mandatory 
Effective 
1/1/2010 
 
 
Toys 
containing 
magnets  
 
Magnets1  
 
Under 14 
years 
Intestinal 
injuries and 
death 
Mandatory 
Effective 
1/7/2010 
 
No holes 
tongue 
studs 
Magnets Age not 
specified 
Inhalation 
to 
lungs/airwa
ys 
Permanent 
Effective 
1/7/2010 
 
Plastic toys, 
childcare 
articles, 
eating 
vessels/ 
utensils 
phthalate 
DEHP at 
concentration 
about 0.1% 2  
Up to and 
including 
36 mths 
Reproducti
ve toxicity 
(if chewed 
or sucked 
excessively) 
Permanent 
Effective 
1/2/2011 
Source: Mandatory Standards; Permanent Bans; 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC 
2010a;2010b;2010c;2011) 
Note 1: Excludes children’s jewellery 
Note 2: Covers only 1 phthalate, other countries cover up to 6 
 
In Australia mandatory standards protect children up to six years old 
against accessible lead and other elements in children’s toys and finger 
paints; protect children under 14 years from magnets in toys (but not 
jewellery) and protect children under 36 months from concentrations of 
more than 0.1% of the phthalate DEHP in plastic toys. In countries like 
Europe and the United States children are now protected against six 
phthalates) in childcare articles and eating utensils/vessels. 
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Although beyond the scope of this study, sex and pet toys made of PVC 
are also a concern for the same reasons as children’s toys. Sex toys are 
used in close proximity to the skin, inserted into body orifices and come 
into contact with bodily fluids that potentially facilitate the migration of 
toxic chemicals from the surface of the plastic, as well as lead and 
cadmium where these are used as stabilisers (See Nilsson, Malgren-
Hansen, Bernth, Pedersen and Pommer 2006; Biesanz 2007). Pets, like 
children, bite, chew, suck and drool over their toys, often sleep with 
them and are likely to play with toys far more aggressively than 
children for a greater part of their lives. A study of pet products by 
American advocacy group, HealthyStuff.org (Undated at 
http://www.healthystuff.org/findings.091609.stuff.php) found that ‘45% 
of pet products tested had detectable levels of one or more hazardous 
chemicals, including: one quarter of all pet products with detectable 
levels of lead; 7% of all pet products with lead levels greater than 300 
ppm (the CPSC lead standard for children’s products at the time) and 
nearly half of pet collars had detectable levels of lead with 27% 
exceeding 300 ppm’ 
Types of Toys 
The way in which toys are categorised defines them in particular ways 
and has wider implications for who they are marketed to, where they 
are sold and who buys them. Toys can be categorised as ‘mechanical, 
electrical and soft *or plush+’ (Kumar and Pastore 2007:818), or as Jaffe 
(2006:3) observes, ‘there are five generic types of toys that were popular 
centuries ago and are still in vogue today – the ball, the spinner, the 
rattle, the doll and the wheeled pull-along’. Broadly speaking, though, 
toys are categorised into new and used (or second hand). 
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New Toys 
Branding and licensing are two important factors in the global toy 
sector. In 2011, the average retail price for a licensed toy was 57% 
higher than for non-licensed toys (Dickson 2012). Best-selling licensed 
properties in 2011, based on dollar sales were Cars: The Movie, Disney 
Princess, Star Wars, Thomas and Friends and Toy Story (listed 
alphabetically) (Dickson 2012). New toys are typically categorised as 
branded (the big toy companies), own-brand (mega retailers like 
Walmart, and no brand (discount stores such as Dollar General), each of 
which carry specific consumer expectations regarding price, quality and 
safety. As a general rule of thumb the higher the price, the greater the 
consumer’s expectation of quality and safety.  
Brand recognition begins early with Achenreiner and John (2003) 
suggesting this may be as young as three or four years old, whilst 
others point to brand recognition at a much younger age. For instance, 
Hamilton (2008:1) maintains that ‘at six months a baby is able to retain 
brand logos’. This high visibility of branding functions to render less 
visible: which entertainment conglomerate? (e.g. Nickelodeon, Disney, 
HIT Entertainment), which manufacturer? (e.g. Mattel Inc, Fisher-Price, 
RC2 Corporation, Hasbro), or which country of manufacture? (e.g. 
China, India).  
For marketing and sales purposes new toys are typically categorised by 
gender, type and age (not necessarily in this order). There are toys for 
girls (Barbie® and Bratz®) and boys (GI Joe® and Power Wheels®). 
There are age-specific toys (e.g., under 3, above 6), toys for groups of 
children within age-bands (e.g., 0-12 months,1-24 months, 2-4, 5-7, 8-11, 
12+ years) or toys specifically targeted to life-stages (e.g. babies, infants, 
pre-schoolers, tweens, teens). Some toys are marketed to specific 
consumer groups (e.g., executive toys, collector’s toys, antique toys). 
Others, like folk toys (dolls, puppets, masks and kites) reflect the dress 
and culture of ethnic groups. Some commemorate heroic individuals 
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and events (e.g. 9/11 firefighters) weapons of war (e.g., guns) or 
strategies of war (e.g. armies of toy soldiers).  
Industry analysts, on the other hand, categorise toys in economic terms, 
by ‘super categories’ (the money spinners), as reflected in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2: Value of Toy Super Categories in the United States 
Super Category July05 –June 
06 
(USD) 
July 06 – June 07 
USD 
% 
Change 
Action figures/accessories 
 
1.3 billion 1.2 billion -7 
Arts & Crafts 2.5 billion 2.7 billion 8 
Building Sets 686.8 million 684.3 million 0 
Dolls 2.7 billion 2.7 billion 1 
Games & Puzzles 2.4 billion 2.4 billion 0 
Infant/Preschool 3.2 billion 3.3 billion 4 
Youth Electronics 962.1 million 1.1 billion 17 
Outdoor & Sports Toys 2.9 billion 2.8 billion -5 
Plush 1.3 billion 1.4 billion 3 
Vehicles 2.0 billion 2.2 billion 9 
All other toys 2.1 billion 2.0 billion -4 
TOTAL 22.1 billion 22.5 billion 2 
http://www.toyassociation.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Industry_Statistics 
2007 sourced from The NPD Group/Consumer Panel Tracking, cited in Woo 
(2008: 11). 
 
Toys can also be categorised by the materials they are made of. One of 
the most significant changes in toy materials has been from rubber to 
plastic. Freinkel (2011: 56) explains how this coincided with other 
events so that ‘the modern toy industry is in many ways the product of 
major developments in the post-World War II era - the baby boom and 
the polymer boom -the convergence of these two broad trends sealed 
the marriage of plastic and play’. As a result, today, approximately 50% 
of toys are made from plastic, a by-product of the petro chemical 
industry (See Smith and Lourie 2009). The benefits for the toy industry 
were two-fold: ‘These ‘cheap, lightweight, flexible materials vastly 
expanded play possibilities while raising profit margins’(Freinkel 2011: 
56). Even if industry did commit to phasing out phthalates (e.g. DEHP, 
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DBP, DNOP) immediately, there would still be a legacy of millions of 
plastic toys, given the longevity of materials like PVC. 
Toys can also be categorised by the absence of chemicals or the 
presence of recycled materials. So-called ‘green’ toys are labelled as 
‘environmentally friendly’ or ‘eco-friendly’ and made of materials like 
natural wood (unpainted) or organic cotton. Some hard plastic toys and 
infant products are now labelled ‘BPA-free’ or ‘phthalate-free’ and 
some jewellery is labelled ‚lead-free’. Although this provides some 
measure of reassurance to consumers, this may not guarantee that the 
product does not contain an alternative chemical or another heavy 
metal (e.g. cadmium substituted for lead in jewellery). 
Used Toys 
Jack Schylling, one of three brothers who run American company 
Schylling Inc (2013), says on the company’s website 
(http://www.schylling.com/k/about-us) that ‘the best toy is the toy that 
is passed along to a younger sister or brother and maybe even the next 
generation’. This traditional practice of hand-me-downs, of giving used 
toys away to charity or selling toys when children have outgrown them, 
means that a proportion of contaminated toys are likely to remain in 
circulation.  
Even the product recall process fails in this regard. For instance, 
unreturned recalled toys, continued to circulate in informal markets like 
charity shops, second-hand stores, garage sales, swap meets, street 
markets, car boot sales and so forth. During the global recalls, some 
recalled toys turned up on internet auction sites, despite the fact that 
those sites had rules governing the sale of recalled toys. In Australia, for 
example second hand/pre-loved toys are regularly sold through sites 
like Gumtree.com and kidspot.com.au. Toys sold through second hand 
and charity outlets are also potentially sites for recalled toys. 
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The 2007 product recalls changed the shape of the used toy market. 
During the height of the crisis some charities stopped taking used toy 
donations because they simply did not have the resources to determine 
a toy’s status (toxic or non-toxic). Even today, many charities will only 
accept new toys. A recurring criticism at the time was the accusation 
that a loophole in the United States law allowed contaminated toys to 
be dumped on developing markets, but America’s 2008 Consumer 
Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) legislation closed this 
anomaly. Although, in  mid January 2009, India announced a six-month 
ban on all imports of Chinese-made toys’ because of concerns about 
chemicals, more specifically phthalates.  
Conceivably some contaminated toys will remain in home and 
community toy boxes, due to unawareness of particular recalls or some 
consumers decisions to retain them. Other toys likely ended up in the 
household trash and have found their way to the local tip, contributing 
to burgeoning landfills. Inside those discarded toys (whether dumped 
by householders or en masse by companies) are lead, cadmium, 
phthalates, the date-rape drug GHB and tiny powerful magnets, all of 
which are problematic at disposal (and beyond). Over time these 
contaminants can leach into soil and water and ultimately contribute to 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.  
In response to numerous requests about the disposal of lead-
contaminated items (including toys) the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency posted an online guideline for households and 
retailers/manufacturers regarding disposal. Householders can dispose 
of individual items to trash. However, retailers/manufacturers 
disposing en mass are required to assess whether the waste is 
hazardous according to specific testing guidelines.  
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 For instance, ‘if lead in the leaching solution is present at a 
concentration greater than or equal to 5 mg/l (or parts-per-million - 
ppm), the waste would be considered to be hazardous, and would be 
required to be managed as a hazardous waste’ (US EPA Questions 
About the Disposal of Lead-Contaminated Items’, Available at: 
(http://www.epa.gov/osw/hazard/tsd/lead/faq.htm).  
Toy packaging can also be toxic (including the thin plastic bags with 
suffocation warnings still used by some companies). In 2007, a UK 
environmental group urged the public to ‘stop and think before buying 
toys with excessive packaging, estimating that approximately 800,000 of 
household waste this Christmas [2007] destined for landfill would come 
from packaging alone’ (Jacobs, Toy News, 6/12/2007 at 
http://www.toynews-online.biz/news/read/800-000-tonnes-of-toy-
packaging-destined-for-landfill/039004). As they noted, ‘that is just the 
packaging, without the toys!  
At the time, Science Professor Ian Swingland pointed out that 
approximately 40 percent of those toys would be broken or lost within 
three months of Christmas, also highlighting the ecological impact of 
disposal: 
 Because of the difficulty of recycling heavy plastics, most of these 
will head for the tip. Few toys biologically degrade and even 
batteries are not recycled, despite the poisons they contain 
contaminating the ground water we use (Swingland quoted in 
Jacobs, Toy News, 6/12/ 2007). 
Children’s Jewellery  
Children’s jewellery stands out as falling through the regulatory cracks 
in some countries, because of definitional issues around what is a toy? 
This is despite the fact that children’s toys and jewellery are routinely 
marketed and sold in close proximity to one another. A Google search 
reveals that across internet sites children’s jewellery is variously 
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described as ‘kids jewellery’, ‘costume jewellery’, fashion jewellery’ and 
‘toy jewellery’ and includes items such as rings, bracelets, jewellery 
sets, toy bead sets and earrings. In 2004, Health Canada used the term 
‘metal toy jewellery’ in a product warning notice about the dangers of 
lead-contaminated rings, necklaces and bracelets dispensed from 
vending machines (Health Canada RA-110000145, 9/7/2004 ).  
Some companies go to absurd lengths to link toys and jewellery in the 
labelling and marketing of their merchandise. Examples include 
‘Schylling Toys Horse Jewelry Box’, ‘Dora the Explorer™ and Boots 
necklace jewelry’, Barbie™ Make It Sparkle Jewellery Box and so forth. 
Others blur the boundaries between childhood and adulthood, for 
example the new ‘kidult’ trend, effectively transforming a child’s toy 
into a jewellery item for adults. LEGO’s new range of ‘kidult’ play-
themed jewellery’ (The West Australian 2010) is an example of this 
trend. The sterling silver rings (See Figure 4.1), marketed to adults and 
priced at STG50 (A$90) come with two interchangeable Lego bricks 
available in 15 different colours. 
Figure 4.1: The New ‘Kidult’ Jewellery 
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Although marketed and priced to adults, this toy/jewellery range is 
likely to also be attractive to children, especially girls. In launching the 
range, a spokeswoman from Selfridges Department store 
acknowledged the intergenerational appeal of the product 
‚In our research we found that Lego is one of the most tactile 
objects for people of all ages<‛ (The West Australian , 2010).  
Forthcoming ‘Kidult’ products include Play-Doh™ perfume and 
Lego™ nail varnish indicating that this trend is set to continue. It is 
unclear whether this is just a clever marketing ploy or an audacious 
attempt to circumvent new regulations around what constitutes 
children’s jewellery. In any event, there needs to be a much clearer 
definition of what is and is not a toy, one that takes into account 
potential marketing and advertising strategies that muddy the 
definitional waters. For instance, in the case of jewellery, a distinction 
can be made between jewellery for a child (i.e. intended for the 
adornment of a child) and ‘toy jewellery’ (i.e. intended for the 
adornment of a toy, such as a doll).  
Magnetic Jewellery 
Children in countries like Europe, Australia and some states of America 
are now much better protected against lead (and more recently 
cadmium) in children’s jewellery, but remain unprotected against 
magnets in jewellery. New industry standards introduced in the United 
States in 2008 (also in Australia) now require warning labels on all toys 
containing rare earth magnets. But the effectiveness of such warning 
labels has been questioned in the Australian context. 
 Currently the ACCC is relying on warning labels to inform 
parents at point of purchase and act accordingly to protect 
children. Warnings of this nature have potentially little impact 
because once the toy is removed from the packaging the warning 
is no longer apparent. Whilst parents may read a warning 
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message at point of purchase, there is little to suggest that this 
will translate into preventable behaviour once the product is in 
the home’ (Swaminathan et al 2010: 6-7). 
However, generally speaking these same standards do not extend to 
children’s jewellery, despite evidence that the flux of magnetic 
jewellery can be even greater than that in toys. Flux (that is the strength 
of the magnetic field) matters when it comes to rare earth magnets, 
because these are the most powerful magnets in the world today.  
In 2007 the Chicago Tribune (Possley 2007a) reported that magnetic 
earrings sold by Schylling Inc. had ‘a flux index of more than 100’ 
(twice that of the 50 threshold for toys), ‘were recommended for ages 5+ 
and carried a choking warning for children under age 3, but no other 
warnings’. When told of the finding, Dr Gary Gardner, Chair of the 
American Academy of Paediatrics committee on injury, violence and 
poison prevention said: 
‚I don't care whether they call it a toy or not, these are still a risk. 
Any magnet that can be aspirated or swallowed is dangerous‛ 
(quoted in Possley 2007a). 
Once a child ingests two or more magnets (or one magnet and another 
metallic object) the magnetic force (or flux) they exert perforates the 
tissue caught between them. In the case of ingested magnets, that tissue 
is most often (but not always) a child’s intestines. If the magnets are not 
removed quickly they puncture holes in the intestines, causing serious 
infection and sometimes death (See Chapter 7, the trouble with 
magnets). 
The point to note here is that these magnets are less a choking hazard 
than they are an intestinal perforation hazard, a message that may 
finally be getting across to consumers in the face of the highly 
publicized risks from loosely attached magnets in ‘desk toys’ like 
Buckyballs® and Neocubes™. Children from toddlers to teens are 
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swallowing these magnets, albeit for different reasons. ‘In late 2011, an 
18 month old Australian child from Queensland died after ingesting 12 
small, round powerful magnets from a novelty product’ (New South 
Wales Fair Trading Media Release 2012: 1). On 23 August 2012, State 
and Territory government Ministers in Australia acted to place an 
interim (60 day) ban on loosely attached magnets sold as either desk 
toys or jewellery.  In a media release announcing this decision in 
Tasmania, then Minister for Consumer Protection, Nick McKim said: 
Relevant Ministers from each state and territory have agreed to 
impose an interim ban on these products effective immediately, 
to ensure that the public is protected from the risk that these 
magnets pose. The Australian Government is expected to impose 
a permanent ban on the products following a period of 
consultation (McKim 2012: 1) 
A Short History of Toys 
Our relationship with toys dates back thousands of years and is 
traditionally associated with pleasure and play. ‘In 1000 BC kites first 
appeared in China and stone yo-yos were used in Greece. In 2000 BC 
the Egyptians began to play a game similar to modern-day checkers 
and made dolls from string, fabric and paper, and the first iron skates 
were used in Scandinavia (Skalel, Dr Toy’s Timeline at 
http://www.drtoy.com/toy-history/).  
Then ‘in 3000 BC a game resembling backgammon was played in 
Ancient Samira and stone marbles were first used in Egypt, with glass 
marbles being popularized in the United States in the 1800s (Skalel, Dr 
Toy’s Timeline at http://www.drtoy.com/toy-history/). The first mass-
produced toys are said to have appeared in 1840 when an American 
doll maker was granted a patent (Skalel, Dr Toy’s Timeline at. 
http://www.drtoy.com/toy-history/ 
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‘The twentieth century saw the introduction of classic toys like Lionel 
trains, Lincoln Logs, LEGO building sets, Matchbox Cars, Etch-A-
Sketch, Easy Bake Ovens, Nerf Balls, Cabbage Patch Kids, Pokemon and 
Star Wars Episode 1 figures (See Skalel, Dr Toy’s Timeline at 
http://www.drtoy.com/toy-history/). In 1959, ‘the first Barbie® doll was 
introduced at the New York Toy Fair, accompanied by a massive 
advertising campaign which referred to her as ‚a shapely teen-age 
fashion model‛ (do Rego Barros 1999:3-4).  
As noted above a series of epochal events have changed the nature and 
scale of toy making including the advent of mass production, the 
discovery of plastic and the post World War II baby boom. But it is the 
advent of television, alliances between toy and entertainment 
industries, the digital age and the internet that have shaped the scale 
and reach of toy marketing. Over time strong commercial links have 
been forged between the toy and entertainment industries. The advent 
of television has paved the way for ‘new markets and pioneering 
aggressive marketing techniques’ (do Rego Barros 1999:3) and for what 
Beder, Varney and Gosden (2009) refer to as ‘the corporate capture of 
childhood’.  
For instance, ‘in 1952 Hasbro’s Mr Potato Head revolutionized the toy 
industry by becoming the first toy to be advertised on television, with 
first year sales reaching US$4 million’ (Auerbach, Dr Toy’s Timeline at 
http://www.drtoy.com/toy-history/). In 1955, Mattel Inc sponsored The 
Mickey Mouse Club, the first time in industry history that a toy 
company had sponsored a TV series’ (Auerbach, Dr Toy’s Timeline at 
http://www.drtoy.com/toy-history/) ‘In 1965, GI Joe was released, based 
on a new television show called ‚The Lieutenant‛, with the doll 
proving much more popular than the TV series, much to the surprise of 
many toy manufacturers (Auerbach, Dr Toy’s Timeline at 
http://www.drtoy.com/toy-history/).  
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By the 1960’s ‘western social trends began to dictate doll styles and 
clothing (e.g. the emancipation of women into the workforce for a 
career). Then by the early 1970’s the focus shifted to designing an 
experience beyond the product’ (Falcāo do Rego Barros 1998: 9) says is 
akin to the ‘lifestyle’ concept we see today. 
In the 1960s girls played with a fashion shop, a school and a little 
theatre. Twenty later these have been related with a fitness 
centre, and office and a rock stage (Falcāo do Rego Barros 
1998:9). 
During the 1970s targeted areas for products were loosely identified as 
‘make and play, mechanical toys, pre-school Barbie®, see and play and 
others’ (Falcāo do Rego Barros 1998:7). Television, the digital age and 
the internet have all changed the way in which toys are marketed, how 
children interact with them and the very nature of play. Toys like 
‘Barbie Coca Cola’ are themselves consumers of products (known as 
product placements) and ‘promote lifestyle choices heavily influenced 
by western ideas of affluence and consumer ideology. Mattel, for 
instance boasts that Barbie is not simply a toy, she’s a lifestyle’ (Brooks 
2008: 110).  
Social Aspects of Toys 
Toys have a social dimension too, functioning as objects of desire, 
pleasure, play, education, reward, comfort and nostalgia, throughout 
life. Brooks (2008:109) describes the giving of toys as ‘an important 
social ritual, enshrined in holidays, anniversaries and festivities<’. 
Toys are given to celebrate and commemorate important life events like 
marriage, graduation, birthdays, baptism and naming ceremonies. They 
are exchanged on festive occasions like Christmas, New Year and 
Thanksgiving and in countries that celebrate Halloween, toys like 
masks, fake teeth and face paints (some of which were contaminated 
with lead and cadmium) are popular items. 
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Toys also serve as comforters for babies in neo-natal units (despite 
concerns about bacteria), for children (and adults) recovering from 
cancer and for dementia sufferers. Toys provide comfort for young 
children, relieving the discomfort of teething and providing solace 
during periods of illness and emotional distress. For instance, in 2005 
UNICEF distributed toys to relief centres following the Indian tsunami 
and to southern Kyrgyzstan to help children deal with the stress 
associated with civil unrest in the region. (UNICEF 2005 at 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/index_25263.html) 
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina toy companies like Hasbro, 
Mattel, Toys ‚R‛ Us and others donated thousands of toys to affected 
children. In June 2008, toys were used as a form of social protest when 
school children in Costa Rica exchanged toy weapons such as guns for 
sporting equipment and notebooks to mark the global week of action 
against gun violence (UNICEF 2008).  
Sometimes toys are used as ‘rewards’. For instance, in July 2010, the 
United States Consumer Product Safety Commission (USCPSC) recalled 
approximately 66,000 charm bracelets and 2,200 rings containing high 
levels of cadmium that had been distributed free to children for 
attending the dentist or doctor (See USCPSC Release 2010a). Every year, 
around the world, toys are donated to charities for distribution to 
underprivileged children or placed under special Christmas giving 
trees for the needy.  
Toys and Play 
The idea of ‘play’ is said to have begun in India in 6000 BC with the 
game called ‚Chaturanga‛, an ancestor of chess, or a Babylonian board 
game in 4000 BC (Dr Toy’s Timeline at http://www.drtoy.com/toy-
history/). Children can be great improvisers when it comes to play. For 
instance, ‘in the late nineteenth century a poor child in London’s east 
end wrapped an old shoe in a cloth and chalked a face on its heel – such 
is the need to play’ (Jaffe 2006:3). The right to play is also enshrined in 
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Article 31 (1990:9) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (Play England 2009: 3). Even in the absence of mass produced 
toys, children still find ways to play. For instance, ‘in the late nineteenth 
century a poor child in London’s east end wrapped an old shoe in a 
cloth and chalked a face on its heel – such is the need to play’ (Jaffe 
2006:3). Children in the 1950’s painted faces on wooden pegs and glued 
fabric to the peg’s body to emulate clothing. Painted peg dolls can still 
be found today in tourist outlets, often depicting historical characters 
Children also improvise using objects like pots, pans and metal spoons 
or climbing in and out of cardboard boxes.  
In poorer countries (like Malawi in Africa), children make toys from 
waste such as discarded milk cartons, cigarette containers, cornhusks 
and whatever trash they can find lying around (Fehrenbacher 2008). In 
war torn parts of the world, such as Iraq, the association between toys 
and play takes on a more sinister connotation, as children collect 
discarded depleted uranium shells to use as toys (South Movement 
2006 cited in White 2008:42). In Afghanistan, naturally curious young 
children pick up Soviet-made butterfly mines that ‘although not 
designed to look like toys <can still hold a deadly attraction <’ 
(Machel 1996:27) 
For the worldwide toy industry, the ‘vital importance of toys’ (ICTI 
Care Foundation 2006) is captured in the following declaration, 
proposed by the Spanish Toy Association and endorsed in 2006 by the 
International Council of Toy Industries (ICTI), the global industry body 
for toy manufacturers: 
1. Children have played with toys throughout history and in all 
cultures. Toys promote children’s well-being. 
2. Toys have a central role in children’s play with one another and 
help them develop socially. 
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3. Toys support the right to play in childhood which is essential to 
healthy child development. 
4. Restriction of the right to play and the time to play has serious 
consequences on children’s development and their later 
behaviour as adults. 
5. Toys are vital tools that help foster the mental, physical, 
emotional and social development of boys and girls. 
6. Toys support the right to education through encouraging play 
and learning. 
7. Toys are basic instruments for development of children’s 
fantasy, imagination and creativity. 
8. Toys are available for all stages and ages of child development. 
They enrich family life by fostering fun, amusement and 
communication between all family members, regardless of age. 
9. A safe secure environment is essential for play. Toys must be 
safe and of high quality to avoid foreseeable hazards. 
10. Providing they comply with all the conditions necessary to 
ensure children’s safety, toys are an integral part of their 
development (ICTI Care Foundation 2006at http://www.icti-
care.org/resources/importanceoftoys.htm)  
The British Toy and Hobby Association (BTHA 2009) identify different 
types of play, each with its own characteristics and benefits (See Table 
4.3) 
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Table 4.3: Types of Play 
Type of Play Description 
Exploratory play Becoming aware of the world – sounds, sights, wanting to 
touch and taste 
Constructive play Discovering how things work, taking them apart, putting 
them together again and learning about size, weight, 
colour, shape and materials and texture 
Energetic play Practicing new physical skills so that the growing child 
becomes better at running, climbing and other required 
activities 
Modelling play Learning from watching others and copying them 
Pretend play Playing in a world of fantasy and imagination usually 
without any interference from parents or other adults 
Social play Learning to play with others where those you play with 
are more important than the game itself 
Skilful play Playing that requires care and practice 
Source: Tabulated from British Toy & Hobby Association (BTHA 2009). 
<http://www.btha.co.uk/education/template.php?id=161> 
 
As the nature of play has changed, Varney (1999: 22) notes that 
‘traditionally toys were peripheral to play, that is in most cultures and 
eras toys fitted into play rather than play being determined by the 
plaything as is the case with so many of today’s toys. Changing 
patterns of play are also reflected in the emergence of a consumer 
group referred to as KGOY (Kids Getting Older Younger). Whereas ‘for 
many years toys were targeted at children aged 14 and under, now the 
upper band has moved down to age 12 and threatens to drop by as 
much as two years, thanks to media and other forces that cause children 
to aspire to adolescent interests at younger ages’ (Gogan et al Undated, 
7). 
Toys and Child Development 
What is clear from the above ideals is that the design of toys is 
intertwined with child development. This association between toys and 
child development appears to have entered the equation as early as 
1914 when Charles Pajeau developed Tinker Toys, which were marketed 
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with a view to improving balance and co-ordination while developing 
gross motor skills (Auerbach, Undated). Brooks (2008: 109) notes that 
‘since ancient times adults have developed a variety of toys for children 
to play with from yo-yos and dolls to dice, to stimulate their 
imagination, teach them physical dexterity, sharing and co-operation, 
enhance their cognitive abilities and keep them out from under busy 
grown-up feet’. Through play children are said to learn to problem-
solve, communicate, use imagination and be creative and physical play 
is said to assist in developing agility, balance, co-ordination and fine 
motor skills. Toys then, ‘play a key role in the social, physical and 
intellectual development of children’ (The Children’s Hospital at 
Westmead, Safety Fact Sheet, 2008: 1). 
But the toys in this study were the antithesis of these ideals. These toys 
contained chemicals and heavy metals that were harmful to health and 
wellbeing, particularly at certain stages and ages of development when 
children are especially vulnerable to environmental toxins. The parents 
of a child at a play centre in the United States believed their child was 
playing in a safe secure environment when magnets fell out of a poorly 
designed toy onto the play centre floor and their son swallowed them, 
suffering serious intestinal perforations. This toy did not comply with safe 
design standards and what made the situation even worse (and would 
later come to light) is that by the time he swallowed those magnets, the 
company in question (Rose Art/Mega Brands) had already received 
hundreds of reports about magnets dislodging from these toys (See 
Chapters 5 and 8). 
Toys are Commodities 
Some scholars, like Varney (1999) argue that ‘the participation that was 
once a frequent ingredient in play has been replaced by a very different 
sort of participation, which revolves around toys as commodities’ 
 a typical well-promoted toy may have a movie made about it, a 
television series, a fast-food tie-in, a breakfast cereal linked to it 
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and a plethora of merchandise such as sneakers, lunch boxes and 
bed sheets featuring the toy on their design’(Varney 1999: 1). 
In part, this transition has been facilitated through marketing and 
advertising. Popular marketing ploys that reinforce the perception of 
toys as commodities include promotional toys given away as free gifts 
with other products (e.g. clothing, footwear) and toys given away with 
fast food meals (e.g. McDonalds Happy meal toys), often as part of a 
collectible ‘series’ that has children returning again and again to collect 
the whole set. A second strategy is planned obsolescence, which can be 
achieved by ‘instilling in the buyer the desire to own something a little 
newer, a little better, a little sooner than is necessary’ (Stevens cited in 
Adamson 2003: 129). Another strategy is to actually engineer a toy’s 
demise (Beanie Babies are an example of this) where the idea of scarcity 
(e.g. retirement) increases demand. Inevitably the outcome is waste. 
The toy industry has close links with the entertainment and film 
industry. Varney (1999: 21) describes the toy industry as ‘an arm of a 
broader entertainment and commodity industry which organizes its 
promotions to children, reinforcing the wares on offer through cross-
promotion and multi-layered promotion’, citing as an example: 
 The closest promotional toys come to encouraging participation or 
being part of a community is to urge potential consumers to be 
part of a community that eats at McDonald’s, shops at Toys ‚R‛ 
Us and wears Reebok shoes. (Barbie®, for instance, wears 
Reebok shoes and promotes these companies among many 
more) (Varney 1999:30) 
It was once thought that a child needed companions in order to be able 
to play meaningfully, now it seem a child needs toys as ‚friends‛. A 
Google search reveals many examples of this including - Barbie Dolls & 
Friends, Will you be Barbie’s friend? Thomas and Friends, Funky 
Friends Cozy Friends Play Gym, Friendship Toys Online at Target, 
Hasbro toys Fur Real Friends Butterscotch Pony, Floppy Friends Horse 
104 
toys to name a few. The ‘friends’ concept also extends to children’s 
jewellery, including cumbersome labels like ‘Alex Toys best friend 
bracelet set’. 
An article entitled ‘Virtual toys online friends – the latest trend’ 
describes how ‘many of the toys being introduced at the American 
International Toy Fair in New York don’t require batteries, but come 
with a web site where participants can play with virtual images of the 
same toy’ (The Washington Times 2008). Some scholars directly challenge 
the toy industry’s claim that children, rather than profit, are their first 
priority. 
Far from having the best interests of children at heart, their 
primary interest lies in market share and profit making, in an age 
of techno-capitalism, where the urge to buy more is not only 
imprinted in the psyches of children and adults but is a 
fundamental aspect of the toys themselves (Brooks 2008: 110). 
Michelle Archer, a reporter for USA Today says  ‘if there are two 
characteristics that stand out as dominating criticism of the toy industry 
they would have to be what Clark (2007: 211) describes as ‘grabbing 
them young’ and ‘Santa’s Sweatshop’ (Clark 2007: 252). Archer, notes 
that ‘Grabbing them young reveals the sometimes nefarious marketing 
methods aimed squarely at kids as young as six months and Santa’s 
Sweat shop is a quick but chilling ride through China, where about 
8,000 toy factories and three million workers produce the bulk of U.S. 
toys’ (Archer, USA Today, 28/1/2007). The counter claims are that toys 
are invaluable developmental and educational tools. 
Brooks (2008:109) notes that ‘somewhere along the production line, the 
relationship between adults, children and toys has irrevocably 
changed< toys no longer signify what they used to or serve quite the 
same purpose’. Further, that ‘these days children need toys not just for 
play, but for social currency’ and that ‘kids who don’t have the ‘right 
stuff’, ‘can be cruelly ostracised’ (Brooks 2008:110).  
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Who Makes Toys? 
Toy manufacturing is big business. At the time of the 2007 recalls, the 
global toy sector was worth approximately US$71.0 billion, with some 
(estimates as high as US$105 billion (NPD Inc 2007).The industry was 
predicted to reach US$122.2 billion by 2012, with developing economies 
in Asia-Pacific and Latin America poised to drive future growth (Global 
Industry Analysts 2008). The toy industry is ‘highly competitive and 
global in nature, characterised by short product life-cycles, seasonal 
demand, constant, product innovation, time to market [speed], and 
high product turnover, with very few products having what it takes to 
last longer than one or two years’ (Gallagher 2008: 122). For most toy 
companies it is the holiday season that is the most lucrative, with ‘the 
third and fourth quarters of each fiscal year usually bringing in the 
most sales’ (cited in Woo 2008:12).  These market dynamics ‘put 
pressure on manufacturers and their suppliers to act quickly’ 
(Dannwolf et al 2011:12). 
Table 4.4: Dynamics of the Toy Industry 
Market 
Dynamics 
Market 
Players 
Toy 
Characteristics 
Market Structure External 
Pressures 
     
 Dynamic 
 Fast-
moving 
 [Fad] 
driven 
 Seasonal 
 Fragmented 
 Competitive 
 
 Inexpensive 
products 
 Hetereogeneous 
product range 
 
 Small market 
in terms of 
buying power/ 
 materials 
consumption 
 Formal 
markets and 
informal 
markets 
 Regulation 
 Sensitivity 
 Awareness 
in some 
regions 
Source: Dannwolf et al 2011: 12 
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Key Players in the Global Toy Sector 
The global toy sector ‘is characterised by only a few large players and 
thousands of small to medium companies’ (Dannwolf et al 2011: 8; Woo 
2008).Examples of key players include American toy corporations 
Mattel Inc (and subsidiary Fisher-Price), Leap Frog, Hasbro, MGA 
Entertainment and JAKKS Pacific; Bandai (Japan), Lego (Denmark), 
Leap Frog (and Canadian toy giant Mega Brands. Companies of a 
smaller size but with a global reach include RC2 Corporation (now 
owned by TOMY Japan) and Schylling Inc (a family owned company 
with a global reach). Choice Australia (2008), describes the toy industry 
as ‘complex and comprising manufacturers, distributors, importers, 
wholesalers, retailers and any combination of these’. 
Table 4.5: Global Toy Sector by Country and Volume 
Country Size of Toy Market 
Million USD 2008 
Country Share of Toy 
Market 
United States 21,510 26.8% 
Japan 5,820 7.2% 
China 4,954 6.2% 
United Kingdom 4,317 5.4% 
France 4,239 5.3% 
Germany 3,420 4.3% 
Brazil 2,773 3.5% 
India 2,091 2.6% 
Australia 1,881 2.3% 
Canada 1,872 2.3% 
Source: Dannwolf, Ulmer, Cooper and Hartlieb (2011: 8) 
 
Global Industry Bodies 
The global toy industry is networked through the International Council 
of Toy Industries (ICTI), based in New York. The American arm of this 
Association, the TIA, played an active role during the product recall 
crisis, ‘collaborating with the Chinese Government’s General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine 
(AQSIQ) to force tighter testing protocols on Chinese manufacturers 
(Woo 2008:15). On 15 November 2007, the Toy Industry Association and 
the Chinese Government co-hosted a toy safety conference in 
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Guangzhou, China, attended by representatives from almost 300 
Chinese toy manufacturers (Woo 2008:15).During the recall crisis, ICTI 
also issued various statements about lead in toys, including this one 
reassuring consumers about toy safety whilst simultaneously 
diminishing the scale of the problem: 
These recalls do not reflect the situation of the entire toy industry 
and represent a very small percentage of the products we sell. 
The vast majority of toys are safe as they always have been and 
we as an industry are dedicated to ensuring that consumers can 
once again be confident in the safety of toys for their children 
(ICTI 2007a Statement on Lead http://www.toy-
icti.org/info/lead_in_toys.htm). 
 
As to the controversial issue of phthalates in toys (now regulated in 
both Europe and the United States), the ICTI states on their website 
that: 
Recently, some groups have raised concerns about phthalates, an 
ingredient that makes vinyl soft and pliable. Critics have taken a 
potpourri of scientific half-truths and developed a campaign 
alleging that vinyl products containing phthalates pose a danger, 
especially when used to make products such as children’s toys. 
They claim that harmful chemicals migrate from the soft plastic 
and accumulate in the human body causing serious health 
threats. These allegations are simply not true and do not stand 
up to scientific scrutiny (ICTI 2007b, Vinyl Toys Are Safe at. 
http://www.toy-icti.org/resources/vinyl_toys.html) 
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The toy industry is concerned that parents and consumers are 
unfairly targeted and frightened by extremist environmental 
groups. We would like to take this opportunity to clarify 
misinformation about vinyl and any potential threats to the 
health and well-being of children. None of the claims made by 
critics have been supported by reliable scientific evidence. If 
there were any truth to these claims, we would be the first to 
eliminate any hazardous ingredients. We would never 
compromise children’s safety. After all, we have children too 
(ICTI 2007 b, Vinyl Toys Are Safe at: http://www.toy-
icti.org/resources/vinyl_toys.html  
The hands that make the toys 
A group of stakeholders often overlooked in discussions about toxic 
toys are foreign factory workers (the hands that make the toys). In the 
course of their work they injection mould, die-cast, paint, glue, 
assemble and package the toys. Like the children who played with the 
toys, these factory workers too were exposed to the same chemicals and 
heavy metals, as well as other supply chain toxins routinely used in toy 
production such as solvents and glues.  
These are women and men of reproductive age (issue here is exposure 
to certain chemicals and links to reproductive disorders), typically 
between the ages of 18 and 28 who have often left families in rural 
communities to toil long hours for low wages and who live in corporate 
dormitories in proximity to the factories in which they labour.  
The International Centre for Corporate Accountability (ICCA 2008) 
report on seven of Mattel’s Vendor Plants (all located in Guangdong 
Province China) describes the typical workforce profile (see Table 4.6): 
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Table 4.6: Workforce Profile 
Plant 
No.` 
Gender Ave 
Age 
Min 
Hiring 
Age 
Education 
High 
School 
Education 
Middle 
School 
Average 
Employ 
ment 
Years 
5 & 6 85% female 28 16* 90% 10% 3 
7 65% female 22 16** 15% 80% 3 
13 90% female 25 18 20% 80% 1.5 
19 & 20 85% female 21/24 16* 11% 90% 1 
21 65% female 20 18* 15% 80% 1.3 
*No employees under 18 
**Workers aged 16-18 represent 9% of the workforce 
Source: International Centre for Corporate Accountability (ICCA) Audit 
Report, Mattel’s Vendor Plants (2008), Rev 25/1/2008. 
The literature relating to exploitation of foreign workers in export 
factories, including China, dates back several decades. Recent examples 
include Chan and Siu (2010) on low wages and excessive overtime; 
Egels Zanden (2007) on Multinational Companies (MNC’s) codes of 
conduct and behind the scenes at Chinese toy suppliers. Other scholars 
have looked at specific incidents such as a 1993 fire at the Zhili Toy 
Factory in Gunangdong that killed 87 workers (Chan and Senser (1997). 
Scholars like Egels-Zanden (2007) and Sethi et al (2011) have examined 
compliance issues with respect to Multinational corporations’ codes of 
conduct. Others, like Schrempf-Stirling and Palazzo (2013) draw the 
links to ‘upstream corporate social responsibility’. This issue of 
corporate social responsibility, as it relates to different size toy 
company responses to the issue of unsafe toys is explored further in this 
thesis (see Chapter 9). 
As noted earlier, this thesis focuses unapologetically on the 
victimisation of children (as consumers). But this is not to say that the 
author is unaware of the academic and wider literature on labour 
standards and human rights or unconcerned about the risks and 
impacts faced by Chinese toy factory workers, including labour 
exploitation, long hours and unpaid overtime, workplace health and 
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safety hazards, isolation from family and living conditions in toy 
factory dormitories. 
Where Are Toys Made? 
In times past, toys were manufactured domestically, in small numbers 
in cottage industries.  What differentiates today’s toys is that the 
majority are mass produced in off-shore locations, under conditions 
with differing humanitarian and safety standards and in countries with 
diverse political and regulatory regimes. Those ‘factors that make China 
an attractive off-shore destination include low wages, a highly efficient 
industrial network clustering, lax environmental regulations and 
enforcement and minimal worker health and safety regulations’ 
(Navarro 2007: 4), as well as ‘low raw material costs’ (Kavilanz, CNN 
Money, 11/9/2007). China’s off-shore facilities manufacture ‘a single 
product or set of products in highly localized supply chains that extend 
a just in time *speed to market+ principle to the entire supply chain’ 
(Navarro 2007: 3).  
Mattel, for example, manufactures its toys through a global network of 
manufacturing facilities including Tier 1: ‘11 manufacturing and tooling 
facilities owned, operated or managed by Mattel in China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Thailand and Mexico; Tier II: approximately 75 contract 
factories not owned, operated or managed by Mattel, mostly in China 
and some in India and Brazil, and Tier III approximately 1,000 licenses 
who have signed agreements with Mattel to use their logos and 
characters and approximately 1,000 licensees who have signed 
agreements with Mattel’ (Mattel Global Citizenship Report 2007: 7). 
The majority of the toxic toys in this study were manufactured in Tier II 
type factories in China - that is factories not owned or operated by the 
toy corporations that commissioned the toys. In Mattel’s case, contract 
facilities like these manufacture 50% of all their toys and ’for some of 
these factories, Mattel’s business may represent as much as 30 to 50% of 
their annual turnover, making them highly reliant on Mattel’s 
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continued ‘loyalty’. Johnson (2005: 22) suggests that the advantages of 
this ‘dual sourcing strategy achieves high productivity in corporate 
owned plants while ensuring changes of customer demand and 
performances can be satisfied through outsourced partners’. At the time 
of the recalls the Chinese toy sector was estimated to be made up of 
approximately 2,700 companies (Dannwolf et al 2011: 9; Woo 2008). 
What is in a Toy? 
As a product category, toys are highly heterogeneous in terms of the 
variety of materials used’ (Dannwolf et al 2011: 12). In times past toys 
were made from natural materials like untreated wood, fabric or wool 
and produced in small quantities in the home or in cottage industries. 
Over time, plastic has replaced more traditional materials such as wood 
and fabric and it is now estimated that approximately 50% of the 
world’s toys are made of plastic, a by-product of the petro-chemical 
industry. Some of these substances are not chemically bound to the 
surface of the products and are known to migrate either directly into 
the air or to enter a child’s body through contact with saliva when they 
chew or suck on toys and trinkets. Risk of exposure to toxins is 
exacerbated when a child is teething or when toys are used as 
‘comforters’ at bedtime or during times of illness. 
In June 2007, the discovery of lead in Thomas & Friends® wooden 
railway sets triggered a spate of recalls that served to connect toys and 
toxicity in the public imagination. Also affected were high-profile 
brands like Dora the Explorer™, Barbie ®, Winnie-the-Pooh®, Go 
Diego Go® for lead; Polly Pocket® and Magnetix® for small powerful 
magnets that dislodged; Bindeez® and Aqua Dots® for a chemical that 
metabolised in the body as the date-rape drug GHB, and chemicals 
called phthalates (thall-eights) routinely used to make plastic toys soft 
and flexible.  
The toxic toys in this study were predominantly made of wood, metal 
or plastic and affected jewellery from metal or pearl-like materials. 
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Unfortunately some of the substances added to toys are not chemically 
bound to the surface of the products and they migrate either directly 
into the air or enter a child’s body through contact with saliva when 
they chew, bite or suck on toys and trinkets. At least two children are 
known to have died from lead poisoning, one from swallowing a 
heavily leaded charm from a promotional toy sold with footwear and 
the second after opening a set of heavily contaminated toy cars. The 
true nature of deaths and injuries is unknown because there are no 
global statistics on how many children died or were injured by lead-
contaminated toys. 
In other cases tiny powerful magnets that dislodged from certain toys 
were swallowed by children, causing life-threatening intestinal injuries 
and two known deaths (one child in the United States after ingesting 
magnets from a Magnetix™ construction set (2005) and one child in 
Australia after ingesting magnets from a desk toy (2011). Although rare 
earth magnets continue to be lawfully incorporated into children’s toys, 
if they do dislodge and are swallowed the consequences can be truly 
awful. Again, there are no global statistics on the number of children 
killed or injured by these magnets, although statistics are more prolific 
than those on lead-related injuries and deaths. Available statistics are 
largely silent on the victimisation of children in the developing world.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has set the scene for the primary case study on toxic toys, 
answering preliminary questions about the nature of toys, how toys are 
categorised and the social aspects of toys. It has provided a short 
history of toys and contextualised toys in the wider social landscape of 
the rituals of giving, receiving and celebration. It has introduced the key 
toxic contaminants and deadly components found in children’s toys 
during a spate of global recalls. Chapter 5 focuses on two of the most 
prolific hazards found in children’s toys (lead and magnets) through 
the lens of transference where the focus is on lifecycle harms from 
origin to disposal (and beyond). 
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Chapter 5: Toxic Contaminants and Deadly Components 
Introduction 
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the key toxins found in 
children’s toys including patterns of exposure and the consequences of 
those hazards for humans. More specifically it examines two of the 
most prolific toy hazards (rare earth magnets and lead) that migrated 
out of certain children’s toys and were the subject of global recalls 
between 2006 and 2008.  
Each hazard (the trouble with magnets; the trouble with lead) is 
examined through the lens of transference where the key questions are: 
where is this (contaminant, component) coming from? where is it going 
to? and what are the consequences for human (e.g. children) and 
ecological health. The closing section presents a quantitative snapshot 
of lead-related deaths, incidents and, injuries in the United States and 
magnet-related deaths, incidents and injuries in the United States and 
Australia. This is followed by case reports (medical accounts of victim 
suffering) and case vignettes (accounts of victim suffering) of children 
injured by lead and magnets in their toys. 
Toxic Toys 
Drawing upon Becker, Edwards and Massey (2010: 7987), Table 5.1, 
presents an overview of the major toxins found in children’s toys and 
jewellery, the nature of the hazards (for humans), and the pathways of 
exposure into children’s bodies. 
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Table 5.1: Key Toy Toxins 
 
Chemical Hazard Pathways of Exposure 
Lead (Pb)  Neurotoxin 
 Harmful to most organs and 
systems in the human body 
 Infants, children and the 
developing foetus are 
particularly vulnerable. 
Toys and children’s jewellery can contain Pb 
paint and leaded metal clasps, chains or 
charms.  Pb is used as a stabilizer in some toys 
and other children’s items made from PVC 
plastic.  Pb can leach out of products when 
children handle, suck or swallow them. 
Cadmium 
(Cd) 
 Carcinogen 
 Can cause bone softening and 
kidney problems and hinder 
brain development in infants 
and children. 
Used in surface paint and base material of 
children’s jewellery, toys, other products.  Cd 
can leach out of products when children 
handle, suck or swallow them. 
Phthalates 
 
 
 In animal studies, phthalates 
have been found to be 
reproductive and developmental 
toxicants, and to damage liver, 
kidney, heart and lung. 
 A recent study found reduced 
male-typical play behaviour in 
boys whose mothers had 
prenatal exposure to anti-
androgenic phthalates  
Phthalates are used as softeners in PVC plastic 
products.  These chemicals are not bound in 
the plastic substrate and can leach out when 
children mouth teethers, toys or other 
products. 
Brominated 
flame 
retardants 
(BFRs) 
 Persistent toxic chemicals that 
accumulate in people and 
wildlife and contaminate breast 
milk and umbilical cord blood. 
 
There are few studies of BFRs in toys.  A 
recent study examined 69 toys purchased in 
China – including BarbieTM and other dolls, 
soft plastic teethers, swords, race cars, foam 
toys and action figures, and found PBDEs in 
all hard plastic, foam and stuffed toys, and in 
a third of soft rubber toys. Higher exposures 
to BFRs were observed for infants and 
toddlers than older children 
 
Azo dyes 
(certain 
dyes) 
 Certain azo dyes, on reductive 
cleavage of one or more azo 
groups, form carcinogenic 
aromatic amines such as 
benzidine. 
Azo dyes represent 60-70% of all dyes 
commonly used in the textile and leather 
industries and can be found in textile or 
leather toys and toys that include textiles or 
leather garments.  Azo dyes may be absorbed 
through dermal, respiratory, and intestinal 
routes.  Non-fixed, water-soluble azo dyes can 
also come into contact with skin through 
perspiration. 
Bisphenol A 
(BPA) 
 Estrogenic effects 
 Epidemiologic studies have 
linked BPA to diabetes and 
cardiovascular disease. 
 A recent study found that low 
level exposure to BPA in 
pregnant women may affect the 
foetus  
BPA is used in the manufacture of 
polycarbonate plastic and epoxy resins.  Until 
recently, polycarbonate was commonly used 
in baby bottles.  BPA may also be found in 
linings of canned foods and in dental sealants. 
Source: Adapted from Becker, Edwards and Massey (2010:7987) 
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The Hazards 
The following section examines two of the most prolific hazards (rare 
earth magnets and lead) that migrated from certain children’s toys and 
were subject to global recalls between 2006 and 2008. Each hazard (the 
trouble with magnets; the trouble with lead) is examined through the 
lens of transference where the key questions are: where is this 
(contaminant, component) coming from? where is it going to? and what 
are the consequences for human (e.g. children) and ecological health. 
 
The Trouble with Magnets 
The trouble with rare earth magnets is that ‘they are approximately ten 
times stronger than even the strongest ferrite magnets and they are, as a 
result, able to exert a powerful magnetic field even through human 
tissue’ (Quinlan 2008: 37) The ingestion of multiple magnets is widely 
acknowledged as a global problem, one that inflicts serious injury on 
the gastrointestinal tract of the children who swallow them (Oestreich 
2009; Swaminathan, Baker & Scott 2005, Cauchi and Shawis 2002; 
McCormick, Brennan, Yassa and Shawis 2002; Gregori and Morra 2007). 
Described as the strongest magnets in the world, ‘the low cost of 
neodymium iron boron (NIB) magnets and their diminishing size in 
proportion to strength has inspired new uses’ (Swaminathan et al 2010: 
5).  
What are rare earth magnets? 
Rare earth magnets are called ‘rare earths’ not because of their scarcity, 
but because neodymium is one of the seventeen ‚rare earth elements‛ 
on the periodic table (See K & J Magnetics Inc, Frequently Asked 
Question Undated at http://www.kjmagnetics.com/FAQ.asp). There are 
‘two types of rare earth magnets: samarium-cobalt and neodymium 
(Wade 2011: 1). However, ‘Neodymium (also known as Neodymium 
Iron Boron magnets) are the strongest permanent magnets in the world’ 
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(K & J Magnetics Frequently Asked Questions No. 3 (Undated). They 
are also the ones most likely to be found in children’s toys, because of 
their affordability (for the time being). 
As illustrated in Figure 5.1, rare earth magnets come in varying shapes 
and sizes including arcs, rods, blocks, cubes, discs and spheres and so 
forth. 
Figure 5.1: Types of Rare Earth Magnets 
 
Source:  National Magnets LLC, Magcraft® (2003-2010 permanent 
magnets at <http://www.rare-earth-magnets.com/t-about.aspx> (4 
August, 2011) 
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What differentiates rare earth magnets from other types of magnets is 
their flux [strength of magnetic field] (See Figure 5.2). Swaminathan et 
al (2010: 5) define flux as‛ 
 A measure of quantity of magnetism, taking into account the  
strength and the extent of a magnetic field. The ‚Strength‛ of the 
physical magnetic force inherent in a magnet decides how tightly 
the magnet attracts and binds to another magnet 
The small size of these magnets not only belies their strength, but also 
‘increases their potential for ingestion or insertion by children 
(Swaminathan et al 2010; Devenyi 2009). 
Figure 5.2: Commonly Used Magnets by Magnetic Strength 
 
Source: Callahan (2007), The Chicago Tribune, citing Freeman, Northwestern University 
Department of Physics and Astronmy 
Are All Magnets the Same? 
Generally speaking refrigerator magnets are not rare earths. Instead 
they are made from ‘inexpensive oxides of iron and other metal such as 
barium< often the ferrite is in powder form and dispersed within 
plastic or rubber (Livingston 2004: 18). Although not as powerful as 
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rare earth magnets they can still pose a choking and poisoning hazard, 
especially for young children. Magnets and erasers that look and smell 
like food are particularly appealing to small children (See Figure 5.3). 
Children can potentially ‘mistake them for the real thing. If chewed 
[and] if chewed they could splinter and if mouthed the magnet could 
choke a child – or be toxic’ (ACCC Safe Toys For Kids 2009: 15). 
Figure 5.3: Magnets That Look Like Food 
 
Source: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2013) 
Eraser and Fridge magnets in food at: 
http://www.productsafety.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/971373 
A recent study by the Queensland Injury Surveillance Unit in Australia 
(Swaminathan et al 2010: 2) found that ‘only children under the age of 
four years were identified as having been injured due to fridge 
magnets’. Having said that, some online traders do suggest that rare 
earth magnets can make ‘good fridge tidies’ however, if you have 
children or are likely to have children in your home you should avoid 
using them in this way. 
Neodymium magnets can help reduce clutter and hang even 
large objects from your fridge (Bunting Magnetics Company at 
<http://buymagnets.com/uses-for-neodymium-magnets/>). 
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The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (2012b: 31) notes an 
example where a family purchased two sets of magnets. The family 
used some as refrigerator magnets that were within reach of a three 
year old child. The child ingested several of them over two days before 
their absence was noted (USCPSC 2012b: 31). 
Where Do Rare Earth Magnets Come From? 
Rare earth magnets are not created in a political and economic vacuum, 
but are part of the race for rare earth elements around the world. In 
2011, Nicholas Curtis, CEO of Australian rare earth mining company, 
Lynas Corporation, told a Sydney Morning Herald reporter that ‚we are 
as addicted to rare earths as we are to oil, we just don’t know it‛ (Wen 
2011, Sydney Morning Herald, 14/7/2011). Although not rare in 
themselves, REEs are concentrated in just a few locations in the world 
(Powell 2011: 18), and at the time of writing this is China.  
Currently, as Humphries 2010:7-8) explains ‘China has a monopoly on 
deposits and in 2009, produced 95% of the world’s rare earth element 
raw materials; manufactured 75% of the world’s neodymium magnets 
and 60% of the samarium magnets’ .Besides their use in children’s toys 
and jewellery, neodymium iron boron magnets are also common in 
consumer electronics, green energy technologies and defence 
applications. For instance, they are ‘essential to many military weapons 
systems’ and samarium-cobalt magnets (another type of rare earth 
magnet) are used in military technologies like precision-guided 
missiles, smart bombs and aircraft (Humphries 2012:7).  
Neodymium magnets are ‘produced by mixing iron, boron and 
neodymium powders before pressing them into the required 
shape <the blanks are then magnetised and are five to ten times 
as strong as plain iron magnets’. (McCormick et al 2002:72). 
Online manufacturers and distributors of rare earth magnets 
note their specific characteristics. For instance, K & J Magnetics 
Inc note that ‘If neodymium magnets are not plated the iron in 
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the material will oxidise very easily if exposed to moisture< 
even normal humidity will rust the iron over time (See K & J 
Magnets Incat http://www.kjmagnetics.com/faq.asp#drill)  
The grab for rare earth elements also comes at a human and ecological 
cost. The rare earth elements (REE) global supply chain involves five 
stages, described by Humphries (2010:8) as: 
1. Mining [use of chemicals in extraction], 
2. Separation [use of chemicals], 
3. Refining oxides into metal [chemicals, pollution of wastewater], 
4. Fabrication of alloys, 
5. Manufacturing of magnets and other components. 
In an article in the New York Times, Bradsher (25/12/2009) notes that 
some rare earth mining techniques have caused significant 
environmental damage: 
In south eastern China, for instance ‘miners scrape off the topsoil 
and shovel golden-flecked clay into dirt pits, using acids to 
extract the rare earths. The acids ultimately wash into streams 
and rivers, destroying rice paddies and fish farms and tainting 
water supplies’. 
Others argue  that the process of separation (stage 2) ‘produces waste 
water, sometimes containing potentially harmful materials, including 
radioactive thorium, radium, and uranium, which require careful 
recycling or disposal’ (Hurst 2010 cited in US Magnetic Materials 
Association 2011:3). 
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An online trader notes the issues surrounding disposal of these types of 
magnets: 
All strong permanent magnets should be thermally 
demagnetised prior to disposal. Alternatively, all strong 
permanent magnets should be placed in a steel container prior to 
disposal, so the magnets do not attract waste disposal equipment 
or refuse containers (Magcraft 2010, Available at: 
http://www.magcraft.com/safety). 
These issues are important when considering the ecological impact of 
rare earth magnets, especially those embedded in toys. 
Toys Containing Rare Earth Magnets 
These tiny powerful magnets are typically embedded in the plastic 
parts of play sets such as the hands and feet of dolls like Mattel’s Polly 
Pocket® and MegaBrand’s Magnaman® action figures. They enable 
children to snap clothing, hair pieces and other accessories onto a doll 
or action figure. They are also encased in the plastic coated joining rods 
used to connect the pieces in construction sets like Magnetix®, 
embedded in magnetic jewellery clasps, in the tips of magnetic darts 
and used to link strings of ferrous beads together.  
As indicated by those who trade in these magnets, they have a wide 
range of uses: 
Our spheres, discs and cubes are often used to form magnetic 
bracelets and necklaces. Our smaller magnets (large ones will 
pinch and hurt) are often used as pierce-free body jewelry. 
Smaller discs and rings are often used to close bracelets and 
necklaces, perfect for people that can’t quite do those tiny clasps 
and snaps. We have custom made rings that are specifically 
designed for this application (K & J Magnets Inc 2003-2012) 
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Some are even used for ‘holding a pacifier in a dolls mouth’ 
doll’s mouth – our D42 discs are a favourite of Berenguer Baby 
enthusiasts. The magnets will also work well with other dolls, 
teddy bears and stuffed animals’. (K & J Magnets Inc 2003-2012) 
In fact, according to K & J Magnet Inc. ‘these magnets are used for just 
about anything you can imagine’. 
 Examples of the range of children’s products containing magnets 
include:  
 Construction or building sets 
 Jewellery 
 Puzzles 
 Action figures and dolls 
 Alphabets and numbers 
 Science and craft kits 
 Board games 
 Vehicle sets 
 Magnetic dart sets 
 
More recently, the popularity of desk toys has heightened the exposure 
of children to these small powerful magnets, which are typically loosely 
attached and readily accessible (See Figure 5.5). ‘Each unit of the 
neodymium magnet has approximately 125 to > 1000 magnetic balls 
and can be purchased on the internet and in other retail outlets 
(Hussain et al 2009: 239) 
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Figure 5.4: Typical Sets of Magnets 
  
Source: U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (2012: 2) 
Although these types of ‘magnet sets have only been available since 
2008 the USCPSC has ‘determined that an estimated 1,700 ingestions of 
magnets from magnet sets were treated in emergency departments 
between 1 January 2009 and 31 December 2011) (USCPSC 2012: 1). To 
illustrate the currency of this issue, Hussain et al (2012: 240) refer to ‘an 
informal survey of North American Society of Paediatric 
Gastroenterology, Hepatology and Nutrition (NASPGHAN) members 
in Spring 2012 [that] identified significant morbidity in >80 magnet 
ingestions, which resulted in 39 endoscopies, 26 surgeries, 26 bowel 
perforations and 3 bowel resections’ (Hussain 2012:24). 
For instance, In June 2012, a three year old American girl swallowed 37 
magnets from a Buckyballs® desk toy.  She ‘ate’ the magnets because 
they looked like the silver sprinkles (See Figure 5.4) her mother used to 
decorate cupcakes.  
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Figure 5.5: Silver Sprinkles  
 
Inside her body the magnets joined together end to end, forming a 
circle that appeared on x-ray as a bracelet, but which subsequently 
perforated her intestines in four places.  Provided the rare earth 
magnets used in children’s toys and trinkets remain cheap and 
plentiful, they will continue to be used in children’s toys and jewellery 
in the foreseeable future. 
Health Effects 
In testimony to a U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee on the safety 
of toys, Kyran Quinlan, representing the American Academy of 
Paediatric said that ’the injuries caused by these magnets are especially 
pernicious because they are not immediately evident’ (Quinlan 2007:2). 
Parents and caregivers typically describe children as initially presenting 
with non-specific symptoms such as a stomach ache or gastro. Oesterich 
(2009:144), in a worldwide study of multiple magnet ingestion, 
described these initial symptoms as ‘<often mild, resembling ‘flulike 
illness, nausea, vomiting, cramps, or abdominal pain’. Similarly, a U.S. 
Centre for Disease Control Report (CDC 2006b) likewise notes that ‘the 
initial signs and symptoms of injury can be mild and non-specific, 
leading to a delay in diagnosis and even greater injury’. A worldwide 
study by Oesterich (2009), cited in Swaminathan et al (2010: 5) observed 
‘Considerable delay before seeking medical assistance was frequent, 
with additional delays before obtaining radiographs or ultrasound 
imaging’.  
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The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission (USCPSC 2012:22) 
explains how these delays, when coupled with disclosure issues, can 
have serious consequences for children: 
 Accurate and timely diagnoses also are complicated by the fact 
that children and teens may not attribute their gastrointestinal 
symptoms to prior ingestion of magnets and they may be unable 
or unwilling to communicate to parents, caregivers, or medical 
personnel that they have ingested magnets. Accordingly, the 
delay of surgical intervention due to the patient’s presentation 
with non-specific symptoms and medical personnel’s lack of 
awareness of the dangers posed by multiple magnet ingestion 
can exacerbate life-threatening internal injuries and has resulted 
in the need for a bowel transplant (USCPSC 2012: 22). 
Certain children are particularly vulnerable, especially those with 
neurodevelopment disorders, as they are ‘more likely to intentionally 
ingest the magnets either during normal hand to mouth behaviour or 
during a clinical episode of some sort (See Devenyi 2009: 92; CDC 
2006b).  
Children may also suffer longer-term effects from their injuries, as 
noted by the USCPSC (2012: 24): 
Complications after these abdominal surgeries include bleeding, 
infection, and ileus (temporary paralysis of gut motility). 
Adhesions (where bands of intra-abdominal scar tissue form that 
can interfere with gut movement and can cause obstruction) may 
occur as a short-term or long-term (years) complication, 
frequently resulting in bowel obstructions requiring additional 
surgeries, and thus, creating a cycle. In females, there also can be 
future fertility concerns related to abdominal scar tissue and 
adhesions. In cases where long segments of injured bowel have 
to be removed, digestive function of victims can be impaired 
permanently, resulting in mal-absorption, diarrhoea, cramping, 
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total parental nutritional feeding (and consequent frequent bouts 
of sepsis), need for a bowel transplant, and even death. 
A separate, but important concern is the effect of magnetic toys and 
other items on paediatric patients with programmable shunt valves. A 
study by Zuzak (2009: 162) found that ‘the pressure level of adjustable 
valves can be altered by magnetic toys present in the everyday life of 
paediatric patients’. Figure 5.6 shows some of the products identified by 
Zuzak (2009: 162) as containing magnets and although not all are ‘toys’ 
it does illustrate the wide range of items in which these magnets are 
embedded. 
Figure 5.6: Magnets and Programmable Shunt Valves 
A: Road roller (Lego Duplo); B: Skarloey (HIT Entertainment); C: 
Flower (kitchen magnet); D: Cube with magnet; E: Disc (kitchen 
magnet), F: Bornimag (GIGA iKids), G: Geomag, H: Super magnet 
small, I: Supermagnet big 
Similarly, Anderson et al (2004) also note the malfunction of a 
programmable valve after exposure to a toy containing magnets. 
Australian study (Swaminathan et al 2010: 5) cites a finding by 
Oestreich (2009) that ‘twelve of the 122 children in the study were 
known to be autistic, noting that this ‘highlights both the propensity for 
children with disabilities to ingest foreign bodies, as well as challenges 
in obtaining a verbal history of the same’. 
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The following section presents a statistical snapshot of lead-related 
deaths, incidents and, injuries in the United States and magnet-related 
deaths, incidents and injuries in the United States and Australia. This is 
followed by case reports (medical accounts of victim suffering) and case 
vignettes (accounts of victim suffering) of children injured by lead and 
magnets in their toys. 
 
Victims and Survivors of Magnets 
Magnet-Related Deaths and Injuries: The United States 
Table 5.2 shows a selected snapshot of incidents reported to the United 
States Consumer Commission (USCPSC) between 2007 and 2011, where 
children sustained injuries from a range of magnetic toys. 
Table 5.2: Magnet-related Incidents and Injuries - United States 
Toy Incident and Injury Details 
Building Set Magnet dislodged from toy during play. Eight year old girl 
swallowed 16 magnets, suffered intestinal perforations - six 
were repaired, four inches of intestine removed. 
Toy Blocks Three year old boy swallowed toy blocks belonging to five year 
old sibling. Required surgery to repair damage to intestines. 
Building Set Five year old boy swallowed a steel ball that separated from a 
magnetic piece and was hospitalized for four days. 
Building Set Four year old boy swallowed steel ball from magnetic building 
set which had to be removed by endoscopy. 
Building Set Four year old boy ingested several magnetic toy pieces, 
sustaining serious internal injuries requiring multiple surgeries. 
Unspecified 
 
Three year old boy ingested magnets from an unspecified toy, 
causing intestinal perforations and the removal and re-
attachment of two sections of his intestine 
Building Set Eight year old boy swallowed four magnets from a popular 
magnet toy which were surgically removed. 
Magnetic 
Ball 
Six year old boy was hospitalized for eight days after he 
swallowed two magnetic balls, causing intestinal perforation. 
Building Set Eleven year old boy swallowed magnets and plastic pieces that 
were surgically removed along with four inches of his large 
intestine. 
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Unspecified Three year old boy swallowed several small magnets during 
play. Surgical removal, bowel perforation, hospitalized nine 
days. 
Unspecified Six year old boy swallowed metal ball which had to be 
surgically removed. 
Building set Three year old male stuck dislodged magnet in nose which had 
to be surgically removed 
Building Set Eight year old female swallowed thirty pieces of a 200 piece 
magnetic toy building set requiring surgical removal of 
magnets and suffering intestinal injuries 
Building Set Two year old female swallowed seven magnets that dislodged 
from a building set. Surgery to remove magnets, colostomy bag 
required after surgery 
Building set Three year old female swallowed six magnets from a building 
set, surgically removed from intestines, hospitalized for several 
days 
Building set Three year old female ingested magnetic triangle from building 
set, surgically removed, hospitalized for two nights 
Refrigerator 
magnet 
Three year old female swallowed eight small round magnets 
off the refrigerator door, Surgically removed from esophagus 
and stomach 
Unspecified Four year old boy swallowed three metal ball shaped magnets 
which were surgically removed 
Unspecified Nine year old boy swallowed two toy magnets whilst at school, 
surgically removed and damaged tissue repaired 
Unspecified Eighteen month old boy swallowed three magnetic balls that 
had to be surgically removed including nine inches of his 
intestine, the boy has ongoing medical issues 
Unspecified Eight year old male was hospitalized after swallowing 
magnets, required surgery for intestinal injuries 
Source: USCPSC (2011a) NEISS data provided to the author 
 
Magnet-Related Deaths and Injuries - Australia 
The following summary of the state of the statistics in Australia was 
provided by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC 2013b, 2/2/2013), in response to an enquiry from the author. It 
reflects the state of statistics on magnet-related injuries worldwide and 
is reproduced in its entirety below (see pages 142-145): 
[Beginning of Quote] Product related injury data in Australia is 
not collected nationally. The data comes from a variety of 
sources and covers unclear geographic boundaries. Identification 
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and recording of information on specific products is uncertain; 
most cases of magnet ingestion do not adequately identify the 
type or brand name of magnet. 
It is often difficult to separate out injury associated with specific 
products from other related or similar products – in this instance, cases 
of ingestion of magnets from magnet sets versus ingestion of other 
types of magnets.   
The proportion of households that have a product (in this case a 
set of the magnets), and the intensity of its use (how often it is 
used and how many people are exposed to it), is often unknown. 
This means that a comparison of injuries with number of users, 
and an associated calculation of the degree of ‘risk,’ is 
problematic.  
Noting that Australian data is imperfect, the ACCC believes that the 
following information is of relevance:  
 A 21 month old Queensland toddler died in 2011 after ingesting 
multiple small high powered magnets. The ingestion of the 
magnets had not been witnessed by the father or any other 
person, and so medical treatment was not sought. 
In addition to this death, the ACCC is aware of a number of serious 
injuries involving small high powered magnets from magnet sets—
including via the media, via state and territory fair trading agencies and 
via a recent national survey of surgeons by the Queensland Injury 
Surveillance Unit.  
The cases below are, for the most part, cases specifically identified by 
paediatric surgeons. Details of surgical cases performed by adult 
surgeons or by specialist surgeons (ear, nose and throat; or respiratory) 
are not known. In addition, non-surgical cases where a 
gastroenterologist has removed magnets by endoscope are not known.  
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A summary of severe incidents identified to date in Australia, is 
summarised in Table 5.3: 
Table 5.3: Magnet-related Incidents - Australia 
2012 Cases 
 15 year old Victorian girl swallowed 3 small spherical magnets when imitating 
a fake tongue piercing. This caused a fistula in the duodenum and required 
surgery. 
 14 year old Queensland girl swallowed 4 small spherical magnets imitating a 
fake tongue piercing. The magnets became stuck between the stomach and the 
duodenum, necessitating a laparotomy. 
 13 year old Victorian girl ingested 3 small spherical magnets when imitating a 
fake tongue piercing. This perforated the duodenum and bowel. Laparoscopic 
surgery was required. 
 12 year old New South Wales girl was hospitalised in 2012 for surgical removal 
of magnets reported as Buckyballs. The magnets were swallowed while 
mimicking facial piercing. 
 12 year old New South Wales boy swallowed 3 spherical magnets with an 8 
mm diameter. This perforated the colon and jejunum. Laparoscopic surgery 
was required. 
 7 year old New South Wales boy who was hospitalised in 2012 for surgical 
removal of magnets, undergoing 5 hours of surgery. 
 7 year old New South Wales boy swallowed 8 small spherical magnets while 
playing. This perforated the duodenum and appendix, leading to surgery. 
 3 year old Queensland girl swallowed 21 small spherical magnets. Treating the 
injuries required re-sectioning the bowel and a week in hospital. 
 3 year old New South Wales boy swallowed 30 small spherical magnets which 
were stored on a fridge door. This ruptured the bowel and caused peritonitis. 
Treatment involved re-sectioning the bowel. 
 2 year old Western Australian boy underwent emergency surgery in 2012 to 
remove 27 magnets from his stomach. 
 18 month old New South Wales boy swallowed approximately 20 magnets 
described as BuckyBalls. Initially misdiagnosed by a GP and the local hospital, 
the boy required a laparotomy. 
2011 Cases 
 10 year old New South Wales boy swallowed 6 small spherical magnets. This 
caused multiple small bowel perforations and infection. 
 8 year old New South Wales boy swallowed 2 small spherical magnets. 
Surgery was required to repair the fistula between the small bowel and 
sigmoid colon. 
 3 year old New South Wales girl was hospitalised in 2011 for surgical removal 
of magnets reported as being NeoCubes. 
 18 month old Tasmanian girl was hospitalised for surgical removal of five 
small, spherical magnets suspected to be Buckyballs. 
Source: ACCC 2013b, Email to author 1/2/2013 
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Table 5.4: Identified Australian Cases - 2011 and 2012: 
Age of child Location Number of Magnets 
Swallowed 
21 months Brisbane, QLD 12 
15 years VIC 3 
14 years QLD 4 
13 years VIC 3 
12 years Greta, NSW 5 
12 years NSW 3 
7 years Mona Vale, NSW 6 
7 years NSW 8 
3 years QLD 21 
3 years NSW 30 
2 years Perth, WA 27 
18 months NSW 20 
10 years NSW 6 
8 years NSW 2 
3 years Central Coast, NSW - 
18 months Tasmania 5 
Source: ACCC 2013b, Email to author 1/2/2013 
As noted by the ACCC ‘the severe cases (one death and 15 surgical 
cases) broadly conform to the US pattern of injury: 
 Divided between children aged 3 and under and those aged 7 
and above; 
 All cases where large numbers of magnets were ingested 
involved a young child (aged 3 years or under); and all cases 
involving a young child involved ingesting five or more 
magnets; 
 The maximum number of magnets ingested by a single child was 
thirty  
Source:  ACCC 2013(b), Email to the author 2/2/2013.[End quote] 
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Case Report 
The following case report reflects the type of report that is widely 
available in published medical journals, some of which date back 
several decades. It provides a graphic image of the circumstances 
surrounding ingestion and the injuries sustained by a five year old boy 
who ingested multiple magnets in 2006. 
Box 5.1: Case Report 1 - Magnets 
Case Report 1 
Boy Aged 5 years 1 month - 2006 
Case 3: On May 5, 2006, while using his teeth to separate magnetic 
pieces from a toy building set, a boy aged 5 years, 1 month, 
inadvertently swallowed one of the pieces. The boy’s mother called his 
paediatrician, who advised her to take him to a local hospital. 
Radiographs revealed magnetic pieces in the child’s stomach. Doctors 
advised the mother that the pieces would probably pass normally but 
that she should monitor the child’s stool for up to 5 days. Two days 
later, the boy told his mother that he had swallowed another toy, a 
small metal ball; this did not concern her. 
By May 18, the mother reported that the magnet and metal ball had not 
passed; the child’s paediatrician ordered another radiograph. Imaging 
center staff members reported finding two metal objects stuck together 
farther along the intestines and advised that they would probably pass 
naturally. However, on May 24, the paediatrician ordered another 
radiograph, which showed that the objects had not moved.  
The next day, the mother informed the paediatrician that she had 
learned of a fatality that occurred after ingestion of magnets. After 
consultation with specialists on May 26, an endoscopy was scheduled 
for May 31. On May 30, the boy began vomiting and was taken to the 
specialist’s hospital and admitted. During endoscopy on May 31, the 
toy pieces could not be removed, and surgery was required. The 
surgeon removed two disc-shaped magnets, each 10mm in diameter, 
from the boy’s large intestine and a steel ball, also 10mm in diameter, 
from the small intestine and resected the affected bowel. 
Source: Morbidity and Mortality Weekly, 55(48): 1297-1298.  
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Case Vignettes 
The following case vignettes reflect the suffering of victims: 
Box 5.2: Case Vignette - Magnets 1 
Girl Aged 7 Years : 2006 
In February 2006, attorney Gordon Tabor alerted Mattel that his 7-year-
old client had to undergo emergency surgery after swallowing magnets 
from a Polly Pocket toy. The magnets connected inside her intestines, 
creating a deadly obstruction. It took Mattel a year and a half to alert 
parents and issue of recall of 18.2 million Polly Pocket, Doggie Day 
Care, Batman, Barbie, and One Piece toys containing magnets that can 
connect across intestines and ‚rip through a child’s bowels like a 
gunshot.‛ Before finally recalling these toys in August of 2007, Mattel 
executives met numerous times to discuss the toys in meetings that 
revealed graphic evidence of magnets ripping up children’s intestines, 
injuring dozens. 
American Association of Justice at: 
http://www.justice.org/cps/rde/justice/hs.xsl/5027.htm 
Box 5.3: Case Vignette 2 - Magnets 
Boy Aged 4 Years - 2007 
In December 2007, Braden Eberle, 4, swallowed two tiny magnets from 
his older brother’s construction kit on two successive days last spring. 
After telling his mother, her first reaction was that the magnet would 
pass through her son’s system without a problem.  ‚People swallow 
pennies of the same size every day,‛ said Jill Eberle.  ‚They’re smaller 
than an eraser.‛ But by the next morning, with Braden still in pain, the 
family’s doctor told them to go straight to the emergency room where 
an X-ray revealed the two magnets were stuck together.  ‚They were 
attracted to each other with the wall of each segment they were in stuck 
together,‛ said Dr Sanjeev Dutta, the paediatric surgeon at Good 
Samaritan Hospital who would operate on Braden later that day.  
‚Because they were so powerful, the wall of the intestine was getting 
squeezed, squeezed, squeezed, and then it just necrosed, or kind of 
rotted away, and created a hole between the two‛ Dr Dutta said. 
Dutta wants to make sure that parents are aware of this risk. "It seems 
like such a benign thing," he said. "[But] these things look like candy to 
a 3-year-old  
Source: Gardner, HealthDay Reporter, HealingWell.com, (2008) 
http://news.healingwell.com/index.php?p=news1&id=612352 
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Section Summary 
This section has described what rare earth magnets are and how they 
are made, in the wider economic context of a race for rare earth 
elements around the world. It has also explored how the process of 
extraction and processing of rare earths generates significant upstream 
harms well before processing into magnets and incorporation into 
children’s toys. Not only are there significant health consequences for 
the children who swallowed these magnets, but whether free in the 
environment or embedded in toys, these types of magnets are 
problematic at disposal.  
The unique characteristics of these magnets have been described, with 
special emphasis on their powerful flux [magnetic pull] and in 
particular their risk as an intestinal perforation, rather than ingestion 
hazard especially for small children (but also for teens and potentially 
for pets). Incorporating these components into children’s toys and 
trinkets may be lawful, but the injuries they inflict, should they 
dislodge and two or more are swallowed, are truly awful. Toy 
companies continue to produce toys containing these magnets in full 
knowledge of the harms they can cause. They continue to take this risk, 
in the belief that stronger methods of attaching the magnets will insure 
them against further tragedies. The following section addresses the 
second toy hazard, the trouble with lead. 
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The Trouble with Lead 
Introduction 
At the time of the global recalls in 2007, the unrestricted presence of 
heavy metals in toys and other products not only posed a hazard to 
children worldwide, but also to foreign factory workers and to the local 
natural environments in which leaded paint was disposed or to which 
contaminated wastewater was released. Lead has been described by the 
American Association for Justice (2009:1) as ‘the second most deadly 
household toxin in existence after arsenic’. Like many other chemicals, 
lead also has ‘significant hazards associated with upstream processes 
like mining < and end of life disposal’ (Healthystuff.org, Undated). 
Children chew, suck and bite their toys during key stages of 
development (think about teething) and their saliva functions as a 
pathway for toxins in their bodies.  
What is Lead? 
Lead is a bluish-grey metal that occurs naturally in the environment. 
Lead is produced from burning fossil fuels, mining and manufacturing 
(Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 2011). It ranks 
among the strong environmental toxins and is bio-accumulative.  
Although typically described as odourless and tasteless, it has also on 
occasion been described as ‘sweet-tasting’, which may make it more 
attractive for children.  
One of the hallmarks of substances like heavy metals is their mobility 
(in their own right). As we saw in 2007, they can also move around the 
world through international trade. This concept of mobility was 
reflected in a Thought starter prepared for the Intergovernmental 
Forum on Chemical Safety (IFCS) by Rosenthal and Wiser (2008: 1) 
asking: 
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 Whether the mobility of lead and cadmium through 
international trade may warrant co-ordinated international 
action to protect human health and the environment? 
Where Does Lead Come From? 
Lead comes from both industrial and domestic sources. Industrial 
sources include ‘mining and metal manufacturing; ’the mining and 
extraction (removal from the ground or sea) of oil gas and coal; and 
‘factories that burn fossil fuels or waste products (NPI Fact Sheet 2009: 
1-2 2). Lead is sometimes used as an admixture in products like car 
batteries and also sometimes in paints, glazes and certain ceramics.  
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC 2010a: 
1) identifies the most common sources of lead poisoning in children as 
‘lead-based paints, contaminated air, water and soil, cosmetics and 
toys’. In some countries (including some provinces in China) leaded 
gasoline remains a source. In addition to lead, those elements known to 
be most dangerous to children playing with toys and finger paints 
include antimony, arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium, mercury and 
selenium (ACCC 2010a: 1). 
Other everyday sources include: 
 Drinking water or breathing air that contains lead, 
 Eating fish or shellfish from polluted waters as lead builds up 
in their tissues, 
 Swallowing or inhaling house dust that contains lead, 
 Playing in soil that contains lead, 
 In proximity to hobbies in which lead is used (e.g. stained glass 
work), 
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 Coming into contact with ‘lead-based’ paint (e.g. in older 
homes), 
 Working in a job where lead is produced or used,(e.g. lead 
smelter, mine), 
 Living near industrial areas where fossil fuels are burnt 
(Adapted from NPI Fact Sheet 2009:2), 
Additions to this list might include children already living with lead in 
their daily lives, such as: 
 Children working in or exposed to e-waste recycling, especially 
in developing countries; and 
 Children living with legacy wastes from past industrial 
activities in both developed and developing countries 
Exposure to lead is not confined to children in the developing world, 
although they may be disproportionately affected. Children in 
Australia, for instance, are also exposed to lead, whether this is legacy 
wastes from past mining activities (e.g., Broken Hill New South Wales); 
children with elevated blood lead levels from current mining activities 
(Port Kembla, South Australia and Mount Isa, Northern Territory) or 
recent spills such as in the Port of Esperance Western Australia. For 
children exposed to lead in their daily lives (in both developed and 
developing worlds) lead in their toys represents a further layer of 
poison. 
Toys Containing Lead 
In 2007, lead re-emerged as a threat in a range of children’s products 
including toys, infant products, PVC items and jewellery. Excessive 
levels of lead were found in the painted surfaces of a range of children’s 
wooden and metal toys, in vinyl baby bibs and lunch boxes, in face 
painting kits, in the logos on children’s backpacks, in lipsticks, 
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Halloween toys and in promotional toys given away with footwear and 
fast food meals as well as in children’s costume jewellery. In Australia, 
along with barium and cadmium, lead was found in fake teeth, masks, 
jewellery and painted wooden blocks given away in promotional ‘show 
bags’ at showgrounds in the cities of Brisbane and Perth; in vending 
machine candy in the United States and leaching from the surface of 
poly-vinyl chloride (PVC) toys in India (See Kumar & Pastore 2007). 
In 2007, according to a RAPEX Report (European Communities 2008: 
13) ‘almost 2 million toys were pulled off store shelves in Europe 
because of excessive levels of lead in their paint’. Figure 5.8 provides a 
very good illustration of the range of heavy metals that might be found 
in a single toy, also making the links between leaded paint and primary 
colours: 
Figure 5.7: Range of Heavy Metals in a Single Toy 
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Lead was also found in children’s metal and pearl-like jewellery 
(Weidenhamer and Clements 2006) and these authors proposed a direct 
link between e-waste and children’s lead-contaminated jewellery (see 
pilot case example Chapter 3). In 2010 in particular there was a spike of 
recalls for of recalls for jewellery contaminated with cadmium. At the 
time it was suggested that because lead was now under closer 
regulatory scrutiny, some manufacturers may be substituting cadmium 
for lead.  
For instance, over a three year period between 2004 and 2007, the 
USCPSC recalled more than 150 million pieces of lead-laden children’s 
jewellery. (Hitchcock and Merzwinski 2008:2). In 2007 alone, the US 
Consumer Product Commission issued 18 recalls, covering more than 
6.7 million pieces of jewellery for children and teenagers containing 
dangerous levels of lead (Fairclough 2007). This problem was not 
confined to China; in Australia in 2008, Makit and Bakit jewellery sets 
made in India were recalled because the clasp on the metal bracelet 
contained impermissible levels of lead (ACCC 2008a). 
PVC toys posed a special risk, representing a case of double-exposure 
for children; on the one hand containing phthalates (thall-eights) 
chemicals used to make the plastic soft, and on the other, the heavy 
metals lead and cadmium, where these are used as stabilisers. The 
trouble with PVC is that it ‘releases its metal stabilisers as dust on its 
surface, which may contain lead or cadmium (Kumar & Pastore 2007: 
817).  
As a material, PVC has been dubbed by global activist organisations 
like Greenpeace International (2003) as ‘the poison plastic’ because of 
toxic emissions throughout its lifecycle from origin to disposal (and 
beyond). Scholars from Toxics Link in India (Kumar and Pastore 
2007:818) say that the ‘chewing, licking and swallowing behaviour of 
children is a common source of lead and cadmium exposure where 
heavy metals are also added to polyvinyl chloride (PVC) as stabilisers 
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and as colouring agents in the form of organo-metallic compounds. The 
These authors also describe a largely uncontrolled, big grey market in 
cheap plastic toys containing phthalates and heavy metals like lead and 
cadmium. In the west, cheap unbranded toys and jewellery typically 
sold through dollar discounts stores remain an enduring threat to 
children. 
In an article in The New York Times, Lipton cites ‘industry officials’ as 
saying that lead ends up in polyvinyl chloride (PVC) from one of three 
primary sources; 
 It is sometimes added as an inexpensive stabiliser, 
 It can come from the pigments used to add colour, or 
 It can come from recycled vinyl, which may have had lead in it 
from its earlier use  
Sometimes much was made of the fact that lead was only  found  on 
components of toys, such as the knobs of spinning tops and pails, on 
the olive-green top of ‘Sarge’ die-cast cars, on the painted decal of a 
plastic drum, or on the yellow headlights of a train car and miniature 
ladder. However, this does not diminish the hazard, because these are 
the very parts of a toy a child is most likely to mouth and it is now well 
understood that little bits of lead over time add up. 
Why Use Lead Paint?  
In September 2007, Barboza, in The New York Times, posed the question 
that was everyone’s mind, Why Lead in Toy Paint? This became a 
widely debated question in the public domain, with most critics 
speculating that the reasons were related to ease of application, making 
the paint brighter, and cost factors. For instance, a businessman told a 
journalist from The Sunday Times (Sheridan 10/8/2007). 
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Lead paint is used because it ‘gives toys a brighter, glossier look 
and is almost half the price of safe paint 
Red and orange are give-away colours and they are also the ones 
which most often fail the safety tests 
As Barboza reports in The New York Times, others attributed the use of 
lead paint to cost-efficiencies: 
The simplest answer, experts and toy companies in China say is 
price. Paint with higher levels of lead often sells for a third of the 
cost of paint with low levels. So Chinese factory owners, trying 
to eke out profits in an intensely competitive and poorly 
regulated market, sometimes cut corners and use the cheaper 
leaded paint (Barboza, the New York times, 11/9/2007). 
This was a widely debated question in the public domain, with most 
critics speculating that the reasons were related to ease of application, 
making the paint brighter, and cost factors. For instance, in New 
Zealand, the Dominion Post (2007) reported that: 
The use of lead paint on toys is heavily restricted in China as 
well as elsewhere, but it is cheaper than the alternatives and is 
reportedly favoured by some Chinese manufacturers because it 
is easier to apply and dry, and offers richer colours’ (Dominion 
Post, 20/8/2007). 
The impression was that China had lower standards, but this was not 
necessarily the case, as pointed out by Barboza, in The New York Times, 
11/9/2007: 
On the books China’s paint standards are stricter than those in 
the United States, requiring that paint intended for household or 
consumer-product use contain no more than 90 parts of lead per 
million (by comparison American regulations in 2007 allowed up 
to 600 parts per million)  
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Health Effects of Lead 
Lead is a known neurotoxin [damaging to nerve tissues] and a 
nephrotoxin [poisonous to the kidneys] (Schettler et al 2000). It is 
associated with negative outcomes in children including impaired 
cognitive, motor, behavioural and physical abilities (CDC 2007; Binns et 
al 2007: 1285).). Some scholars argue that ‘even exposure to low doses of 
lead can cause IQ deficits, attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder and 
deficits in vocabulary, fine motor skills, reaction time and hand-eye co-
ordination’ (Hitchcock and Mierzwinski 2008:9). This is consistent with 
Ted Schettler’s written testimony to a U.S. Senate Committee on 
Environment and Public Works (Schettler 2010:2) that:  
lead exposures that have minimal or no discernible impacts in 
adults can permanently alter brain development and function in 
a child. There is substantial and growing evidence showing that 
environmental exposures during development can increase the 
risk of chronic, degenerative diseases much later in life 
When it comes to heavy metals, children are not little adults; they have 
‘a higher metabolic rate and greater surface area to weight ratio than 
adults, immaturity of organ systems, and rapid growth and 
development of organs and tissue such as bone and brain’ (Becker, 
Edwards and Massey 2010:7986). ‘Children’s exposure also differs from 
that of adults because they ‘drink more fluids, eat more food, and 
breathe more air per kilogram of body weight [and their] hand to 
mouth behaviour creates a pathway for toxic chemicals in toys and 
other products to enter the body’ (Becker et al 2010:7986). 
Lead is an ever-present danger for many children in the developing 
world, where the World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that 15-
18 million children are suffering from permanent brain damage owing 
to lead poisoning (cited in Kumar 2006: 6).  
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In the developed world, lead is an ever present danger for children 
living in old homes with flaking lead paint. Children in certain ethnic 
groups are exposed to lead in locally made pottery (e.g. Mexican 
children) (See Weinhold 2004) and through the use of ‘eye cosmetics 
and folk remedies such as ‚tiro‛ (in Nigeria), surma and ‚kajal‛ (in 
Asia) and ‚Kohl‛ (in the Middle East) (See Morbidity and Mortalilty 
Weekly 2012:574). 
The effect of low-dose exposure to lead over time (e.g. chewing on a 
Thomas™ the tank engine toy for 3 years) and the intergenerational 
effects of exposure to heavy metals like lead have been downplayed, as 
have the effects of cadmium (an emerging threat in children’s 
jewellery): 
 Cadmium is found in breast milk and a small amount will enter 
the infant’s body through breastfeeding. The amount of 
cadmium that can pass to the infant depends on how much 
exposure the mother may have had’ (ATSDR 2012:6). 
Toys and other products intended specifically for children are [only] 
one category of a much larger set of consumer products that expose 
infants and children to toxic chemicals [on a daily basis] such as 
personal care products, furniture and food containers (Becker et al 
2010:7986). These multiple low-dose daily exposures are one reason 
why what is in a toy matters.  
Children are more vulnerable to lead exposure than adults ‘because of 
hand-to-mouth behaviour, their growing bodies absorb more lead and 
their developing brains and nervous systems are more sensitive to the 
damaging effects of lead’ (PIRG 2008:9).  
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The insidiousness of lead is also reflected in the way in which it 
manifests in subtle behavioural changes: 
Neuro-developmental disabilities are not easily defined. They do 
not lend themselves to simple diagnostic tests like blood sugar in 
diabetes or the EEG in epilepsy. They are refined in low clinical 
or behavioural terms and often present as a range or spectrum of 
behaviours (Schettler et al 2000: xi). 
Those groups most vulnerable to lead include boys and girls 
particularly during the first two years of life, pregnant women and the 
developing foetus: 
Pregnant women are also at risk as lead can be passed onto the 
unborn child through the placenta. Exposure of a foetus to lead 
levels is associated with developmental effects during the first 
two years of life. These can include effects on memory, learning 
and problem solving (Department of the Environment and 
Heritage (2009) website at: 
http://www.environment.gov.au/atmosphere/airquality/publicati
ons/health.html) 
Children who have a condition known as pica (the propensity to eat 
non-food items) are especially vulnerable to lead. 
The injuries caused by lead are insidious because they may not be 
immediately evident and by the time symptoms do emerge, the effects 
can be irreversible. In addition, the time lag between exposure and 
presenting symptoms makes establishing the links between cause and 
effect almost impossible to prove, especially if there are multiple 
sources of lead in a child’s environment. Lead exposure produces 
different effects at different levels in the blood as shown in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5: Different Lead Blood Levels – Different Effects 
Micrograms per 
decilitre 
Behavioural Changes/Effects 
10-25  suppression of appetite with resulting weight loss 
 sleep disturbance 
 hyperactivity 
 reductions in intelligence and short-term memory 
 irritability 
 shortened attention span 
30-50 
 requiring special education,  
 dropping out of school, and  
 reading disability as a young adult 
Higher  
concentrations 
 irreversible mental retardation and seizures,  
 intermittent abdominal pain or constipation,  
 coma and  
 even death 
Source: Tabulated from Australian Department of Environment, Water 
Health (DEWHA) and the Arts (now Department of Sustainability, 
Environment, Water, Populations and Communities (DSEWPC 2009). 
 
Scientific studies indicate that in terms of the central nervous system, 
there is no safe level of lead. Research continues to reflect reducing lead 
exposure thresholds, based on growing evidence ‘that children’s 
physical and mental development can be affected at blood lead levels 
below 10 ug/dl’ (Centres for Disease Control 2007 at 
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5608a1.htm).  
Likewise, Hitchcock and Mierzwinski (2008:9) note that ‘even exposure 
to low doses of lead can cause IQ deficits, attention-deficit hyperactivity 
disorder and deficits in vocabulary, fine motor skills, reaction time and 
hand-eye co-ordination’. As Kumar and Pastore (2007:6) observe ‘when 
considering the impact of lead on the body, it is important to remember 
that ‘what constituted ‚safe‛ yesterday is no longer ‚safe‛ today and 
what is ‚safe‛ today may not be ‚safe‛ tomorrow (Kumar and Pastor 
2006: 6). 
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Pathways of Exposure 
Children ingest lead-laden dust through normal hand to mouth 
behaviours by simply placing their hand or an object in their mouth [or] 
when handling food during eating’ (See American Academy of 
Paediatrics 2005b: 1041. This has serious implications, especially for the 
chewing, licking and biting of lead-contaminated toys over time, 
especially during key developmental stages such as teething. The 
following diagram (Figure 5.7) from a 2008 World Health Organisation 
presentation summarises the multiple sources of lead and critical 
windows of harm for children and adolescents. 
Figure 5.8: Multiple Sources of Lead for Children 
 
Source: World Health Organisation Presentation (2008: Slide 35). 
Australia’s national regulator for consumer products, the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC 2010a: 1) notes that 
‘the most common sources of lead poisoning in children are lead-based 
paints, contaminated air, water, toys and cosmetics (ACCC 2010a: 1). 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC 1985: 1) notes 
that ‘childhood lead poisoning is one of the most common pediatric 
health problems in the United States today, and it is entirely 
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preventable’. Target organs for lead include the bones, brain, blood, 
kidneys and thyroid gland (ATSDR 2007: 8). 
‘Lead can be brought home via dust on hands or clothes when it is used 
in the place where you work’ (ATSDR 2007:9). Those workers who 
sprayed the leaded toys may have redistributed lead particles from 
paint on their clothes on return to corporate dormitories (where they 
typically live) or in some cases to their own homes. The washing of 
clothes in the family washing machine is also known to distribute lead 
particles. Heavy metals like lead (and cadmium) can also be present in 
air (dust), water (for drinking and sediments in rivers), soil 
(contaminated) and in the food chain (green leafy vegetables; drinking 
water; bottled water). 
Exposure to lead has been liked to lung, stomach and bladder cancer. 
The part of the body most sensitive to lead exposure is the central 
nervous system, especially in children. In pregnant women exposure to 
high levels of lead has been linked to miscarriage, premature births and 
smaller babies. Exposure to high levels of lead in the womb can cause 
decreased mental ability (IQ), learning difficulties and reduced growth 
(See ATSDR 2007: 1) 
Insidiousness of Lead 
Schettler et al (2000) in a publication titled In Harm’s Way notes that 
lead is an invisible and insidious harm that relies on early detection for 
protection. Other scholars suggest that more studies are required on 
whether there is a relationship between heavy metals like chromium, 
cadmium and autism in children (See Yorbik, Kurt, Hasimi and Ozturk 
(2010). Other studies have also explored a potential link between high 
levels of lead in the body and crime (Nevin 2007; Stretesky and Lynch 
2001; Needleman et al 2002).  
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In the midst of the lead-related recalls for children’s toys in 2007, 
Christopher Zinn a spokesman for Australian consumer watchdog 
Choice summed up the insidious nature of lead in comments to a 
journalist: 
 Lead is not a thing you can detect just by looking at it, in the way 
you might reject something that looks shonky < you have to rely 
on an authority and its system of checks and balances (Zinn, 
quoted in Shtargot, The Age, Melbourne, Australia 3/8/2007). 
Once lead enters the body, it travels through the bloodstream and is 
stored, mainly in the bones, where it can remain for a lifetime (AAP 
2005a). It  travels in the blood to the ‘soft tissues’ and organs (liver, 
kidneys, lungs, brain, spleen, muscles, heart) and after several weeks 
most of it moves into the bones and teeth, with approximately 73% of 
the lead in children’s bodies being stored in their bones (ATSDR Public 
Health Statement Lead 2007: 6).  
Some of the lead can stay in the body for decades, however some can 
leave the bones and re-enter blood and organs during after a bone is 
broken, during advancing age, periods of breast-feeding and during 
pregnancy. In pregnant women high levels of exposure to lead may 
cause miscarriage and high level exposure in men can damage the 
organs responsible for sperm production (ATSDR Public Health 
Statement Lead 2007:6).  
These are concerns not only for children exposed to lead-contaminated 
toys, but also for foreign workers exposed to lead paint in the supply 
chains that made these particular toys. A little bit of lead on a children’s 
toy might seem innocuous but that depends on what stage of 
development the child is at, over what period of time a child chewed on 
the toy (e.g. some of these toys were on the market for up to five years)  
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The issues in relation to lead in toys and jewellery were two-fold: lead 
by weight (e.g. as in jewellery items) and accessible lead (e.g. the 
amount of lead that can potentially migrate from a product during use). 
For instance, if swallowed, a metal charm or trinket can (and has 
already) killed a child, whereas paint on the surface of a toy is much 
more insidious, migrating from the product through repeated chewing, 
biting or licking of the surface of the toy over time. According to the 
American Academy of Paediatrics (2005b: 1036), ‘Evidence continues to 
accrue that commonly encountered blood lead concentrations, even 
those less than 10ug/dl may impair cognition and there is no threshold 
yet identified for this effect . 
Much was  made of declining lead thresholds as a result of taking the 
lead out of petrol (although some developing countries still have leaded 
petrol), but this denies the fact that millions of children are living with 
lead as part of their daily lives in both developing and developed 
countries, albeit with differing levels of protection and advocacy.  As 
Kumar and Pastore (2007) noted in relation to lead thresholds in a study 
of India’s toxic toys, ‘it is important to understand that what constituted 
‚safe‛ yesterday is no longer ‚safe‛ today and what is ‚safe‛ today 
may not be ‚safe‛ tomorrow.  As we gather more knowledge about the 
trouble with lead, the thresholds at which it is considered harmful to 
human health (in particular) continue to trend downwards. 
Where is the Lead Now? 
In December 2008, US consumer advocacy group, Healthytoys.org 
found lead was still showing up in 20% of the 1,500 toys they tested. 
Key take-home messages at the time were: 
Lead is still in toys – lead is still turning up in children’s toys and 
trinkets 
It’s not just lead – Cadmium, mercury, arsenic and bromine were 
also found in children’s toys 
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Lead in jewellery – jewellery remains the most contaminated 
product category tested. It is five times more likely to contain lead 
above the federal threshold than other products 
It’s not just China - China is not the only culprit – 21% of toys 
from China and 16% of those from all other countries had 
detectable levels of lead 
PVC is still an issue - toys made from PVC are still problematic 
viven the human health and environmental hazards associated 
with its manufacture, consumption and disposal 
The good news – 324 [of the approximately 1500 toys tested] 
contained no chemicals of concern (Adatped from Healthytoys.org 
2008: Full version  Available at 
http://www.preventharm.org/Content/117.php). 
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Victims and Survivors of Lead in toys 
The following statistical snapshot selected from data provided by the 
USCPSC, provides examples of incidents reported to the agency by 
consumers who believed their children had been affected by lead in 
toys, many of whom had recorded elevated blood lead levels: 
Lead-Related Deaths and Injuries – United States 
Table 5.6: Statistical Snapshot - Lead-related Injuries - United States 
Product Narrative 
Wooden Blocks 
Consumer believes son has delayed speech and scored 15 
on lead test because of lead-containing wooden blocks he 
chewed on. 
Toys 
Boy playing with several toys that contain lead was 
diagnosed and confirmed with lead poisoning. 
Toy Horse 
Girl diagnosed with seizure disorder. Consumer reports 
child has toy horse recalled for high content of lead which 
may have caused seizures. 
Toy Unknown 
Child sick the day after he played with a new toy which had 
a warning label for lead. Consumer concerned that son's 
illness was related to lead. 
Tank Train 
Boy diagnosed with autism had extremely high lead levels 
caused by tank trains he constantly carried. He bathed with 
them, chewed them, mouthed them, and slept with them. 
Train 
Girl playing with train had routine check- up.  Lead levels 
in her blood gone from 2 to 11. Consumer feels train is 
unsafe due to lead hazard. Product related to a recall. 
Train 
Boy suffered some degree of lead poisoning from a train 
under recall. Boy chewed and mouthed before recall was 
made. 
Train 
Boy showed signs of development delay and autism after 
lead poisoning from wooden train under recall. 
Wooden Train 
Boy showed high blood lead levels after playing with 
wooden train.  Test results showed decrease in lead levels 
after stopped playing with toy.  
Toy 
Boy suffered possible lead poisoning.  Two physicians from 
poison control said symptoms may relate to hard plastics 
toys that were recalled. 
Train 
Boy tested positive for elevated blood lead levels.  
Respondent said when trains were removed boy's lead level 
became normal.  
  
153 
Train 
Boy developed lead poisoning after playing with toy train. 
The train has been placed in a recall program. 
Toys 
Girl was found to have high blood lead levels of 35.5 during 
routine physical check- up. She played for years with toys 
now recalled. 
Toys 
Girl tested for lead level and results came back with level of 
18. Girl has variety of toys. 
Toy Unknown 
Lead poisoning of male who suffered over two hours of 
unconsciousness and severe brain damage. 
Charms 
Child tested positive for lead exposure. Parents came across 
marker set. Charm on marker tested positive for lead. 
Play Medical 
Kit 
Girl diagnosed with blood lead levels of 10 after playing 
with every day medical kit. 
Figurines & 
House 
Three children tested positive for high levels of lead. 
Consumer believes illness related to recalled figurines and 
house. 
Wooden Train 
Girl tested positive for elevated blood lead levels. 
Consumer tested wooden trains with home lead testing kit 
and green, blue and red colours tested positive for lead. 
Handmade 
Mexican Toys 
Two children checked and confirmed to have elevated lead 
blood levels after playing with handmade toys from 
Mexico. 
Medallion from 
Spinning Toy 
A boy swallowed a quarter sized metal medallion from a 
spinning toy. After surgery to remove toy lead was found in 
toy. Boy still has elevated levels of lead in his body, some 
short-term memory loss. 
Train & 
attachable Car 
Boy diagnosed with lead poisoning after playing with train 
and attachable car. 
Toy Car Consumer attributes lead poisoning to toy car. 
Wooden Train 
Lead test done on son and it came out 8.7 - very high. 
Consumer states child playing with wooden train and 
putting in mouth every day. She did not know of lead 
related recall. 
Train 
Boy has back pain & having problems going to the 
bathroom from exposure to lead from train.  He is in 
hospital for possible kidney failure. 
Wooden Train 
Wooden trains contained lead causing boy to have high 
levels of lead in blood stream led to decrease in appetite, 
hyperactivity and speech delay. 
Toy Car 
Consumer's son's hands started itching after playing with 
remote controlled toy car. Box said toy contains lead. 
Toy Cars 
Child opened set of toy cars. After 5 minutes developed 
huge red rash over his hands and diagnosed with lead 
poisoning.  He experienced breathing problems and nausea 
and died the following day (no death certificate provided). 
USCPSC 2011(b) NEISS Incident and Injury Data 
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Case Reports 
The following account is drawn from a peer reviewed medical journal 
and gives voice to the medical professionals who cared for children 
injured by lead in their toys. 
Box 5.4: Case Report 1 - Lead 
Case Report 1 
Four Year Old Boy - 2006 
In mid-February 2006, a boy aged 4 years with a previous medical history of 
microcephaly and developmental delay was brought to a hospital paediatric 
emergency department in Minneapolis, Minnesota, with a chief complaint of 
vomiting. Probable viral gastroenteritis was diagnosed, and the boy was 
administered ondansetron, an antiemetic; his parents were encouraged to 
increase his fluid intake, and he was released. He returned to the emergency 
department 2 days later with intractable vomiting, poor oral intake, ‚sore 
tummy,‛ and listlessness.  He was dehydrated and had normal blood sodium 
and elevated blood urea nitrogen levels. He received intravenous fluid 
replacement and was admitted to the hospital. 
The next day, about 10 hours after admission, the boy became agitated and 
combative and exhibited possible posturing. During transport to the radiology 
department, the boy suffered a respiratory arrest associated with seizure-type 
activity. He was resuscitated and placed on mechanical ventilation. He was 
administered a computer tomography (CT) scan of his head and of his chest 
and radiographs of his abdomen.  The CT scan revealed diffuse cerebral 
oedema, and the boy underwent emergent ventriculostomy and 
decompressive craniotomy. A heart-shaped object was observed on his 
abdominal radiographs but it was thought to be a radiopaque probe on his 
body. When the radiographs were examined again, the object was recognised 
as a foreign body in his stomach, and testing for heavy metal levels was 
requested. 
The next day, a BLL of 180µg/dL was reported; cerebral blood flow studies 
indicated no flow to the brain, and the boy met clinical brain death criteria.  
On the fourth day of hospitalization, the child was removed from life support 
and died. Upon autopsy, a heart-shaped charm imprinted with ‚Reebok‛ was 
removed from the child’s stomach. The mother recognized the object as a 
charm that came with a pair of shoes belonging to another child whose home 
her son had visited.  The mother was not aware that her son had ingested the 
charm, and he had no history of ingesting non-food substances. Acid digestion 
testing performed on the ingested charm by the Minneapolis Public Health 
Department Laboratory using EPA protocol 3050§ determined that the charm 
consisted of 99.1% lead 
Source: Centre of Disease Control (2006), ‚Death of a Child After Ingestion of 
a Metallic Charm-Minnesota, 2006’, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report , 
55(12):340-341 
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Case Vignette 
 
The following case vignette is representative of accounts of suffering as 
a result of ingesting lead-contaminated jewellery. 
 
Box 5.5 Case Vignette - Lead 
 
Case Vignette 1 
Four Year Old Boy - 2006 
In February 2006, a four year old Minnesota boy died of lead poisoning after 
swallowing a heart-shaped charm from a bracelet, given away with the 
purchases of a pair of Reebok shoes. The news that the company had been 
fined US$1 million came as small comfort for the mother of Jarnell Brown. 
‚I just don't really believe that my son is gone because of some shoes," said 
Juanna Graham, who said her life has been "hell" since Jarnell died on Feb. 22, 
2006. Jarnell suffered vomiting, seizures and respiratory arrest before dying at 
Children's Hospital in Minneapolis. "I think that no child should have to 
suffer as much as my child did," said Graham, who now lives in St. Louis 
Park. ‚Jarnell was an intelligent, sweet child who could recite his own phone 
number and who taught his little brother to walk‛, she said. 
Source: Lemagie, The Star Tribune, 18/3/2008 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an insight into the characteristics of lead and 
rare earth magnets, two of the most prolific hazards found in children’s 
toys. It emphasises that lifecycle harms (including upstream emissions) 
need to be taken into account when assessing the true toxicity of any 
product (not just toys). In addition, there is the issue of both lead and 
magnets migrating from the toys (at consumption) as well those 
relating to disposal of both contaminated raw materials and returned 
toxic products in the countries of import. Of concern too are the current 
and intergenerational harms associated with incinerating and/or 
dumping toxic toys to landfill, as well as the ultimate links to 
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. Making these links is 
important to understanding how to reduce pollution of the planet. 
Chapter 6 examines the ‘global’ supply chain and distribution network 
as the primary mode of transference for these products including what 
they contained and subsequently released. 
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Chapter 6: The ‘Global’ Supply Chain 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the dynamics and dimensions of the ‘global’ 
supply chain and distribution network. It begins with a review of the 
economic significance of the supply chain, including the risks 
associated with extended supply chains that span geographical and 
jurisdictional borders. The discussion then narrows to a focus on the toy 
supply chain, with a particular emphasis on the China supply chain 
where this refers to the manufacturing sector of toy companies 
extended supply chains, located in Guangdong province in China. This 
chapter challenges the focus on the ‘global’ in the supply chain, arguing 
instead for an equivalent focus on the  ‘local’, one that recognises that 
the consequences of discrete supply chain activities (e.g. extraction, 
production,  consumption, disposal) are experienced most acutely at the 
local level by different people, places and natural landscapes, where 
these activities are carried out. 
The ‘Global’ Supply Chain 
According to the World Economic Forum (WEF 2012: 3) ‘global supply 
chains and transport networks form the backbone of the global 
economy, fuelling trade, consumption and economic growth’. 
Conversely supply chains can also be responsible for some of the most 
destructive upstream (extractive), midstream (manufacturing) and 
downstream (disposal) harms, directly impacting local people, places 
and natural landscapes in different locations across the world where 
discrete activities in the chain are located. What differentiates today’s 
global supply chains is that ‘companies are involved in managing 
supply chain risks across oceans and continents’ (FM Global 2006: 9) 
and ‘what is new is the speed and scale of the current wave of 
globalisation and the associated phenomena of outsourcing and off-
shoring’ (OECD 2007: 2). 
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In reflecting on the global financial crisis, a recent publication by global 
consultants Ernst and Young (2009: 10) describes the nature of today’s 
supply chains as: 
 increasingly global with business participants from developed and 
developing countries frequently separated by language, culture, 
geography, different time zones, physical distance and disparate 
systems using a variety of processes 
This study also notes that one of the downsides of globalisation is ‘the 
localisation of risks and harms as companies increasingly choose to 
transfer their manufacturing, labour and environmental costs abroad’: 
Risk can present itself anywhere along the [off-shore] supply 
chain [and] as supply chains reach farther into remote areas of 
developing countries, new uncertainties arise regarding vendor 
selection and management, regulatory compliance, supply chain 
design and currency fluctuation, among others. These risks can 
be dramatically different and less anticipated than those 
associated with a local [onshore] supply chain (Ernst & Young 
2009:12).  
The World Economic Forum (WEF 2012: 4) rates the top five external 
risks to the supply chain as ‘natural disasters, conflict and political 
unrest, sudden demand shocks, export/import restrictions and 
terrorism’. Others suggest that ‘among the top challenges for companies 
are product recalls, supply chain controls, price pressures, a changing 
regulatory environment and corporate sustainability (See Horwitch 
2008). There is also an argument that that risk is less important than 
resilience in the supply chain - that is the capacity for supply chain 
stakeholders to bounce back. But when things go wrong in a far-off 
component of the extended supply chain economic, political and 
cultural factors can complicate resolution of the issues. 
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Global trends that affect supply chains include market liberalisation, 
trade restructuring, the increasing power of retailers and consumer 
demand, among others. But by far the greatest threat to off-shore 
supply chains is disruption, as occurred in the toy supply chain in 2007. 
As Ernst & Young (2009: 12) reflect ‘recent headlines regarding the 
quality of children’s toys and infant formula are dramatic reminders 
that low-cost country sourcing, while it can lower an organisation’s 
expenses, can be fraught with risk’. This is consistent with the views 
expressed by a risk consultant, commenting on outsourcing practices in 
the supply chain: 
The convoluted supply chain is probably one of the most 
underestimated and unrecognized risks in China. You really 
have to have experienced people on the ground that know what 
they’re doing and know the language (General Manager for 
Greater China, Control Risks, quoted in Barboza, The New York 
Times, 5/1/2008). 
Another argument is that the executive boardroom is out of touch with 
what is happening in their off-shore supply chains, an issue not widely 
discussed in relation to these recalls. For instance, a global survey of 500 
executives conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU 2009: 4) 
suggests an underlying factor for supply chain failure may be lack of 
understanding of supply chains at Board level: 
As many as 35% of respondents believe there is still a lack of 
understanding of supply-chain risk at a board level. 
Furthermore, nearly one-half feel that their company 
underestimates the potential impact of supply chain risk, and 
that it lacks expertise in knowing how to deal with it. 
Meanwhile, 40% believe their organisation lacks visibility 
across its entire supply chain The Economist Intelligence Unit 
2009: 4).  
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A characteristic of many supply chains is that most have one or more 
off-shore components. Increasingly this is manufacturing, typically 
located in a developing economy, sometimes in a special economic 
zone, such as in these cases Guangdong, province, China. This distance 
makes chains difficult to manage and as Woo (2008: 7) notes this 
‘changes the dynamics of responsibility, accountability and liability’: 
Some argue that corporations cannot be held 100 per cent 
accountable for slip-ups when hundreds of suppliers and 
thousands of employees are involved. Others say it is impossible 
for a company to test every batch of toys produced. The most a 
company can do is pick its suppliers carefully, strengthen 
communications, consistently implement rigorous inspections 
and threaten to cease business with companies that fail (Woo 
2008: 7). 
What makes this process even more ‘complex’ or challenging is not so 
much the structure of the chain; but rather establishing and maintaining 
robust ‘relationships of trust’ with supply chain partners across 
geographical, jurisdictional, economic, political, social and cultural 
borders, when arms-lengths governance is the order of the day. When 
something goes wrong in another jurisdiction, as it did in China (e.g. 
lead paint on toys; magnets dislodging from finished toys) then 
managing the political and economic relationships becomes the 
complex part. 
The toy supply chain 
The supply chains responsible for the toxic toys in this study placed a 
heavy reliance on relationships based on trust rather than enforcement, 
monitoring and verification. Mattel provides an example of the 
reciprocal nature of these relationships and the benefits and risks 
inherent in the chain: 
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As a part of our efforts to cut costs, achieve better efficiencies 
and increase productivity and service quality, Mattel relies 
significantly on vendor and outsourcing relationships with third 
parties for services and systems including manufacturing, 
transportation, logistics and information technology. Any 
shortcoming of a Mattel vendor or outsourcer, particularly an 
issue affecting the quality of these services or systems, may be 
attributed by customers to Mattel, thus damaging Mattel’s 
reputation, brand value and potentially affecting the results of 
operations. In addition, problems with transitioning these 
services and systems or operating failures with these vendors 
and outsourcers could cause delays in product sales, reduce 
efficiency of Mattel’s operations, and significant capital 
investments could be required to remediate the problem (Mattel 
Inc 10K Filing 2010: 15). 
Mattel’s business depends in large part on the success of its 
vendors and outsources, and Mattel’s brands and reputation 
may be harmed by actions taken by third-parties that are outside 
Mattel’s control. In addition, any material failure, inadequacy or 
interruption resulting from such vendors or outsourcings could 
harm Mattel’s ability to effectively operate its business (Mattel 
10K Filing 2010: 15). 
The toy supply chain then consists of different sized companies in 
different localities, co-operating to bring toys to the global market place 
with each country playing its part by completing the activities assigned 
to it in the chain. In this way the supply chain functions not only as a 
conduit for the flow of goods but also a web of relationships between 
organisations, which in these instances, although contractual, appear to 
have been largely based on trust, that trust sometimes arising out of 
long-term partnerships between toy companies in the west and their 
wholly dedicated or preferred contract vendors in China.  
161 
Toy companies (and the safety of toys) are heavily reliant upon selected 
Chinese vendors manufacturing toys to prescribed standards and 
specifications and getting those toys to market as quickly as possible. 
Contract factories in China too are heavily reliant on toy companies, for 
all or a part of their business.  There is a relationship between the size of 
the toy company (e.g. transnational, medium, small companies) and the 
size of the Chinese contract vendor (e.g. from mega vendors like Early 
Light Industrial to medium sized vendors like Lee Der Industrial to 
smaller vendors). Cancelling a contract is going to be more 
economically disastrous for the smaller operators (as was the case for 
Lee Der, for instance). 
Size matters when it comes to toy safety. According to a European 
Commission Report (European Commission 2008: 3), ‘the toy supply 
chain consists of different types of actors, each playing a distinct role 
when it comes to product safety; the way these various actors interact 
depends largely on their position in the chain and a defining 
characteristic of the way in which toys arrive on the European market is 
the amount of control that different stakeholders in the chain (eg OEMs, 
retailers, traders) exert on this chain’ (see Dannwolf et al 2011). The rule 
of thumb is ‘the smaller the player, the lower its buying power, the 
weaker its influence on the supply chain and consequently its ability to 
control product safety. Overall there were a range of stakeholders in the 
supply chain that bought these toys to market. (See Table 6.2). 
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Table 6.1 Key Stakeholders in the Toy Supply Chain 
Stakeholder Activities 
Toy Companies 
(OEM’s) 
Design, develop and commission the manufacturing of 
toys, often in offshore locations. 
Contract Vendors  Off-shore factories that manufacture toys on behalf of toy 
companies under contractual arrangements. 
Raw Material 
Factories 
Companies that supply Contract Vendors with raw 
materials like paint or paint pigment. 
Sub-contractors Companies that paint toys or components of toys for 
Chinese contract vendors. 
Factory Workers The hands that make the toys. 
Marketing 
Agents 
Agencies that promote and advertise the toys. 
Export Logistics 
Agents 
Agencies that transport, store, and distribute toys at point 
of export and import. 
Import Logistics 
Agents 
Transport warehouse and distribute toys at point of 
import. 
Traders  Agents who scour international markets to purchase toys 
on behalf of big retailers (e.g. discount stores).  
Wholesalers Companies that import toys directly and distribute them 
through retail channels. 
Retailers Retailers (mega, specialist and small) that buy and sell the 
toys through physical (stores) or virtual (online) channels. 
Consumers Individuals and groups who purchase the toys. 
End-users Those who play with the toys, predominantly children. 
Waste 
Companies 
Those who arrange disposal of toys in domestic and 
commercial settings, as well as en masse disposal of 
contaminated toys. 
 
Dannwolf et al (2011:11) explain in detail the level of control some of 
these key stakeholders have over product safety, paraphrased as 
follows: 
 Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM’s) [like Mega Brands, 
Mattel, RC2, Schylling] – exert a larger amount of control over 
the manufacturing chain, including raw material supplier 
controls, supplier auditing, production monitoring and product 
testing  
 Retailers [like Wal-Mart, Target, Toys R Us] – exert limited 
influence over product design, since except for companies that 
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develop their ‘own-brand’ toys, most retailers are not involved in 
toy development. Nevertheless, especially the bigger [mega 
retailers] often make significant efforts to control the safety of the 
products they buy including: supplier auditing, prototype 
testing, finished product testing, phase-out programs, and 
chemical control programs [Wal-Mart is an example here]. 
However they typically employ a lower number of safety-
dedicated personnel and safety contact with vendors tends to be 
less frequent 
 Traders [e.g. middlemen, brokers, buyers for example for big 
discount chains] - exert control over distribution, but no 
significant control over design or manufacturing. Combined 
with the often small size of these companies, and the fact that 
they might import many other types of products besides toys, 
means they are often not aware of all the relevant requirements 
and have less capacity to control product safety. They often 
source toys directly from Chinese manufacturers, choosing from 
a selection of toys in catalogues or at toy fairs 
Source: Adapted from Dannwolf et al (2011:11) 
A further group that could be added to this analysis are off-shore 
contractors (from mega to medium to small). Here too size, capacity 
and interaction with local networks have a bearing on what happens in 
practice on the ground  
Mega retailers are a group that can exert enormous pressure on toy 
companies. For toy companies mega retailers are both competitors (e.g. 
produce own-brand products that compete with the products of toy 
companies) and customers (purchase stock from toy companies. The 
larger retailers dictate which brands they will buy, from which toy 
companies and the volumes they will stock on their shelves.  
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As an example of these dynamics, Mattel Inc (like many large toy 
companies), relies on its three largest customers [the mega retailers Wal-
Mart, Toys R Us, and Target] for a fair proportion of its business. In 
2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, this represented 43%, 41%, 38%, and 40% 
respectively, of Mattel’s worldwide consolidated net sales. 
 
Table 6.2: Mattel’s Three Largest Customers Proportion of Net Sales 
2006-2009 
 
Mega Retailer 2006 
US$ Billion 
2007 
US$ Billion 
2008 
US$ Billion 
2009 
US$ Billion 
Wal-Mart 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 
Toys ‚R‛ Us 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Target 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.5 
Percent of 
worldwide 
consolidated 
Net sales 
43% 41% 38% 40% 
Source: Tabulated from Mattel Inc 10k Filing (2010) 
 
This ‘strain’ (See Agnew) has been exacerbated in recent years as some 
of these mega retailers have rationalised their business interests, 
resulting in fewer retail channels for toys. In short, ‘toy production and 
consumption occur in a global system characterised by convoluted 
supply chains with constant downward pressure on prices’ (Becker, 
Edwards and Massey 2010: 7988). All of this has implications for 
product safety, as noted by USCPSC Commissioner, Sir Thomas Moore 
in a written statement to a U.S. Senate panel on the safety of toys: 
 A contributing factor to product harm is the global market’s 
reliance on competition [but] such competition does not and will 
not inevitably take the form of a rivalry to produce the safest 
product *nor will+ the competition and voluntary action of today’s 
businessmen... always suffice to safeguard the public interest 
(Moore 2007: 2). 
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Certain pressure points exist along the chain that are especially 
vulnerable to the types of opportunistic crimes typically associated with 
fierce competition (e.g. using less of something, using cheaper raw 
materials, using poorer quality materials, substituting a cheaper 
substance or material for a more expensive one, turning a blind eye to 
testing because it takes time or is expensive). The underlying drivers for 
this behaviour may lie in the characteristics of the toy industry itself in 
its preoccupation with speed to market from design and development 
to consumption; cyclical supply and demand, an emphasis on the ‘lean’ 
supply chain (among the desired elements being improved supplier 
performance and accountability, reduced logistics costs, reduced lead 
times), and the demand-driven nature of the network. 
As Sheridan (2007) noted, in an article in The Sunday Times, in the 
United Kingdom,  at the height of the recalls ‘whilst business may be 
booming for big toy companies, the reverse may be true for Chinese 
contract factories who have had the ‚squeeze‛ put on them by the 
larger companies. 
A plastic toy sold to a British consumer for 99p 
typically costs 22p when it leaves the Chinese 
factory, making the margins attractive for 
everybody except the manufacturer. When the cost 
of raw materials is deducted, the factory may get as 
little as 7p to cover labour, overheads and profits. 
That is why Chinese manufacturers [may] be 
tempted to cut corners (Sheridan, The Sunday Times,  
15/8/2007). 
  
166 
This competitive environment is likely to be more conducive to 
opportunistic crimes. For instance, to cut corners, a supplier might use 
less of something, a less expensive chemical, a different metal, or a toxic 
substance that mimics a non-toxic substance undetectable with current 
testing equipment. There exists what Savacool (2010: 3) describes as ‘a 
clash between two separate ways of thinking, one concerned with 
human welfare, honesty and morality and the other with profit 
maximisation and ruthless efficiency, conditioned by shareholders and 
management directives’. 
Profits depend on keeping production costs low (getting the best 
manufacturing deal in China), on retaining and building market share – 
in part determined by winning shelf-space at mega retailers - whilst at 
the same time competing with mega retailers own-brand toys. 
Examined in the context of competition and the practice of off-shore 
manufacturing, toy making appears to be quite a risky endeavour. The 
‘demand for low cost products creates pressures for companies to 
externalise environmental and social costs, resulting in unsafe working 
conditions, environmental pollution and a drive toward using the 
cheapest and often toxic materials’ (Becker, Edwards and Massey 2010: 
7988). 
The China Supply Chain 
The principle of lowest cost location has driven the practice of off-
shoring, so that the majority of toys are made in a country 
geographically removed from the place of consumption (and disposal). 
Although toys are manufactured globally, ‘China is by far the biggest 
exporter of toys in the world’ (European Commission 2008:2) with 
‘Hong Kong-owned toy makers supply[ing] nine out of ten toys sold in 
the United States’ (Tsang 2010).  
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In 2007, China’s manufacturers accounted for approximately 80% of the 
world market for toys and employed more than 4 million workers 
(Navarro 2007). The China supply chain is held together by contractual 
relationships between brand owners, toy companies, Chinese 
manufacturers and suppliers and Hong Kong brokers who handle 
logistics. Many of these toys are manufactured in Guangdong Province, 
a special economic zone in China, where approximately 70%-80% of the 
world’s toys are made in ‘supply chain cities’ (Navarro 2007: 14) that 
make products for foreign-owned brands, ‘on a scale and at a price no 
other country can match.’ (Spencer 2007).  
According to Biggemann (2008: 1) ‘the toy industry sources more than 
two-thirds of its products from China’ and at the time of the recalls the 
Chinese toy sector was estimated to comprise approximately 2,700 
companies (See Dannwolf et al 2011: Woo 2008). Navarro (2007: 4) notes 
that ‘theattractiveness of China as an off-shore destination includes low 
wages, a highly efficient industrial network clustering, lax 
environmental regulations and enforcement, minimal worker health 
and safety regulations as well as  ‘low raw material costs’ (Kavilanz 
2007). In addition, China’s potential as a lucrative consumer market of 
enormous proportions, makes it even more attractive to foreign 
investors.  
Although there are obvious advantages in setting up business in China, 
others note the inherent weaknesses from the Chinese perspective. For 
instance Li and Fung Research Centre (2006: 19) observe that  
many export-oriented clusters in the People’s Republic of China 
are owned by foreign investors, who choose to set up business in 
China because of the cheap land and favourable tax policies 
<they often lack a common mission, trust and co-operation 
required for a successful and all-embraced cluster’ (Li and Fung 
Research Centre 2006: 19). 
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Most large toy companies now manufacture their products in foreign 
countries, usually in developing economies. This is typically achieved 
through a network of ‘contract factories’ (that is factories not owned or 
operated by the toy company), but with which toy companies enter into 
partnership agreements to manufacture branded toys to certain 
specifications. Mattel provides a good example of this arrangement. 
Although the company does own some factories in China, the majority 
of the recalled toys were manufactured in ‘Tier II’ factories, that is, 
facilities not owned or operated by the company. Similarly, the majority 
of toys in this study were manufactured in these types (Tier II) of 
factories (See Figure 6.3) 
Figure 6.3: Example of Mattel’s Global Manufacturing Facilities 
Mattel’s Global Manufacturing Facilities 
Tier 1 11 manufacturing and 
tooling facilities – 
owned, operated or 
managed by Mattel 
China 
Indonesia 
Malaysia 
Thailand 
Mexico 
Manufacture approximately 
50% of Mattel’s products. 
Tier II 75 contract factories or 
vendors, not owned, 
operated or managed by 
Mattel 
China 
India 
Brazil 
Manufacture approximately 
50% of Mattel’s products. 
Mattel products may account 
for between 30%and 90% of a 
vendor’s total annual 
production. 
Tier III 1,000 licenses who have 
signed agreements with 
Mattel 
Not stated Permitted to use Mattel logos 
and characters on various 
products such as apparel, 
electronics and sporting goods. 
Source: Mattel Global Citizenship Report (2007) 
There are specific advantages in these types of off-shoring 
arrangements, noted by Johnson (2001: 119) as ‘allowing toy companies 
to transfer their labour costs and pollution, but also capital investment 
costs, avoiding a multimillion dollar investment in plant, property and 
equipment’. The International Council of Toy Industries, on its website, 
also notes the economic advantages of off-shore manufacturing:  
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While Europe, Japan and the United States have highly 
developed research and development programs as well as 
manufacturing facilities, the lower labour costs in such countries 
as China have made the Far East of ever-increasing importance 
in production phases of the toy industry (International Council 
of Toy Industries (ICTI 2010 at: <http://www.toy-
icti.org/info/internationalsales.html>). 
In addition, Johnson (2005: 22) argues that ‘this dual sourcing strategy 
achieves high productivity in *Mattel’s+ own plants, while ensuring 
changes of customer demand and performances can be satisfied 
through outsourced partners’. This type of arrangement (which many 
companies have, not just Mattel) also provides a buffer between foreign 
manufacturers and their supply chain partners.  
During the recalls this structure provided an opportunity for blame-
shifting to occur up and down the chain. Foreign manufacturers 
avoided responsibility, by blaming Chinese contract factories for both 
lead and magnet-related unsafe toys. However these dedicated or 
preferred contract factories (in China) form an integral part of toy 
companies extended supply chains, and as such toy companies are 
responsible for poor production practices and inadequate testing 
regimes, in short the safety of products that bear their brand, wherever 
they are produced in the world. Chinese contractors, on the other hand, 
blamed local vendors (e.g. those who supplied lead-contaminated paint 
or painted components of toys with leaded paint).  
There was a perception too that many of these Chinese contract 
factories were small to medium enterprises, but this is inaccurate. 
Companies like Early Light, for example (that made Mattel’s Sarge die-
cast cars) might more accurately be described as mega contractors, also 
making products for other global toy giants including ‘Hasbro, Jakks 
Pacific, Lionel, and MGA Entertainment’ (Early Light Industrial Co. Ltd 
2012 website at).  
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However, as Navarro (2007: 11) notes, the China toy supply chain 
differs from earlier off-shoring models (like Japan) manufacturing ‘a 
single product or set of products in highly localised supply chains [that] 
extend a ‘just in time’ *speed to market+ principle to the entire supply 
chain’ (Navarro 2007).  (See Figure 6.4): 
Figure 6.1: The Guangdong Toy Supply Chain 
 
Source: Enright Scott and Associates Limited Research, reproduced in 
Navarro (2007: 11) Figure 1: The Toy Cluster of Guangdong Province  
Guangdong province is situated in the southern part of mainland 
China, and is known as ‘China’s South Gate’. The capital city, 
Guangzhou lies close to Hong Kong, and Macau. Zhujiang (The Pearl 
River), China’s third largest river, runs through Guangzhou and is 
navigable to the South China Sea. Here it is said many of China’s 
dirtiest industries are located, mostly manufacturing goods for export. 
Spencer (2007: A25), in The New York Times, cites a study published in 
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the US Journal of Environmental Science and Technology as finding 
that ‘89% of emissions of sulphur dioxide, an air pollutant that causes 
acid rain, are released in the process of export manufacturing’. The 
same study also found that 71% of particulate matter, the small particles 
that cause smog and respiratory problems can be traced to the 
manufacturing of exported goods. Edwards (2009: 7), citing Morrison 
2008, also notes that ‘Pollution is taking an immense human toll as 
China’s economy rapidly industrialises without adequate 
environmental management or protection of public health’. The 
localized nature of the China supply chain means that the risks, harms 
and consequences associated with the manufacturing activities carried 
out there are specifically local. 
A report in TerraDaily in July 2007 highlights these concerns: 
 In the more than three decades since Chinese factories began 
churning out clothing, toys, electronics and other goods for 
consumers around the world, China’s natural environment has 
paid a price. Rampant pollution is leading to widespread health 
problems and water shortages that are increasingly viewed as a 
threat to the nation’s stability. Traditional ways of development 
have caused the near breakdown of China’s resources and 
environment, and people’s lives are in great danger’, said Pan 
Yue, Vice Minister of the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA) (quoted in TerraDaily, 4/7/2007). 
These observations are consistent with a central tenet of this chapter 
that is the argument for an equivalent focus on the ‘local’, especially in 
relation to the harmful consequences of different supply chain activities 
for the people, places and natural landscapes where these industrial 
activities occur 
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Risks in the Supply Chain 
Disruption is the greatest risk to any supply chain, as many toy 
companies experienced during the global toy recalls in 2007 when toxic 
lead paint was introduced to the manufacturing sector of their off-shore 
supply chains in China. This proved damaging to corporate image, 
brand reputation and the relationships of trust between toy companies, 
their supply chain partners and consumers. In these cases, the greatest 
disruption occurred because of the introduction of lead paint (in China) 
to the extended supply chains of toy companies who were 
headquartered elsewhere (e.g. in the United States, Canada and 
Australia). This organizational and geographical distancing from 
manufacturing hubs can compromise quality as well as reduce 
transparency and accountability when something goes wrong. As 
Teagarden (2009: 10) notes ‘the longer and more complex the supply 
chain, the higher the risk of the absence of world class processes and 
material controls’. 
Although the global supply chain is typically described as complex and 
convoluted, it might also be described as fragmented and localized (e.g. 
different companies carry out different supply chain activities in 
different countries). For instance, export logistics is the only part of the 
chain that has a truly global function that is the phase that distributes 
finished products worldwide. As already noted, the impact of different 
supply chain activities (extraction, production, consumption, 
distribution, and disposal) is acutely local and specific to different 
people, places and natural landscapes. For example, an unsafe toy may 
be designed in America (Dora the Explorer) or Australia (Bindeez), 
manufactured in China (or another country), exported from Hong 
Kong, consumed in America, Canada, Asia, Europe and disposed of in 
the country of import and sometimes elsewhere.(e.g. some of Mattel’s 
contaminated toys were disposed of in landfills in  Mexico). 
  
173 
Figure 6.2 Different Activities Different Places these Cases 
   
 
Upstream Activities 
(America, Canada, 
Australia) 
Midstream 
Activities 
(China, Hong Kong) 
Downstream Activities 
(America, Canada, 
Australia, United Kingdom, 
New Zealand, Ireland etc.) 
 Design 
 Development 
 Intellectual property 
 Technical property 
 Information 
technology 
 Tooling 
 Marketing 
 Advertising 
 Public Relations 
 Raw material 
sourcing 
 Manufacturing 
 Assembly 
 Packaging 
 Export logistics 
-Transport 
-Shipping 
 Import Logistics 
-Transport 
- Warehousing 
- Distribution 
 Consumption 
 Disposal 
 
In the ‘authorised’ supply chain model, toys move along the chain in a 
linear fashion from one organisation to another, each of those 
organisations carrying out the activities assigned to them.  One reason 
the toy supply chains in these cases were convoluted was due to the 
inclusion of numbers of ‘unauthorised’ supply chain ‘outsiders’, 
permitted into the chain by supply chain ‘insiders’ (toy company’s 
supply chain partners in China) (See Chapter 10).  
What makes the process ‘complex’ is not so much the structure of the 
chain; rather it is establishing and maintaining robust ‘relationships of 
trust’ with supply chain partners when arms-lengths governance is the 
order of the day. When something goes wrong in another jurisdiction, 
as it did in China (e.g. lead paint on toys; magnets dislodging from 
finished toys) then managing the political and economic relationships 
associated with the fall out becomes the complex part. 
Developed  
Economies 
Developing  
Economies 
Developed/Developing 
Economies 
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Known risks 
Lead in paint was a known risk in the China supply chain, as evidenced 
by the fact that companies were already testing for it, and most only 
strengthened procedures that were already in place (see also Liroff et al 
2008). Global consultants, Ernst & Young (2009:12) also note the 
consistency of product quality as one of the risks in off-shore sections of 
supply chains: 
 Once the customer has certified the supplier, controls must exist 
to ensure the supplier consistently produces at the expected 
standards. This is not always straightforward in off-shore 
destinations, where sample products may be up to standard, but 
subsequent products, unless closely monitored, may not be. 
According to a Newsletter published by the Sustainability Purchasing 
Network Newsletter (SPNN 2007 : 1-2), now the BuySmart Network 
suggests that ‘addressing toxicity is an inevitability for supply chain 
managers’  and that ‘organisations will ignore it at their peril’.  
Companies who fail to address the toxicity of supply chains and 
the implications associated with chemical exposure to humans 
and the environment are likely to suffer losses to brand 
reputation, and revenues as well as facing litigation by the 
community. The benefits of addressing toxicity in the supply 
chain include reduced costs, vendor consolidation, improved 
productivity, product differentiation, new market opportunities 
and better public and stakeholder relations  
The World Economic Forum (WEF 2012:47) suggests that ‘the concept 
of ‘anticipatory governance’ could be applied to challenges in 
regulating global supply chains’. Manufacturing may be located abroad 
(typically in the developing world) but the locus of control rests with 
the off-shoring company (typically in the developed world). There may 
be variations on this theme however the biggest toy companies operate 
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this way. But do they adequately take precautions in relation to 
potential risks throughout the supply chain? And How well did toy 
companies enforce, monitor and validate these procedures?  
As noted above, there are ‘external’ and ‘internal’ influences on the 
China supply chain (from within and without China) and the roles of 
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ exert different pressures on supply chain 
dynamics and relationships as these relate to politics, business culture 
and regulatory pressures: 
Table 6.3: External and Internal Pressures 
External Economic Currency Fluctuations (yuan) 
 Political Political unrest. 
 Business culture Interpreting western business practices and 
product safety codes. 
 Regulatory Standards and regulations imposed from 
outside China (Regulators and Politicians in 
importing countries).  
Internal Economic Currency Fluctuations (yuan to US$) 
 Business Culture Guanxi, closed networks 
 Political Provincial versus National government 
intervention in business practices in 
economic zones. 
 Regulatory Standards and regulations imposed from 
inside China (e.g. quality inspections). 
 
A number of questions arise from considering these types of pressures, 
in the context of this study. These include: what were the underlying 
reasons for why lead was introduced to the China supply chain? Did 
misunderstandings exist about whose standards? What impact do lean 
supply chains, have upon what happens on the ground in China? Was 
there miscommunication between companies in the supply chain 
(information not shared or information communicated in English rather 
than Chinese)? Did market forces (e.g. fierce competition and speed to 
market) create the type of ‘strain’ (See Agnew 2009) that may contribute 
to opportunistic crimes such as chemical substitutions and repeated 
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unauthorised outsourcing? How did the absence of an appropriate 
gatekeeper (e.g. toy companies in the west taking their eye off risk 
management and quality control) contribute to what occurred in their 
extended supply chains? 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the dynamics of the ‘global’ 
supply chain and distribution network, the primary mode of 
transference for all these toxic toys. It has highlighted the known risk of 
lead in the supply chain, given that most companies already had 
procedures in place to test for it. It challenges the ‘global’ in the supply 
chain, arguing for an equivalent  focus on ‘the local’, one that recognises 
that in the practice of off-shoring companies are increasing localising 
the risks and harms in their extended supply chains.  Toys may be 
distributed globally, but the impact of the lifecycle of toxic toys 
(extraction, production, consumption and disposal) is experienced most 
acutely at a local level by bodies, places and nature where discrete 
activities in the extended supply chain take place. The issue of how toy 
companies (in the west) and their supply chain partners (in China) 
mitigated the harms they caused is explored further in Chapter 10. The 
specific case of RC2 Corporation and the adulteration of Thomas™ the 
tank engine wooden toys with lead is the topic of Chapter 7. 
  
177 
Chapter 7: Case Study: The Trouble with Lead 
RC2 Corporation and Thomas™ & Friends Wooden Railway Sets 
 
 
Source: USCPSC Release 07-212, 2007 
Introduction 
“My children cut their teeth on Thomas™ the tank engine” 
The June 2007 recall of approximately 1.5 million Thomas & Friends™ 
wooden railway sets by American company, RC2 Corporation, ‘was the 
first to raise global concerns about excessive levels of lead in the surface 
paint of toys’ (Schmit, USA Today, 22/1/2008a). It attracted worldwide 
media attention as toys were removed from shelves throughout Asia, 
the United States, Canada, Europe, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Australia and New Zealand. Far from being an isolated incident, the 
Thomas™ recall marked the beginning of a spate of similar recalls by 
companies large and small, that saw ‘more than 17 million toys recalled 
*in 2007+ because they violated the U.S. federal lead paint standard’ 
(Morrison 2008 cited in Becker, Edwards and Massey 2010: 7986). As 
well, the recalls came on the back of a range of unsafe products coming 
out of China including tyres, toothpaste and pet food, events that 
exposed the vulnerability of the off-shore supply chain. The question in 
many people’s minds was if a trusted brand like Thomas™ can be 
contaminated, just how widespread and systemic is the problem, and 
what about less expensive unbranded toys? 
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This case study spans the period from March 2007, when lead was first 
discovered on a Thomas™ wooden railway toy, to December 2009, 
when RC2 incurred a civil penalty from the US Consumer Product 
Safety Commission. At the time, the fine was described as ‘the highest 
for violations involving importation or distribution in commerce of a 
regulated product and the third highest of any kind in USCPSC history’ 
(USCPSC 2009 Release 09/237).  
The Toys 
Thomas™ the tank engine is an intergenerational favourite that has 
been around for more than sixty years. The Thomas™ stories were ‘first 
created by an Anglican clergyman, the Reverend Wilbert Awdry as a 
way of entertaining his young son Christopher as he recovered from 
measles (Jones, Mail Online, 7/1/2010). They were simple moral tales 
about the exploits and adventures of a group of railway engines given 
human faces and personalities, with the first stories published in 1945 
and Thomas the Tank Engine™ first appearing in 1946 (Gunn Undated 
at http://www.angelfire.com/nc/shiningtime/history.html).In Christmas 
1945 the Rev. Awdry made his son Christopher a simple wooden toy 
engine that was later christened ‚Thomas‛ and so Thomas the Tank 
Engine was born (HIT Entertainment 2013 at 
http://www.thomasandfriends.com/en-gb/about/index.html) 
By 1984, ‘a whole new generation of children were introduced to 
Thomas the Tank Engine and Friends when the first of the T.V. series 
by that name was made’ (Gunn Undated at: 
http://www.angelfire.com/nc/shiningtime/history.html). Today 
Thomas™ is a global brand, with a plethora of merchandise, proving 
lucrative for brand owners, toy corporations and entertainment 
companies alike. 
  
179 
The Company 
Headquartered in Illinois, RC2 Corporation has been described as ‘the 
little company that could< emerging in the past few years as a popular 
link in the toy manufacturing chain, connecting media outlets like 
Disney, Nickelodeon and Discovery Communications with inexpensive 
labour in China’ (Barboza and Story, The New York Times, 19/6/2007a). In 
2007, RC2 employed approximately 832 people (RC2 Annual Report 
and 10K Filing 2007: 6) and described itself as ‘a leading designer, 
producer and marketer of innovative, high-quality toys, collectibles and 
infant and toddler products including high profile brands like Thomas 
& Friends™, Bob the Builder™, Winnie-the-Pooh™ and Sesame 
Street™.  
Although much smaller than transnational competitors like Mattel and 
Hasbro, RC2 Corporation was a global player, with ‘more than 25,000 
retail outlets in North America, Europe, Australia and Asia Pacific’ 
(RC2 Annual Report and 10K 2007: 4). In 2006, the company was 
‘ranked in the top 10 U.S. toymakers with sales volume of about US$500 
million’ (Pritchard, Associated Press, 2/10/2007a). Company revenue rose 
from US$213 million in 2002 to US$519 million in 2006. In 2007, ‘40.2% 
and 37.8% of their sales came from pre-school products and infant and 
toddler products respectively, most selling through chain retailers 
(68.3%) and specialty retailers, wholesalers and OEM dealers’ (RC2 
Annual Report and 10K 2007: 2). By 2007 RC2 was ‘a party to more than 
400 license agreements, with terms generally of two to three years’ (RC2 
Annual Report and 10K Filing 2007:2).  
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In similar vein to most of the big toy companies, a significant portion of 
RC2’s sales are derived from its top three customers, mega retailers 
Wal-Mart, Target and Toys/Babies ‚R‛ Us (See Table 7.1). 
Table 7.1 RC2 Corporation Top Three Customers Percent of Net Sales 
2005-2007 
Top Three Customers Percent of Net Sales 
 2005 2006 2007 
Wal-Mart 13.4% 16.3% 15.4% 
Target 12.0% 13.1% 14.1% 
Toys R Us/Babies R Us 15.1% 14.8% 13.1% 
Total 40.5% 44.2% 42.6% 
Source: Tabulated from RC2 Annual Report & 10K Filing (2007: 16) 
 
Like most toy companies, RC2’s business is cyclical and highly 
seasonal, with ‘approximately 59.2% of net sales for the three years 
ended 31 December 2007, being generated in the second half of the year 
- August, September, October and November being the largest shipping 
months’ (RC2 2007e: 6). When the recalls occurred in June 2007, ‘RC2 
was trading at over US$45 per share, the highest level it had ever 
reached’ (Kemper and Martin, QFinance 2007: 1), ‘painted toys were a 
key segment of China’s manufacturing sector and the global demand 
for colourful, inexpensive toys seemed insatiable’ (Kemper and Martin, 
QFinance, 2007: 2-3). But the recalls would occur in the lead-up to 
Christmas, one of the busiest and most profitable seasons for both RC2 
and the toy industry as a whole. 
Toy Safety 
At the time the recalls occurred, the safety of toys was  integral to RC2’s 
ethos, as illustrated by the following statement - ‘Our products are 
designed, manufactured, packaged and labelled to conform with all 
safety requirements under U.S. Federal and other applicable laws and 
regulations, industry-developed voluntary standards and product-
specific standards’ (RC2 Annual Report and 10K 2007: 6). 
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China Operations 
According to the Institute for Global Labour and Human Rights 
(Kernaghen et al 2007), RC2 Corporation set up its China headquarters 
in 1989, ‘displaying its corporate logo on office buildings in the Li 
Cheng Industrial Complex, which also houses three toy factories – Peng 
Hui, Yong Yi and Ri Sheng (Kernaghan et al 2007: 11). The authors note 
that ‘all three factories produce plastic and metal toys, apparently with 
RC2 accounting for the vast majority, if not all the production. There are 
approximately 7,000 workers in total in the industrial complex 
(Kernaghen et al 2007: 12). 
In 2007, RC2 reported sourcing ’88.2% of its products from China’ 
through a network of dedicated contract manufacturing facilities: 
We primarily use six third-party, dedicated suppliers who 
manufacture only our products in six factories, three of which are 
located in the RC2 Industrial zone. The RC2 Industrial Zone is 
the name of a factory complex developed in 1997 and located in 
Dongguan City China, (approximately 50 miles from Hong 
Kong), where three of our third-party, dedicated suppliers 
operate freestanding factory facilities. Most of our third-party 
dedicated suppliers have been supplying us for more than ten 
years. Third-party dedicated suppliers produced 40.3% of our 
China-based product purchases in 2007 (RC2 2007:5). 
As RC2 explains, these dedicated suppliers are supplemented by what 
the company refers to as ‘other suppliers in China’ (RC2 Annual Report 
and 10K 2007: 5).  
Products are manufactured to RC2’s specifications using moulds 
and tooling that we own. These suppliers own the 
manufacturing equipment and machinery and purchase raw 
materials, hire workers and plan production. We purchase fully 
assembled and packaged finished goods in master cartons for 
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distribution to our customers. We enter into purchase orders 
with our foreign suppliers and generally do not enter into long-
term contracts (RC2 2007e: 5). 
RC2 acknowledges that these ‘dedicated suppliers’ are responsible for 
purchasing raw materials. ‘Since our products are manufactured by 
third-party suppliers, we do not directly purchase the raw materials 
used to manufacture our products’ (RC2 2007e: 8). But according to 
their 10K Form (2007) the company, through their ‘far-east product 
sourcing operations’, employed 290 people in Hong Kong and China, 
responsible for among other things, assisting suppliers with the 
sourcing of raw materials and packaging, providing on-site quality 
control, and facilitating third-party testing: 
These same arrangements were also in place in 2006, although at that 
time RC2 ‘employed 272 people in Hong Kong and China<’ (cited in 
Lewis et al 2008: 13), to carry out these activities. But in June and 
September 2007, several of these precautionary measures – in 
particular, sourcing safe raw materials, on site quality control and third-
party safety testing – appear to have failed, leading to the recall of 
millions of Thomas & Friends™ wooden railway toys coated with lead 
paint. 
Precursors 
Whether or not RC2 (and other companies whose products were 
recalled for lead) could have predicted these events is open to debate. 
However, there is evidence to suggest that there were early warnings 
and near misses that ought to have alerted the toy industry more 
widely (and RC2 in particular) about the potential for lead in the China 
supply chain.  
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For instance, a study by Liroff  et al (2008: 1), published by the Investor 
Environmental Health Network, argues that the toy industry not only 
ought to have known about the trouble with lead well before the 2007 
recalls but also ought to have declared this in their financial reports: 
‘...information was available to industry insiders in the years prior 
to 2007 to suggest that products sourced from China could contain 
lead paint. However the companies who were hit hardest, like 
RC2 and Mattel disclosed little about these risks in financial 
reports prior to the 2007 recalls’. 
However, according to Liroff et al (2008: 12) this knowledge failed to 
translate into warnings to investors, and in RC2’s case: 
although the USCPSC issued 46 lead-related recalls between 
2001 and 2006, 44 of which involved products geared toward 
children, none of RC2’s SEC filings prior to its own recalls 
mentioned lead paint-related recall risks, instead discussing the 
potential for recalls generically in boilerplate language  
In addition to the 46 lead-related recalls (by the U.S. Regulator alone) 
referred to above, a number of other incidents occurred which ought to 
have acted as early warnings for the toy sector more widely (if not for 
individual companies) that lead was re-emerging as a threat in the toy 
supply chain (See Table 7.2). 
Early Warnings and Near Misses 
One of the earliest recalls for lead contamination in a children’s product 
occurred in March 1999, when Nike recalled 110,000 pairs of infant’s 
Little Air Jordan XIV sneakers, when it was discovered that the trim 
paint contained lead amounts that exceeded US Federal standards 
(USCPSC Release 99-073, 1999). A number of other incidents also 
occurred which ought to have acted as early warnings for the toy sector, 
if not for individual companies. These are illustrated in the following 
table. 
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Table 7.2: Early Warnings and Near Misses: Lead 
Date Details 
1998 A case of clinical lead poisoning occurred in a young 
Canadian child as a result of chewing on the pendant of a 
child’s necklace. The pendant was made of pure lead 
covered by a decorative coating (Health Canada 1998). 
March 1999 Nike recalled 110,000 pairs of infants Little Air Jordan XIV 
sneakers, when it was discovered the trim paint contained 
lead amounts exceeding US Federal standards. USCPSC 
Release 99-073, 1999 
July 2003 A case of lead poisoning occurred when a four year old 
Oregon boy swallowed a medallion reportedly purchased 
from a  toy vending machine (See Van Arsdale et al, 
MMWR 2004) 
July 2004 Health Canada warns Canadians to discard toy jewellery 
obtained from vending machines because it may contain 
dangerous levels of lead. This follows a voluntary recall in 
Canada and the United States involving over 100 million 
pieces of jewellery from four different firms (Health 
Canada 2004). 
March 2005 A recall of approximately 2.8 million metal charms 
containing high levels of lead was carried out in the United 
States and Canada in March 2005 after a U.S. child who had 
mouthed the charms was found to have elevated blood 
levels. 
February 2006 Jarnell Brown died of lead poisoning after ingesting a heart-
shaped charm from a bracelet, given away with the 
purchase of a pair of Reebok shoes (USCPSC Release?? 
29 March 2007 Lead is discovered on a Thomas™ wooden train toy, 
specifically the Thomas & Friends Oval Toy Set (USCPSC 
Settlement Agreement RC2, 2009: 3) by one of RC2’s U.S. 
retail customers (See USCPSC Settlement Agreement RC2, 
2009: 3) 
 
The same authors note  (Liroff et al  2008: 11) note that ‘during 2007, 
‘lead paint recalls became so pervasive that the USCPSC posted a page 
on its website listing lead-related recalls dating back to 2001, linking it 
to a  ‚hazard search‛ engine with ‚lead‛ as a search category.  
A ‚lead‛ keyword query identified 26 lead-related recalls in 2007 
before RC2’s first recall in June 2007. Items recalled included 
dollhouse furniture (2001), bobble head figurines (2002), lead-
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tainted jewellery and zipper pulls (2005), small bendable animals 
(2006).  
They argue that the series of recalls between 2001 and 2006 ‘was fair 
warning to any company that was importing goods from China’ [and 
that] ‘arguably any company with substantial imports from China had 
the information needed to identify a trend <’(Liroff et al 2008: 11). The 
report specifically criticises, RC2, for what the authors describe as 
‘limited disclosures’ particularly in the following areas: 
 failure to disclose that sourcing products from China presented 
lead paint and recall risks, 
 limited disclosures about supply chain management, such as 
the degree of control over its supply chain (Lewis et al 2008: 12) 
But even if companies did not heed these warnings, media reports 
suggest that RC2 was aware of the risks and were already testing for 
lead paint in the China supply chain, in particular the factory where the 
toys were produced, as reported by Oneal, in the The New York Times on 
27 July. 
[Curt] Stoelting *RC2’s Chief Executive] added that the company 
will further increase the rigor and frequency of its independent 
safety testing -- retesting each new style or product quarterly 
instead of annually. It will also hire independent auditors to 
supplement the internal audits RC2 already performs on its 
contract manufacturers. 
These procedures are in place at the plants where wooden trains, 
which were subject to the recall, are made, Stoelting said. They 
will be expanded within weeks to all of the 14 plants the 
company uses in China. 
The excuse that companies (e.g. like RC2, Schylling Inc and Mattel Inc) 
did not know what was happening in their supply chains in China (e.g. 
in terms of systemic outsourcing of raw material supplies (e.g. paint) 
and/or painting of components (to other local vendors) would be a 
recurring theme throughout the lead-related recalls. 
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The Recalls 
Discovery and Detection 
For RC2 Corporation, the trouble with lead began on 29 March 2007 
when one of their U.S. retail customers alerted them to the fact that a 
Thomas™ wooden railway toy had tested positive to levels of lead in its 
surface coating, above the permissible U.S. threshold at the time of 0.06 
percent (USCPSC Settlement Agreement RC2 2009: 3). This finding 
would trigger a spate of recalls by the company, two of which were for 
Thomas & Friends™ wooden railway sets, the subject of this case study. 
Over a period of four months between June and December 2007, RC2 
Corporation announced five separate recalls for children’s toys and 
infant products, three of which were for lead contaminated toys (See 
Table 7.3). For a company that generates ’59.2% of their net sales in the 
second half of the year, with August, September, October and 
November being the largest shipping months’ (RC2 Annual Report and 
10K Filing 2007:6), these recalls occurred leading up to and during some 
of the busiest and most profitable months of the year for the toy 
industry. The toys were pulled from shelves throughout Asia, the 
European Union, Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand. 
Table 7.3 RC2 Corporation Recalls June-December 2007 
Recall Date Hazard Products 
13 June 2007 Lead in surface 
paint on toy 
1.5 million Thomas & Friends™ 
wooden railway sets, 26 models 
21 August 2007 More lead 
discovered on 
surface paint of 
Thomas & Friends 
Expanded recall of Thomas & 
Friends™ wooden railway sets 
26 September 2007 Lead in surface 
paint on toy 
300,000 Thomas & Friends™ 
wooden railway toys, 5 models 
26 September 2007 Lead by weight 1,990 Silver Knights of the Sword 
mounted on red horses 
6 December 2007 Lead in surface 
paint on plaques 
First Three Years 3-in-1 Flush & 
Sounds Potty Training Seats 
6 December 2007 Malfunctioning 
restraining straps 
First Years Newborn-to-Toddler 
reclining feeding seats 
RC2 Corporation (2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2007d, 2007e) 
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But there would be a three month time lag between discovery of the 
lead by the company (in March 2007) and when they officially reported 
the lead hazard to the USCPSC (13 June 2007),  triggering an immediate 
‘voluntary’ recall, that captured media headlines around the world.  
The First Recall 
On the day (13 June 2007) when RC2 finally reported the lead problem 
to the USCPSC, the company announced the first of two recalls for 
Thomas & Friends™ wooden railway toys, pulling approximately 1.5 
million sets off the market because of excessive levels of lead in their 
surface paint. The sets were sold in a retail window of harm between 
January 2005 and June 2007, ‘suggesting that for two years RC2 failed to 
notice that some of its best-selling toys were being produced with lead-
based paint’ (Barboza and Story 2007a  19/6/2007). The toys were 
removed from store shelves throughout Asia, America, Europe, 
Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and Ireland. In Australia ‘about 
18 different models were sold through RC2, trading as Learning Curve’ 
(ACCC PRA 2007/9323), with one news source suggesting ‘about 
100,000 products *had been+ sold across Australia since January 2005’ 
(Brisbane Courier Mail 2007).  
Rather than notifying the USCPSC (as the company is required to do 
under a 24 hour reporting rule for product hazards), RC2 put a hold on 
inventory of the offending toys and initiated their own internal 
investigation to find out what happened and why. This involved  
‘extensive testing of the Thomas & Friends™ wooden railway 
toys product line for the presence of lead, including tests 
conducted by independent certified labs in China and the US on 
finished toys, liquid paints and solvents used in the 
manufacturing process. This yielded multiple failing test results 
demonstrating that dozens of toy samples bore or contained 
paint or other surface coatings with excessive levels of lead’ 
(USCPSC Settlement Agreement RC2 2009: 4).  
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It is interesting to note that in May 2007, a month before RC2’s recall, 
the topic of Chinese imports to the United States was already on the 
horizon for the USCPSC, particularly counterfeit goods, as noted by 
Wilson in a U.S. Department of Commerce International Trade Update 
2007: 3): 
In an effort to improve the safety of products being exported to 
the United States from China, the CPSC in April 2004 signed a 
memorandum of understanding with its Chinese counterpart, the 
General Administration for Quality Supervision Inspection and 
Quarantine. On May 21–22, 2007, Nancy A. Nord, acting 
chairman of the CPSC, travelled to Beijing to participate in 
bilateral talks that are a part of the agency’s continuing efforts in 
this area 
 
This would mark the beginning of ongoing negotiations between the 
USCPSC with representatives of China’s General Administration for 
Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine about the topic of 
unsafe toys. 
Apologies and Regrets 
Partly because of the trust generations of consumers (parents, 
grandparents) had placed in the Thomas™ brand (rather than any 
particular company), these recalls generated a lot of public outrage. In 
response to the recalls, on 14 June, RC2 posted a reassuring message to 
parents and caregivers on their corporate website. It said, in part: 
The trust you have placed in the Thomas & Friends™ wooden 
railway brand is very important to us. We want you to know that 
we fully understand and share your concerns and are dedicated 
to safeguarding your children and that trust (RC2 2007a). 
But critics and consumers did not necessarily accept the company’s 
assurances. Instead they expressed disillusionment with the failure of 
the Thomas™ brand, which they had relied upon to guarantee their 
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children’s safety, as noted by Watkins, on the Harvard Business Review 
Blog Network: 
 [Consumers] believed that Thomas was a premium brand, and so 
let their kids do things with the toys they wouldn’t have 
otherwise. When a mother saw her child put a Thomas engine in 
his mouth, she thought It’s OK, it’s not some cheap piece of 
garbage.‚We trusted that the people behind the brand wouldn’t 
put our children at risk, and that’s why we feel so betrayed‛ (U.S. 
consumer quoted in Watkins at Harvard Business Review Blog 
Network, 26/6/2007, at: http://blogs.hbr.org/2007/06/engine-of-
destruction-lessons-1/). 
Initially consumers were asked to return the recalled items at their own 
expense, but RC2 subsequently reversed this decision in the face of a 
consumer backlash. The ensuing public furore was politically and 
emotively charged with ‘vestiges of historical fears of ‘the yellow peril 
and narratives of domesticity threatened by potentially contaminating 
contact with an essentialised China’ (Hanser 2013: 1).  
What occurred was a scape-goating of China (as a nation), of Chinese 
manufacturers (as organizations) and the tarnishing of Made-in-China 
(as a brand). Toy companies (including RC2) shifted the blame to 
Chinese contract factories (in China) who were members of their 
extended supply chains. However, regardless of where the 
manufacturing hub of the supply chain is located toy companies 
(headquartered in the west) are accountable (usually to licensors) for 
the quality and safety of their branded toys, wherever they are made. 
Michael Watkins, in Harvard Business Review Blog Network, makes 
some interesting observations about these dynamics in relation to RC2 
Corporation’s Thomas recall: 
Rather than admit responsibility and apologise, both RC2 and 
HIT are saying little. HIT is pointing fingers at RC2.  RC2 offered 
to do the minimum possible – replace the tainted toys if parent 
mailed them in – but initially balked at paying for the postage, 
reinforcing the perception of greed. Under pressure, they 
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reversed themselves, but the refund will come only after a 
couple of months, apparently because the company is having 
difficulty coordinating its own internal operations. Everything 
they have done is the antithesis of what we know about how to 
manage crises effectively (Watkins, Harvard Business Review Blog 
Network, 22/6/2007). 
To place these recalls in the context of what was occurring at the time, it 
is important to appreciate that it was not only larger toy companies 
(like RC2, Schylling Inc and Mattel) that were recalling lead-
contaminated products. For instance, Lotke et al (2007: 9), summarise a 
range of products recalled for lead violations in the first two weeks of 
October 2007, in the United States alone (See Figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1: Lead Recalls United States 1-17 October 2007 
 
 55,000 Skull pails filled with Halloween Candy Mix 
 350,000 book marks and journals 
 5,400 tabletop puppet theatres 
 2,400 Breyer 2006 Stirrup Christmas ornaments 
 19,000 deluxe wood art sets 
 49,000 Disney deluxe Winnie-the-Pooh 23 piece play sets 
 7,800 Princess Magnetic travel art set lap desks 
 10,000 Bendable Dinosaur toys 
 2,500 collectible ‚Jeff Gordon‛ mini helmets 
 2,400 Kidnastics Balance Beams 
 1.6 million cub scouts totem badges 
 11,200 Alpine design aluminium water bottles 
 192,000 key chains 
 15,000 children’s toy decorating sets 
 63,000 Frankenstein tumblers 
 79,000 ‚Pirates of the Caribbean‛ Medallion Squeeze Lights 
 35,000 Baby Einstein Discover and play colour blocks 
 10,000 wooden pull-along alphabet and math blocks wagons 
Source: Lotke, Rasmussen, Carter and Borosage (2007: 9). 
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But RC2 continued to shift the blame to China and in July 2007, as 
reported by Marco in The Consumerist (26/9/2007), RC2’s CEO told a 
journalist from The New York Times that ‘he fired the vendor who made 
the contaminated toys’:  
We have always required our suppliers to follow our safety 
specifications. In this incident [September recall] those 
requirements were not met’ (Curt Stoelting quoted in Marco, The 
Consumerist, 26/9/2007).  
On the Harvard Business Review Blog Network, Watkins (22/6/2007), 
attributed the failure to ‘the lack of an effective organisational immune 
system, no distributed early-warning system and no effective allocation 
of responsibility for problem-avoidance in the supply chain’. These 
observations would prove to be fairly accurate, in the light of a spate of 
lead-related recalls for a range of companies large and small. 
Despite having testing procedures in place (as part of agreements with 
Chinese contract manufacturers), and implementing a strengthened  
Multi-Check safety system in July 2007 (a month after their first recall), 
RC2 announced an expanded recall of Thomas & Friends®  when five 
more toys were found to be contaminated with lead. These toys were 
discovered during a massive internal testing program of more than 
1500 toys undertaken by the company between June and September. 
The Second Recall 
In August 2007, more lead was discovered, this time in a further five 
models in the Thomas & Friends® range. The lead was found as part of 
an ongoing testing program of over 1,500 toys in the Thomas™ range. 
On 9 August, Chinese officials responded by revoking the export of 
licenses of Hangsheng Wooden Products Factory, the company 
responsible for some of RC2’s toys. On 13 August, CNN.com(2007) 
reported that ‘police were investigating [Hangsheng] for use of ‚fake 
plastic pigment‛, a type of industrial latex used to make surfaces 
smoother and shinier’ (CNN.com 2007). In New Zealand, the Dominion 
Post was advocating for ‘Western governments to have their own 
inspectors in Chinese factories’ (Dominion Post 20/8/2007). Media 
reports reflected a sense of outrage and betrayal from consumers, as 
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well as the notion that someone should pay and that this should not be 
the consumer. Ultimately these events triggered an expanded recall 
(same products same problem). 
Then On 26 September 2007, RC2 recalled a further five models of 
Thomas & Friends™ wooden railway toys contaminated with lead. In a 
statement on their website announcing the recall, the company 
expressed regret, emphasised the importance of trust and the safety of 
children and the corrective action they were taking to make sure it 
didn’t happen again. However, both the US Consumer Product Safety 
Commission and RC2’s recall notices, noted that toys with the codes 
‚WJ’ or ‚AZ‛ were not included in the recall. Subsequently, the Illinois 
Attorney General’s Department found toxic and non-toxic toys 
packaged together. The question for consumers became which toys?  
In the direct aftermath of the June recalls, RC2’s executives were 
criticised for lying low and there was a reluctance on behalf of both the 
company (and the regulatory) to discuss when the problem with lead 
was first discovered (this would be revealed much later in the ‘staff 
allegations’ section of a USCPSC civil settlement agreement with the 
company). There was a general code of silence around toy safety, as 
Lipton and Barboza reported in The New York Times (19/6/2007): 
Staci Rubinstein, a spokeswoman for RC2 declined on Monday to 
comment on safety control measures at company plants in China. 
The Toy Industry Association which represents most American 
toy companies and importers, also declined to comment. 
In relation to the timing of the company’s disclosure of the product 
hazard to the regulator ‘Scott Wolfson, a spokesman for the CPSC 
would not say how long ago RC2 discovered the [lead] problem or 
when it first reported it to Federal authorities’ (Lipton and Barboza 
19/6/2007). 
Essentially it became a Chinese problem, with the prevailing view being 
that ‘lead is a common problem in developing countries’ (Possley and 
Oneal 27/7/2007). However, as Barboza (2007) pointed out in The New 
York Times, at the time, ‘China had even stricter regulations than the 
United States when it came to lead in paint and consumer products’. By 
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August, Chow, in Law 360 New York, 9/8/2007) was reporting that 
Chinese Quality Inspection officials were saying that, ‘police were 
investigating both companies [Lee Der and Hangsheng Wood Products] 
use of ‘fake plastic pigment’ – the industrial latex used to increase the 
smoothness and glossiness of toy surfaces’. 
Remedies and Solutions 
The response by Chinese Regulators was to suspend the licences over 
over 750 toy companies (Barboza, The New York Times, 2/22/2007). As 
McBride (2009: 242-243) notes in an analysis of the toy recalls in the 
Texas International Law Journal, Chinese regulators also: 
<ordered an additional 690 toy factories in Guangdong 
Province, located in the south of China, to renovate or improve 
their facilities, while claiming publicly that ‚*ninety-nine] percent 
of toy exports in southern Guangdong Province, near Hong 
Kong, met quality standards.‛ Given that more than one-third of 
toy producers in the Guangdong Province were affected by the 
export license suspensions and renovation orders, the New York 
Times (Barboza 2007) noted that China’s dual messages ‚seemed 
contradictory.‛ It is difficult to imagine that AQSIQ can 
effectively manage recalls and police product safety when, at 
times, its first impulse has apparently been to deny the existence 
of problems.  
Several questions remain unanswered and we are left to speculate 
(along with the media) as to exactly how long lead paint had been in 
use in these factories (was it two years or more or just a particular batch 
within that manufacturing timeline?), who actually supplied the paint 
and why exactly did RC2 stop manufacturing with 3i in November 
2006? Why would someone intentionally supply lead paint (the 
recurring speculation is cost-cutting). 
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The fact that the act of wrongdoing (introducing lead paint to the 
supply chain) occurred on Chinese rather than American soil, not only 
created jurisdictional issues from a regulatory perspective, but also 
problems for RC2 in claiming product liability insurance, because of the 
nature of the policies that it held (a domestic policy with a lead 
exclusion clause and an international policy excluding the territory of 
the United States). In short, RC2 was not covered for lead contaminated 
toys either abroad (in China where the toys were painted with lead) or 
at home (in America where the toys were consumed and subsequently 
had to be disposed of). The issue went to court and at first the court 
found in favour of RC2, but this decision was later overturned. 
In the public domain, this recall (and others) became about the 
exploitative nature of off-shoring, the associated politics of lost 
American jobs and sacrificing quality for profit in an arms-length 
governance relationship between toy companies in the west and their 
preferred Chinese contract manufacturers. Instead it was about 
systemic practices of outsourcing paint supply to local Chinese vendors 
which RC2 claims they did not know about; it was about serious 
failures in supply chain risk management and about a serious long-term 
health risk (leaded paint) to both children and factory workers as well 
as the potential consequences for soil, air and water (through lead 
emissions to air, the potential release of contaminated waste water, and 
the disposal of the contaminated raw materials such as paint or paint 
pigment). It is unknown what the process was in China for disposing of 
contaminated raw materials. 
Toys Still on Shelves 
By September 2007, parents were beginning to test toys in their homes 
using Lead Check swab kits they purchased at local hardware stores, 
but this in itself developed into a furore over the reliability of those kits. 
Schoenfield writes in The New York Times, ‘Safety experts warned that 
the do-it-yourself kits [were] not necessarily reliable. The Consumer 
Product Safety Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention do not recommend 
them because of concerns over accuracy.’: 
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‚There are home test kits available, but they are qualitative, and 
their ability to identify lead at low concentrations is under 
question‛ (Mary Brown, Director of the lead program at the CDC 
quoted in Schoenfield, The New York Times, 29/9/2007). 
One of the recurring questions throughout the lead-related recalls by 
politicians and consumers alike was what took so long? (e.g. from 
discovery of the lead to announcement of the official recall). At the 
time, the company, the regulator and the industry body, the Toy 
Industry Association, all seemed reluctant to comment. According to 
Lipton and Barboza, in an article in the New York Times (19/6/2007): 
A spokesman for the USCPSC, Scott Wolfson, would not say 
how long ago RC2 discovered the problem or when it first 
reported it to federal authorities  
The Toy Industry Association, which represents most American 
toy companies and importers, also declined to comment  
The exact timing of this disclosure would later be documented in the 
USCPSC staff allegations of a civil Settlement Agreement with RC2 
Corporation in 2009 (USCPSC Settlement Agreement 2009). However, it 
does seem reasonable to assume, as Lipton and Barboza (2007) noted at 
the time that ‘RC2 had some control over the quality and safety of the 
toys made in China’. 
Some commentators, like Watkins on the Harvard Business Review 
Blog Network were especially sceptical about who knew and when. 
 What’s the next predictable surprise in this sorry tale? Don’t be 
shocked if we find out that one or both of the companies knew 
about the problem for some time before informing the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission. Such a delay would be unforgivable 
if it occurred, but not at all surprising (Watkins, HBR Blogsite 
22/6/ 2007). 
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The following comments were typical of parents’ response at the time: 
With my youngest son, everything goes in his mouth. I can’t take 
any chances (mother of boys aged 5 and 13 months quoted in 
Barboza and Story, The New York Times, 19/6/2007a). 
Here lies the root of parent’s feelings of outrage: 
‘They believed that Thomas was a premium brand, and so let their 
kids do things with the toys that they wouldn’t have otherwise. 
When a mother saw her child put a Thomas engine in his mouth, 
she thought ‚It’s OK, it’s not some cheap piece of garbage. ‚We 
trusted that the people behind the brand wouldn’t put our 
children at risk, and that’s why we feel so betrayed‛ (quoted in 
Watkins, HBR Blog Network, 22/6/2007). 
Just as there was reluctance in the early stages of the crisis to identify 
the Chinese contract manufacturer that painted the toys, this also 
extended to a reticence to talk about the management of supply chain 
risks: 
Staci Rubinstein, a spokeswoman for RC2 declined to comment 
on safety control measures at company plants in China‘(Lipton 
and Barboza, The New York Times, 19/6/2007). 
Parents and caregivers were urged to immediately remove the toys 
from children and initiate the return process: 
 Look for the Thomas & Friends Wooden Railway logo on the 
upper left-hand corner of the packaging and/or locate the 
manufacturing code on the bottom of the product or inside the 
battery cover (RC2 2007a). 
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This involved identifying recalled products, with RC2 publishing a 
brochure titled ‘Is your product included in this recall’ which pictured the 
recalled toys in colour, including model numbers, detailed the return 
process, provided a link to track the status of replacement orders and a 
link to the official US Consumer Product Safety recall announcement. 
The official USCPSC recall notice was more detailed than RC2’s, 
providing the name of the products (various Thomas & Friends™ 
wooden railway toys), the number of units (1.5 million), the importer 
(RC2 Corporation), the hazard (surface paints containing lead), 
incidents and injuries (none), a description of the toys (list of recalled 
products by model), outlets where the toys were sold (toy stores and 
various retailers), and when they were sold (January 2005 to June 2007), 
approximate cost (between US$10 and US$70), country of manufacture 
(China), remedy (Consumers should take the toys away from children 
immediately and request a replacement toy) and contact details for RC2 
(toll free number Mon-Fri and web site) (USCPSC Release 07-212 13 
June 2007). 
RC2 Corporation also posted instructions to retailers on their website, 
publishing a list of recalled items in North America including licence 
numbers and a downloadable Safety Recall Notice that could be 
displayed in-store, as well as well as instructions for consumers to 
complete a form indicating the item(s) being returned. 
Following the June recalls, RC2 posted a set of Frequently Asked 
Questions (See Figure 7.1) on their recall home page: 
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Box 7.1: Frequently Asked Questions Pro-forma RC2 Corporation 
Thomas Wooden Railway Recalls  
Why did the Thomas Recalls occur? 
The recalls occurred because RC2’s product safety specifications, which clearly specify 
that paint used on the toys is to comply with all applicable standards and which 
further define the safety requirements for all materials used in all of our toys, were not 
met by small contract manufacturers and/or their paint suppliers. RC2 has terminated 
production of all Thomas products at the contract manufacturers implicated in the 
recalls. In addition, we have mandated that our other contract manufacturers not 
make purchases from the affected paint suppliers. 
Are the other Thomas Wooden Railway Products safe? 
To assure that the toys families already are safe, more than 1,500 individual Thomas & 
Friends™ Wooden Railway toy styles were retested. By casting this wide net, we 
discovered that five additional toys were potentially unsafe and they were recalled. If 
we discover any further issues either with current products or past production, we 
will react quickly to take action and inform consumers, just as we did in September 
2007. We're hopeful that concerned parents recognize that our Thomas toys have been 
subjected to intense scrutiny and testing and are that much safer for it. 
How do I know if this is a recalled item if my (caboose, train, destination, sign) 
doesn't have a date stamp? 
Please review the product details of our June 13 and September 26, 2007 recall notices. 
If you cannot determine whether or not your item is part of the recalls, please contact 
our Consumer Services Contact RC2 Consumer Care Center via email at 
recalls@rc2corp.com or toll-free at (866) 725-4407. Our Customer Care Center is open 
Monday through Friday 8:00am - 5:00pm CST. 
What should I do as a parent? 
We urge you to check your children’s products carefully to make sure that you have 
returned any recalled items to us. Prepaid U.S. shipping labels for the recalls, and help 
in identifying the recalled products are available on this website. You also may call 
our Consumer Care Center toll-free at (866) 725-4407 for assistance in identifying and 
returning the recalled products. If you believe your child has any health issues, please 
immediately consult your paediatrician or qualified health professional. 
What are you sending in return? 
We are sending exact product replacements where available. If the product has been 
discontinued, or no exact replacements are available, then RC2 will be replacing your 
product from inventory at its discretion. 
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We hear a lot about ‚excess levels of lead‛ what does that mean? 
In the United States, toys and other articles intended for use by children are required 
to meet a regulatory standard for lead (16CFR, Section 1303) established by the U.S. 
Consumer Product Safety Commission in 1977. The standard requires the 
concentration of ‚total lead‛ in any children’s product not exceed 600 parts per 
million (ppm). In addition, the American Society for Testing & Materials (ATSM) has 
published a voluntary consensus standard (ASTM Standard F963-07) that establishes a 
90 ppm maximum for what’s called ‚soluble lead‛. While compliance with this 
standard is not obligatory, most U.S. manufacturers, including RC2, take steps to 
ensure that their products comply with this standard as well as with the mandatory 
standard for total lead 
Does my child need a lead test? Your best resource to learn more about if your child 
has been exposed to lead poising is your paediatrician. If you do not have a 
paediatrician, you can use the American Academy of Paediatrics Referral Service, or 
contact the physician referral service at your local hospital. 
What have you done to ensure the quality of future toy production? 
Since July 2007, RC2 has instituted several significant additional safeguards as part of 
our Multi-Check Toy Safety System to protect our toy quality. Click here to learn 
about our Multi-Check Toy Safety System. 
Will there be more recalls? 
While we hope that there won’t be future recalls, if the need for a recall arises, we will 
move quickly to take action and notify consumers, just as we have in this instance. We 
believe the steps we’ve taken improve our ability to prevent future incidents. 
Source: RC2 Thomas Wooden Railway Recalls Frequently Asked Questions 
(RC2 FAQ Thomas 2007c). 
Remedies and Solutions 
In response to their first recall RC2 implemented a ‘Multi-Check Safety 
System’, designed to prevent a recurrence of these events, but this was 
hardly a new initiative or without its inadequacies, as noted in a 2009 
article by Watson in the Daily Finance: 
  While the company’s Multi-Check Safety System touts ‚tougher 
certification‛, ‚increased random inspections‛ and ‚zero 
tolerance‛ for compromise on RC2 specifications‛, the only 
concrete policy change seem to be ‚mandatory paint control 
procedures for contract manufacturers, including certified 
200 
independent lab test results of every batch of wet paint before 
the paint is released for production‛ 
While this paint control program might have helped identify the 
tainted Thomas toys, it isn’t sufficient to catch a wide variety of 
other potential pitfalls’ (Watson 2009). 
But given the knowledge of the risk of lead paint in the China supply 
chain within the toy sector these types of checks should already have 
been in place as a matter of course. Despite this corrective action, as 
noted above RC2 faced an expanded recall for Thomas & Friends™ 
wooden railway toys in September 2007 
Responses to the company’s handling of the recall were varied. On the 
one hand they were criticised for the ‘silence of their senior executives’ 
following the recalls (Watkins, HBR Blogsite 2007), and for secrecy 
surrounding naming up their dedicated Chinese manufacturers. On the 
other hand, they were congratulated for increased transparency as the 
recall progressed. For instance, Liroff et al (2008: 13) suggest that ‘the 
company became more transparent as it attempted to manage the 
weaknesses in supply chain management’, citing as an example how 
RC2’s CEO Curt Stoelting outlined the corrective action the company 
was taking to address these failures: 
 conducting rigorous audits of contract manufacturing facilities 
and their compliance with the Company’s quality 
specifications, 
 adding a new tougher certification program for paint suppliers, 
and, 
 increasing the scope and frequency of testing for both incoming 
materials and finished products, which now includes testing 
requirements on every batch of paint used in the manufacture 
of wooden toys (cited in Liroff et al 2008: 13). 
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In response to the June recall, RC2 announced in July 2007, that it was 
instituting several additional safeguards as part of a Multi-Check Toy 
Safety System. These safeguards were subsequently documented in 
RC2’s 2008 10K Filing as follows: 
 Increased scope and frequency of testing for both incoming 
material and finished products, including testing of finished 
products from every production run, 
 Tougher certification program for contract manufacturers and 
paint suppliers, including evidence that toy safety standards 
and quality control procedures are in place and operating 
effectively, 
 Mandatory paint control procedures for contract 
manufacturers, including certified independent lab test results 
of every batch of wet paint before the paint is released for 
production, 
 Increased random inspections and audits for both 
manufacturers and their suppliers, including semi-annual 
audits and quarterly random inspections for key suppliers, 
 Zero tolerance for compromise on RC2 specifications reinforced 
by mandatory vendor compliance seminars and signed 
agreements (RC2 10K Filing 2008). 
Reputational and relationship concerns were also high on the agenda, 
linked as they are to economic consequences. Liroff et al (2008: 13), 
citing RC2’s 2008, 10k filing note that these risks included: 
 the licensee relationship with HIT Entertainment, which 
licenses the production of Thomas and Friends products, 
 the likelihood that addressing the recall and issues relating to 
the recall will divert management’s attention and resources 
from [the] business, and 
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 the harm the recall may do to the relationship with the licensor 
who has granted the license under which we market the 
products affected (cited in Liroff et al 2008: 13). 
Commenting on the status of the recall in a statement published on 
RC2’s website in late July 2007, CEO Curt Stoelting was keen to focus 
on the rate of return of recalled products, re-emphasising the safety of 
children and the over-inclusiveness of the recall. 
 We are encouraged by the high recovery levels of recalled 
products. Nothing is more important to us than child safety, 
which is why we took a conservative course of action and 
conducted a wide-ranging recall to not only include the product 
codes for the specific individual items that failed tests, but all of 
the wooden railway toys that could have been painted with the 
potentially unsafe colours, since wooden toy production began 
at the affected facility [unnamed] in January 2005 in RC2 2007 
26/7/2007 
The company was also keen to indicate its co-operation with the 
Regulator and its commitment to ‘getting the message out to parents’.  
‘We continue to work closely with the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission to recover as many of the recalled products as 
possible. From day one, the Company has directed parents and 
consumers to its special recall website and its toll-free Consumer 
Care centre. The company believes the message is getting 
through to parents, not only based on the high levels of product 
recovered to date, but also because approximately 98% of the 
products returned from consumers match the recalled items list’, 
said CEO Curt Stoelting quoted in RC2 2007 26/7/2007). 
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Time Lines and Time Lags 
What took so long is a recurring theme throughout these case series. 
The timing of disclosure (to the regulator, to the public) are critical to 
these case studies, as an indicator of who knew and when. This 
chronological sequence of events is tabulated from the ‘staff allegations’ 
section of the USCPSC Settlement Agreement RC2 (2009). Where 
additional information has been sourced, this is referenced within the 
table 7.4. 
Table 7.4: Timelines and Time Lags: Lead 
When  
They Knew 
Who Knew What They Knew 
Jan 2005 RC 2 Corp 
Overseas Winner 
RC2 commissions Overseas Winner to 
manufacture Thomas & Friends™ wooden 
railway toys 
Nov 2006 RC2 Corp 
3i Corporation 
RC2 ceases manufacturing Thomas & 
Friends™ wooden railway toys at 3i 
Corporation Ltd 
29 Mar 2007 RC2 Corp 
US Retailer 
A US retailer alerts RC2 that one of its 
Thomas wooden railway toys fails the lead 
test 
RC2 places a hold on inventories of the 
toy (the oval set) made by one of their 
dedicated Chinese factories, Overseas 
Winner Ltd 
RC2 initiates an internal investigation in 
consultation with contract manufacturers 
and pertinent retailers 
30 Mar 2007 RC2 USCPSC deadline for reporting the hazard 
under the 24 hour regulatory reporting rule 
1 April 2007 RC2 USCPSC deadline passes- RC2 fails to report 
the hazard 
13 June 2007 RC2 
USCPSC 
RC2 reports the lead hazard to the USCPSC 
13 June 2007 First Recall USCPSC/RC2 recall 1.5 million Thomas & 
Friends™ wooden railway sets with lead in 
their surface paint 
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When  
They Knew 
Who Knew What They Knew 
June 2007 RC2 
Overseas Winner 
RC2 severs its business relationship 
with Overseas Winner 
June-Aug 2007 RC2 
USCPSC 
RC2 continues with additional testing 
of items from the Thomas & 
Friends™ wooden railway product 
line 
17 Aug 2007 
20 Sept 2007 
RC2 
USCPSC 
- By supplemental reports 
submitted by RC2 to CPSC 
between 17 Aug and 20 Sept 2007 
RC2 report they have obtained 
information which reasonably 
supports the conclusion that 5 
additional toys from the 
Thomas™ product line have 
specific colours of paint that may 
contain excessive levels of lead 
- The ongoing investigation yields 
multiple failing tests for lead 
26 Sept 2007 Second Recall USCPSC/RC2 expand the recall to 
include a further 5 Thomas™ models 
from the product range 
Source: USCPSC Settlement Agreement RC2 (2009: 2-6) 
 
Chains of Harm 
How is it that these toys were able to make it along the supply chain 
without detection? To understand this, it is important to reflect on the 
webs of relationships that exist along the chain. These relationships, 
although formalised in contracts, mostly seemed to be based on trust – 
it was breaches of trust that were the hallmark of the lead-related toy 
recalls. For example, Thomas™ brand owner (HIT Entertainment) and 
toy company licensee (RC2 Corporation) had a contractual relationship 
with conditions regarding brand quality.  
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RC2 Corporation and their dedicated contract manufacturer(s) in China 
(Hangsheng Wood Products, Overseas Winner and 3i) had agreements 
to manufacturer toys that were lead-free, to test raw materials like paint 
or paint pigment for lead and other heavy metals (at input), to test 
batches of toys (at throughput) and final products (at output). But these 
precautionary measures appear to have been ignored by RC2’s 
dedicated Chinese manufacturers and RC2 appears to have failed to 
enforce and monitor their expectations for product quality. 
But the introduction of a toxic substance to a supply chain does not 
occur in a vacuum. There are chains of command and control 
(organisational) in the country of the parent company (in this case 
America) and in the country of manufacture (in this case China) where 
key players in each organisation have decision-making authority about 
the day to day activities taking place under their control (whether this 
be design and development, manufacturing or distribution). Having 
said that, the overall responsibility for managing risks (like lead in raw 
materials) in the supply chain rests with the parent company (in this 
case RC2 Corporation).  
The fact that testing for lead and other heavy metals was routine for toy 
companies, albeit not enforced and monitored in their China supply 
chains in these cases, suggests the presence of lead in particular (and 
more recently cadmium) was widely recognised as a supply chain risk 
by toy companies manufacturing in China.  
The question is ‘where does the buck stop’ in terms of decisions made 
in toy company’s supply chains, sections of which are located in 
different countries across the world?  
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Table 7.5: Chain of Ownership/Command 
Apax Partners 
Private equity company and owner of HIT Entertainment in 2007 
United Kingdom 
HIT Entertainment 
Licensor of Thomas™ brand 
United Kingdom 
RC2 Corporation 
Manufacturer of Thomas™ toys under license 
United States 
RC2’s dedicated or preferred Chinese contract manufacturers 
Guangdong Province, China 
Hangsheng Wood 
Products Factory 
Overseas Winner 
Limited 
3i Corporation 
 
Un-named (and apparently unauthorised) paint supplier 
China 
Learning Curve Inc 
Distributor of toys in countries like Australia and wholly owned subsidiary of 
RC2 Corporation. 
Mega Retailers and Specialty Stores 
Wal-Mart, K-mart, Toys ‚R‛ Us 
United States, Europe, Canada, Australasia 
Purchasers 
Parents, grandparents and caregivers 
End-users 
Children between the ages of 2 and 6 years to whom these particular toys 
were targeted. 
 
UK based HIT Entertainment, owner of the Thomas™ brand contracted 
with American company RC2 Corporation to manufacture Thomas & 
Friends™ wooden railway sets under license. The 1,506,900 units of 
various Thomas & Friends™ wooden railway toys recalled in June 2007 
were made by RC2’s dedicated contract factory, Overseas Winner 
Limited in Dongguan, China (See USCPSC Settlement Agreement RC2 
2009. 
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The toys recalled in September 2007 were made by different Chinese 
factories, according to a spokeswoman for RC2, in response to 
questions by Leonhardt, of The New York Times on 24/10/2007: 
The all green maple tree tops and green signal bases were 
produced at Hangsheng Wood Products [in an 11 month 
window of harm] ‘between March 2006 and April 2007’ a 
business relationship that RC2 subsequently severed. Whereas, 
the ‘All black cargo car was produced in [a two year window of 
harm between March 2003 and July 2005] by ‘3i, a small contract 
manufacturer that RC2 has not done business with since 
November 2006  
By 26 July 2007, RC2’s CEO was explaining to New York Times reporter, 
Louise Story how things broke down in the supply chain and Chinese 
contract factories were the scapegoats. 
 We’ve always required our suppliers to follow our safety 
inspections. In this incident, those requirements were not met’ 
(RC2 CEO quoted in Story, The New York Times, 26/7/2007). 
This notion of them and us was a recurring theme in the lead-related 
recalls, captured succinctly by the CEO of another affected company, 
‘Simply put – our systems were circumvented and our standards were 
violated. We were let down and we let you down’ (Mattel CEO, Robert 
Eckert, quoted in US SCOA 2008: 103). 
Political and Legal Influences 
Enquiries and Inquisitions 
By mid-August a U.S. Senate Committee was requesting information 
from 19 companies about recent recalls and more than 9 million lead-
tainted children’s products (Goldman, Los Angeles Times, 24/8/2007). On 
22 August, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy 
and Commerce wrote to RC2 asking them to address a series of 
questions about the recalls. On 6 September, RC2’s CEO Curt Stoelting 
responded: 
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 ‘On behalf of everyone at RC2, we are writing to you today not 
only to answer the questions posed in your letter of 22 August, 
2007 but also to assure you and your fellow committee members 
that RC2 is in the business of making safe, high quality toys for 
children. We share your concerns and assure you that nothing is 
more important to us than keeping children safe’ (RC2 
Corporation 2007g). 
The recalls also exposed the US Consumer Product Safety Commission 
to closer scrutiny and criticisms that it was underfunded, under 
resourced and ill-equipped to monitor the safety of the 15,000 products 
under its surveillance each year. The agency also faced accusations of 
regulatory capture, having allegedly taken trips paid for by the 
industry it regulates. There were calls from members of congress for the 
then Commissioner of the agency to resign over these allegations. The 
compelling question was how did these toys move along a supply chain 
where testing of raw materials and finished products for heavy metals 
was already in place without being detected? And even more 
disturbing, was this only the tip of the iceberg? 
On 30 October 2007, the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on 
Energy and Commerce again wrote to RC2 raising further questions. 
The topic of discussion in the public domain turned to the frequency, 
rigorousness and independence of product testing, with affected 
companies quick to publicise their commitments to toy safety. Retailers 
began increasing testing in response to the recalls. Mega retailer, Wal-
Mart, for instance, said ‘it was increasing its third-party testing, adding 
an average of 200 more toy safety tests a day’ (quoted in Goldman, Los 
Angeles Times, 24/8/2007).   
But consumer activists like Edmund Mierzwinski of the U.S. Public 
Interest Research Group (PIRG) were critical of this sudden flurry to 
address product safety: 
 ‘These are things they should have been doing already -- the 
manufacturers, the distributors and the retailers. The toy 
manufacturers and the department stores have worried too much 
about price and not enough about quality. So they're responsible 
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for this mess’ (Edmund Mierzwinski, PIRG, quoted in Goldman 
Los Angeles Times 24/8/2007). 
Amidst the furore, there were calls from the U.S. Consumers Union for 
all toddlers to be tested for lead exposure by their paediatricians. 
Class Actions and Law Suits 
The June and September recalls led to numerous class action law suits 
against RC2, alleging that the recalled toys were negligently 
manufactured and tested. The toys were contaminated in China and 
consumed predominantly in America, but also in other countries such 
as the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand and Australian. RC2’s 26 
July 2007 press release noted that, ‘an anticipated US$3-4 million net 
charge for the second half of 2007 included estimated defence costs 
related to the 12 class action lawsuits filed against the company’ (Liroff 
et al  2008: 13). 
On 22 June 2007, a Chicago parent filed a proposed class action lawsuit 
against RC2 on behalf of all purchasers of Thomas® wooden railway 
coated with red and yellow surface paint containing lead. 
The named plaintiff ‘purchased a number of the lead-tainted toys 
for her toddler boys beginning in 2006 believing the toys were 
safe. Now, according to [her solicitor] she wonders about the 
long-term health effects on her children 
‚The biggest horror of this story is that parents know their 
toddlers often put toys in their mouths<. Consumers trust that 
companies like RC2 will live up to the promise it makes in its 
advertising, promising ‚safe and quality playthings’ (Plaintiff’s 
attorney cited in Hagens Berman, Sobol Shapiro 2007). 
An article in The Chicago Tribune (Higgins 14/8/2007), reports that ‘two 
Indiana couples filed a lawsuit against RC2 and two related companies 
(Racing Champions ERTL Corp and Learning Curve Brands Inc) in 
relation to the June recall of Thomas & Friends™ wooden railway toys: 
The toys had been on the market since 2005 and ‚defendants 
knew, or should have known, that the toys were defective and 
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presented a serious risk to the health and safety of children‛, the 
lawsuit said. The lawsuit alleged that the toys were produced in 
China and that RC2 failed to adequately screen and test the 
products for lead  
In January 2008 RC2 agreed to pay US$30 million to settle a nationwide 
class-action lawsuit representing hundreds of thousands of families 
who bought the Thomas & Friends™ toys. Under the settlement 
agreement, class members can receive cash refunds or replacements of 
the toys< plus a ‚bonus‛ toy. Also, RC2 will institute new quality 
controls to prevent future infractions, pay US$2 million to plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and US$5,000 to five plaintiffs, as well as donate US$100,000 
to a non-profit to be identified (Ihejirika 2008). 
According to Schmidt, USA Today, 22/1/2008). 
The class-action called for reimbursements for hundreds of 
thousands of consumers and improved product safety, which 
RC2 says it has implemented. Consumers would be reimbursed 
in cash for recalled toys or offered a replacement plus a bonus 
toy if they prefer. Customers who lack toys and proof of 
purchase can get $15 coupons.  
As part of the settlement, RC2 also ‘promised to step up testing and 
auditing of materials, improve communication between U.S. workers 
and those overseas, and require contract manufacturers to meet its 
testing and audit standards’. (Schmit, USA Today, 22/1/08) 
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Product Liability 
Most companies carry product liability insurance, so it is debatable 
exactly how much such violations cost the corporate purse in real terms 
and thus how effective fines are in deterring companies from re-
offending. For instance, RC2 notes in its 2007 Annual Report and 10K 
filing, 
‘...we carry various product liability insurance policies with 
coverage in aggregate of over US$75.0 million per occurrence. 
Certain policies have coverage exclusions including, but not 
limited to, some policies that exclude claims related to lead’ (RC2 
Annual Report & 10K 2007:6). 
But if RC2 was relying on recovering all or some of its costs from 
product liability insurance, the company was to be disappointed: 
When RC2 turned to its insurers for coverage relating to the class 
actions, however, both its U.S. and international insurers denied 
its claim. The U.S. policies contained a lead paint exclusion, which 
specifically applied to the type of liabilities for which RC2 was 
seeking coverage. That left the international policies which did not 
have a lead paint exclusion (Elkind and Carter 2010: 1). 
 The international policies covered bodily injuries caused by an 
‚occurrence‛ that took place in the ‚coverage territory‛, which 
included anywhere in the world except the U.S. There was no 
dispute that the toys were manufactured in China. The 
international insurer took the position that the ‚occurrence‛ 
giving rise to the injuries alleged in the class actions took place 
within the U.S. and thus its policies did not apply (Elkind and 
Carter 2010: 1-2).  As RC2 unfortunately found out the lead paint 
exclusion in its U.S. policy left it uncovered in a major market for 
its products (Elkind and Carter 2010: 2). 
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Lobbying 
The toy industry's biggest trade group (The Toy Industry Association) 
asserted that its members had a good system of safety standards and 
compliance and that the group was working toward a "uniform safety 
program." 
‘The first step for us is enhancing the system and making sure 
the system works,’ said Joan Lawrence, the group's vice 
president of standards and regulatory affairs. ‘I don't know if 
hearings are necessary because we have long been in 
conversations with individual members and we plan to continue 
those conversations.’ (Lawrence quoted in Goldman, The Los 
Angeles Times, 24/8/2007). 
Part of the analysis of who knew and when relates not only to specific 
company knowledge about the hazards, but also to industry-wide 
‘knowledge’ about the trouble with lead, especially in the China supply 
chain where all these toy companies chose to manufacture their 
products (among other countries). Yet RC2, like most of the other 
companies in this case series was aware that lead (and other heavy 
metals) were a risk in the China supply chain, because they were 
already testing for them prior to the 2007 recalls. 
Aftermath 
Allegations and Denials 
USCPSC staff allege that RC2 violated section 19(a)(1) of the Consumer 
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. 2068(a)(1) and that it did this ‘knowingly’ 
(as defined in section 20(d) of the CPSCA, 15 U.S.C. 2069(d) (USCPSC 
Settlement Agreement 2009: 6). For these violations the company was 
fined US$1,250,000.00, payable within twenty (20) calendar days 
(USCPSC Settlement Agreement 2009: 6). RC2’s response was to deny 
the allegations. It should be noted that Settlement Agreements do not 
constitute an admission by RC2, or a determination by the Commission 
that RC2 knowingly violated the CPSA (USCPSC Settlement Agreement 
2009: 6). 
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There was much debate about the definition of ‘knowing’ in the Act. In 
her Statement accompanying the RC2 penalty Commissioner Northup 
said in part: 
 In addition, going forward, I believe that the statutory definition 
of ‚knowing‛ used by this agency should receive further scrutiny. 
15 U.S.C. § 2069(d) defines knowing under the CPSA to not only 
mean the ‚having of actual knowledge‛ (which is fine), but also ‚the 
presumed having of knowledge deemed to be possessed by a 
reasonable man who acts in the circumstances, including 
knowledge obtainable upon the exercise of due care to ascertain 
the truth of representations‛ (which is a barely intelligible 
standard of mens rea). As greater civil penalties are at stake in the 
future, some defendant will challenge this standard unless the 
agency does a far better job than it has to date of articulating what 
it means and applying it in a manner that is not merely 
conclusory. If the standard as written is too difficult to apply 
clearly and consistently, then it should be discarded in favour of a 
less tortured definition of knowing. The agency should act before 
a litigant forces us to do so, both to provide greater clarity to the 
regulated community as well as greater protection for our own 
future enforcement decisions (USCPSC Statement of 
Commissioner Northup, RC2 2009:2). 
Penalties and Prosecutions 
In agreeing to the settlement, RC2 denied that it knowingly violated 
federal law, as alleged by USCPSC staff (USCPSC Release 2009).When 
the degree of deviance and size of this penalty is compared with other 
lead offenders like Mattel Inc/Fisher-Price, it seems disproportionate to 
the offence. Perhaps RC2 Corporation paid a price (that is they were 
made an example of) for being the ‘first cab off the rank’ in terms of 
violating the lead paint ban in toys.  
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As USCPS’s Commissioner Northup noted, some extenuating 
circumstances in RC2’s case. These circumstances not only support the 
view that RC2 may have been treated more harshly than necessary, but 
they also indicate the company well understood the risk of lead in their 
supply chain. For clarity the comments Commissioner Northup made 
are presented in bullet-point form below. She said it is worth noting 
that: 
 RC2 had a newly revised compliance system in place at the time 
these violations occurred, a fact for which the agency may not 
have given the company enough credit.  
 RC2 already required its contract manufacturers to complete 
lead paint testing at independent certified labs and obtain 
certifications from their paint suppliers that all paints met 
applicable standards for lead levels (steps akin to what the 
CPSIA now requires of all companies).  
 In addition, RC2 already conducted a good deal of final product 
testing of the kind envisioned by the CPSIA.  
 When RC2 leadership in the United States learned of the 
problems at issue here, the company cut off the responsible 
contract manufacturer in China, cut off the paint supplier in 
Hong Kong for use by its other contract manufacturers, 
conducted an extensive internal investigation, took a very 
broad approach in determining the appropriate size of its 
recall—a fact that should not count against companies when the 
CPSC then decides the size of a civil penalty to be assessed—
and instituted many new internal measures even beyond what 
the CPSIA requires well before agreeing to this settlement. 
Staff have also informed the commissioners that the company 
was very cooperative and in no way dismissive of agency 
inquiries when the problem surfaced. (USCPSC Statement of 
Commissioner Northup in relation to RC2, 2009). 
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When the settlement was announced, RC2 made the following 
statement: 
 ‘Today’s settlement agreement announced by the U.S. Consumer 
Product Safety Commission not only resolves remaining issues 
from 2007 product recalls, but also reaffirms RC2’s comprehensive 
program of preventive measures to safeguard its products. In 
instituting its Multi-Check Safety System, RC2 has created a 
strong protective barrier to provide parents added comfort and 
assure continued compliance with product safety standards 
around the globe. We’re pleased that we’ve been able to resolve 
the issues in a manner that helps us continue to build parents’ 
trust and assure children many hours of play with innovative, 
high-quality and safe toys (RC2 Statement 2009). 
Tougher Standards 
In the United States Quattleman and Rustin (2009: 38) refer to the 
passage of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA 
2008)  as ‘the most significant outcome of the year of the recall <it 
enacts stricter rules and stiffer penalties for those companies that fail to 
comply with USCPSC standards’*as well as+ increasing consumer 
protection legislation, particularly in the area of chldren’s products’. 
Importantly, they note that it gives the regulator more power: 
The Act bolsters USCPSC enforcement procedures and powers 
through significant increases in civil fines, criminal penalties and 
ease of conviction. Now a director, officer or agent of a 
manufacturer, distributor or retailer can be convicted of 
violations of USCPSC stanards even if he or she has no 
knowledge of noncompliance with with the CPSIA from the 
commission. It establishes whistleblower protection and an 
online database of reported product hazards and increases state 
attorneys general enforcement power. Information on violations 
will be shared with other federal, state, local, or foreign 
governmental agencies. (Quattlebaum and Rustin 2009: 38). 
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In his testimony to a U.S. Senate Committee on the topic toy safety, 
UCPSC Deputy Commissioner Thomas Moore summed up the trouble 
with lead in children’s toys: 
 ‚As far as children’s products such as jewellery or vinyl baby’s 
bibs containing accessible lead are concerned, I wish that the 
Commission had the authority to find it unacceptable for any 
amount of lead to be in a children’s product‛ (Moore 2007:6). 
As noted by the New Zealand local paper, the Nelson Mail in August 
2007, ‘the spotlight needs also to be played on Western regulatory and 
testing regimes’ (Nelson Mail 2007). The result was a flurry of bans 
(temporary and permanent) and new regulations (at least in developed 
countries) and mandatory testing by manufacturers. But mandatory 
testing procedures for heavy metals were already in place when these 
recalls occurred. The question still remains who is checking that the 
testing has been carried out, and that the certificates alleging that the 
toys are safe are authentic. 
Four years after the recalls, on 19 October 2011, USCPSC’s Chairman 
and Commissioners announced a new safety framework for children’s 
products in the United States, describing it as ‘a monumental day for 
the safety of America’s children, and one that parents and grandparents 
have waited for years to happen’ (USCPSC 2011: 1). 
Today, we took a giant step in transforming the children’s product 
safety framework in this country from the reactive system that 
tens of millions of consumers still remember from the shocking 
‚year of the recall‛ in 2007 into a new, proactive framework that 
Congress directed this agency to create and that the parents, 
grandparents, and children of this country expect and deserve 
(USCPSC 2011: 2). 
The framework moves away from ‘the old, reactive children’s product 
safety system that failed to protect children or establish the United 
States as the global leader in product safety’ (USCPSC 2011: 1)  
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The objective is to intercept toys at the point of manufacture and in the 
country of manufacture, thereby ‘preventing a wave of children’s 
products containing harmful cadmium (and lead) from reaching the 
hands of children in the United States’ (USCPSC 2011: 2).The USCPSC 
reported overwhelming public support for such an approach, 
evidenced by: 
...The thousands of parents, grandparents, and everyday 
consumers who took the time to reach out to all five 
Commissioners during the past week, and who urged us to vote 
yes and support these rules. We believe that such an 
unprecedented outpouring deserves some recognition, especially 
considering the fact that we have received more than ten-
thousand (and still counting) letters from consumers in all 50 
states. This unprecedented flood of letters from consumers 
asking us to support the third party testing rules has occurred 
over just the past seven days (USCPSC 2011: 2). 
Counting the Cost 
The recalls would come at considerable cost to RC2, as recorded in their 
2007 10K filing: 
 ‘We recorded charges of US$17.6 million, net of tax, or US$0.84 
per diluted share, for the year ended December 31, 2007, related 
to these recalls, based on the latest estimates of retailer inventory 
returns, consumer product replacement costs and shipping costs 
as of the date of this filing [31 December 2007] as well as the 
additional replacement costs or refunds, donations, notice 
charges, claims administration and legal fees related to the 
settlement of the class action lawsuits’ (RC2 2007e: 7). 
The negative consequences of a product recall for any company are 
noted by Raiborn et al (2009: 36). 
Product recalls cause companies to incur numerous additional 
direct expenses for reacquiring and disposing of the recalled 
products, issuing press releases and recall notices, increasing 
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advertising to compensate for negative publicity, legal costs, and 
raising estimates for sales returns 
Reporting on the costs incurred by the company, Fetterman et al (2007), 
in USA Today says: 
RC2 ‘took a charge of US$4 million in recall costs in the second 
quarter of 2007, and expects another US$3-US$4 million in recall 
costs for the remainder of the year. 
In announcing the proposed civil penalty settlement of US$1.5 million 
on 1 December 2009, then Commissioner Northup of the USCPSC 
commented on how the costs of a recall function as a deterrent: 
The tremendous costs associated with a voluntary or CPSC-
ordered recall (over US$42 million in this case) provide a 
significant financial deterrent against companies taking a casual 
approach toward their product safety compliance responsibilities 
(Northup 2009: 2). 
On the other hand Watson from the Daily Finance took an alternative 
viewpoint: 
 ‘In addition to its surprisingly low penalty of US$1.25 million, RC2 
couldn’t ask for better timing for the agreement. After all, a pre-
holiday release of the settlement would have poured fresh salt on 
the scabbed wound of two years ago; by announcing after 
Christmas, the government spared RC2 what might have been a 
brutal blow in an already depressed holiday climate (Watson, 
Daily Finance, 29/12/2009). 
This fine also appears to have served as a warning to others in the toy 
industry: 
‘The tremendous costs associated with a voluntary or CPSC-
ordered recall (Over US$42 million in this case) provide a 
significant financial deterrent against companies taken a casual 
approach toward their product safety compliance responsibilities. 
In addition, civil penalties like the one assessed against RC2 serve 
as a further reputational disincentive against treating product 
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safety responsibilities too lightly. I believe that the civil penalty 
assessed in this case and the other steps taken under pre-existing 
law sufficed to correct the situation adequately and will deter 
future lead paint violations in toys made by RC2’ (USCPSC 
Statement of Commissioner Northup RC2, 2009). 
What Commissioner Northup appears to suggest is that the size of this 
penalty may have threatened RC2’s viability 
 This entire incident has cost the company greatly. RC2’s net 
income declined from more than US$34M in 2006 (the year before 
the recall) to a net loss of more than US$200K in 2008 (the year 
after the recall). Its number of employees declined from 830 at 
2007 year end to 740 at 2008 year end, (USCPSC Statement of 
Commissioner Northup RC2, 2009). 
 As we look to the future and to implementing the new law on lead 
in toys, I hope this agency will continue to apply penalties in a 
manner that creates proper incentives to produce safe products, 
but that does not cripple companies that operate lawfully the vast 
majority of the time. A civil penalty is not a death sentence. Fines 
are meant to deter non-compliance. Civil penalties are not meant 
to sink a company that is providing jobs or to unduly interfere 
with the future operations of a company that manufactures other 
safe products. (USCPSC Statement of Commissioner Northup 
2009: 2) 
Conclusion 
This case has examined the key players and events leading up to and 
following the recall of millions of lead-contaminated toys by American 
company RC2 Corporation. It reveals a consistent pattern throughout 
all these cases, where the company was slow to disclose the hazard to 
the regulator, which subsequently delayed disclosure to consumers. In 
the early stages of the ‘crisis’ senior managers were accused of lying 
low and initially being reluctant to name up the Chinese manufacturing 
partners in their extended supply chain.   
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Although they issued a statement of regret some critics suggested that 
this fell short of either apologising or explaining what happened. The 
issue of what happened and the order in which events occurred would 
be revealed in 2009, two years after the recalls (2007) in the ‘staff 
allegations’ section of the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission’s 
civil Settlement Agreement with the company. A compelling question 
for the media, politicians and consumers alike became what took so 
long? Once recalls did get under way, the wording of recall notices was 
sometimes confusing and in one instance was compounded by the fact 
that toxic and non-toxic toys were packaged together, causing 
consumers to ask which toys?  
As part of a corrective strategy to reassure consumers, the company 
introduced a multi-check system, but rather than being a new initiative, 
this was simply a strengthening of processes that were already in place. 
The company compounded their problems by sending out a 
replacement ‘gift’ that was subsequently found to be lead-contaminated 
and had to be returned. In between recalls contaminated toys continued 
to circulate in formal and informal markets. When RC2 was finally 
prosecuted in 2009 (some two years after the main events) they denied 
that they ‘knowingly’ imported toxic toys. However, when comparing 
this company’s conduct to that of other companies prosecuted for lead 
recalls (e.g. Mattel subsidiary Fisher-Price for Dora the Explorer™ and 
other toys and Schylling Inc for various spinning tops and pails), RC2 
appears to have paid a heavy price for being the first cab off the rank 
for lead-contaminated recalls, both in terms of being made an example 
of and in terms of the size of the fine incurred. 
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Chapter 8: Case Study 2: The Trouble with Magnets 
Rose Art/Mega Brands and Magnetix™  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Over a three year period between March 2006 and March 2008, two 
transnational corporations were involved in a series of global recalls 
that exposed the dangers of tiny powerful magnets dislodging from 
certain children’s toys. The first was Canadian toy giant, Mega Bloks 
Canada (now Mega Brands Canada), who at the time was in the process 
of acquiring American company Rose Art Industries (now Mega Brands 
America), the original manufacturers of Magnetix™ building sets. The 
acquisition of Rose Art promised to give Mega Brands a leading edge in 
the construction toys market, but instead delivered a toy that caused 
the death of a little boy and more. The second was the world’s largest 
toy manufacturer, American company Mattel Inc, makers of Polly 
Pocket™ play sets and other magnetic toys.  
This case study focuses on the Mega Brand’s recalls of Magnetix™ 
which occurred between March 2006 and March 2008. It also draws 
upon some of Mattel’s experiences to illustrate how these two cases 
overlapped. At the time both companies were engaged in the business-
as-usual process of getting toys to market from their respective 
manufacturing hubs in China. Between them the two companies 
recalled approximately 28 million magnetic toys worldwide.  
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The Toys 
American company, Rose Art Industries, first launched Magnetix™ 
building sets in 2003, labelling them safe for children as young as three 
years old (Callahan, The Chicago Tribune, 6/5/2007a). Not until a boy 
died The popular toys typically consist of 20 to 200 plastic building 
pieces containing neodymium magnets and 20-100 steel bearing balls 
which can be connected together to form various geometric shapes and 
structures. The pieces come in a range of colours including red, yellow, 
blue and green, shaped in squares, triangles and cylinder rods (See 
USCPSC 2006; Reference.com 2012). Magastik™ and Magnetix™ Pre-
School magnetic toys which were also subject to recall are animal, 
vehicle or building toys embedded with magnets that allow the parts to 
connect to large coloured metal balls.  
In the year leading up to the magnet-related recalls, the toy was in 
demand, ranked by retail trade magazine, TD Monthly, as among the 
Top 10 most wanted building sets and a ‘top seller on such leading 
websites as Amazon.com.KBToys.com and Walmart.com’ (Ruggiero, 
TD Monthly, February 2005). The same year the toy made it onto Toy 
Wishes ‘Hot Dozen List for 2005’ and was ‘nominated as Activity toy of 
the year by the Toy Industry Association (TIA) in 2005’ (Clifford, Daily 
Press, 21/7/2007). The toys were sold globally through outlets like Wal-
Mart, Target, Toys R Us and smaller specialty stores for betweenUS$20 
and US$60, depending on the size of the set. On their website, Mega 
Brands notes just how popular the toy was at the time, attracting the 
following awards : ‘2006: Dr Toys Best Vacation toys, Dr Toy’s 100 Best 
Children’s products, Dr Toys 10 Best toys, iParenting Outstanding 
Products and The National Parenting Centre Seal of Approval Winner’ 
and in 2007: the iParenting Best Products Call’. (Mega Brands, 
http://support.megabrands.com/en/customerservice/recallinfo/magnetix
/testimonials_awards.php).  
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The Company 
Mega Brands Inc (formerly Mega Bloks) is a Canadian toy giant 
headquartered in Montreal, Quebec Canada. It is the parent company of 
Mega Brands America –formerly Rose Art Industries (USCPSC 
Settlement Agreement Mega 2009: 2). First incorporated in 1967 as 
Ritvik Holdings, the company went public in 2002 as Mega Bloks Inc 
(Funding Universe.com 2007). Like many big toy companies, Mega 
Brands grew its business over time, through a series of strategic 
alliances, agreements and acquisitions including a co-branding 
agreement with Bandai Japan to develop and sell a range of 
construction toys (June 2003), licensing agreements with 4 Kids 
Entertainment for Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles® (August 2003); 
Marvel Enterprises for their ever-popular super hero franchises 
(October 2004) and Original Appalachian Artworks Inc for Cabbage 
Patch Kids® (May 2005) (See Mega Bloks Press Releases 2003a; 
2003b;2004;2005a).  
So it was not surprising that in keeping with this strategy, on 15 June 
2005 Mega Bloks initiated the acquisition of American toy company 
Rose Art Industries and the Magnetix™ brand (Mega Bloks 15/6/2005a), 
completing the US$315M deal (katz, Bloomberg.com 15/6/2005) on 26 July 
2005 (Mega Bloks Press Release 26/7/2005b; Mega Q3 Report 2005: 3) 
taking full operational control of the company on 31 December 2005 
(See USPSC Settlement Agreement Rose/Mega 2009: 1; Mega Bloks Q4 
Report 2005). Under the terms of the agreement, two of Rose Art’s 
owners, Jeffrey and Lawrence Rosen took up senior management 
positions within the Rose Art Division of the company and also as 
Directors on Mega Blok’s board. In an earlier Press Release Mega Blok’s 
described Rose Art as ‘the number two brand in the US$1.8 billion arts 
and crafts category and the leader in magnetic building sets’ (Mega 
Bloks 15/6/2005a: 1). 
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 But rather than bolstering the Canadian toy giant’s construction toy 
portfolio, the acquisition of American company Rose Art, would mark 
the beginning of three years of trouble for Mega Brands Canada and 
Magnetix™.  Shortly after the first recall in March 2006, the Rosen’s and 
Mega Brands would fall out over the trouble with magnets. In part, 
they disagreed over the question of who knew and when? But before 
this happened, a little boy died. 
A little boy dies 
On 24 November 2005, 20 month old Kenny Sweet from Redmond 
Washington in the United States, was rushed to hospital with what his 
parents thought was the stomach flu, but he died shortly afterwards of 
cardiac arrest. An autopsy revealed tiny magnets – smaller than the 
eraser on a pencil – had lodged in Kenny’s intestine (one at the top and 
one at the bottom). The magnetic force was so great it connected both 
ends twisting his intestine and forcing deadly bacteria into his 
bloodstream (Esteban, KOMO News, 20/12/2005). Kenny swallowed 
nine cylindrical magnets from an older sibling’s Magnetix® 
construction set. The medical diagnosis – volvulus [the bowel actually 
twists around on itself and causes an obstruction to the cavity – think of 
an empty sausage skin], necrosis [death of the tissue due to lack of 
blood-flow in this case] and sepsis [infection due to lack of oxygen and 
necrosis from the twisted bowel]. Surprisingly, Kenny’s death would 
not trigger an immediate recall. 
Precursors 
Early Warnings and Near Misses 
One of the earliest warnings about magnets dislodging from toys was 
‘logged by the USCPSC in March 2000, when an 8 year old American 
child died from intestinal injuries suffered as a result of swallowing 
magnets that dislodged from a broken fast-food meal’ (Callahan, The 
Chicago Tribune, 6/5/2007a).Then in 2003, a six year old girl suffered 
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intestinal trauma after accidentally swallowing powerful magnetic 
jewellery brought at a state fair she was using to emulate a tongue 
piercing. Callahan, reports that according to USCPSC records, ‘her 
surgeon alerted the USCPSC a month later (November 2003), to expect 
more of these types of injuries if products with such magnets were 
marketed to children’ (The Chicago Tribune, 6/5/2007a).  
From that time forward, there was a ‘trail of warnings for magnets’ 
(Callahan, The Chicago Tribune, 6/5/2007a) leading up to and following 
the death of Kenny Sweet on 24 November 2005. Some were received 
by the USCPSC one was expressed in the form of a letter to the editor of 
the journal Radiology, published in November 2004 (See Oestreich 2004). 
Others were for the same magnets in another company’s toys (in this 
case Mattel’s Polly Pocket™) involving early warnings, one in July 
2005, and a second in early December 2005. When Rose Art filed its 
initial report of Kenny’s death with the USCPSC on 14 December 2005, 
in a particularly repugnant example of blame-shifting the company 
allegedly ‘attributed the release of magnets from the plastic pieces to 
unusually abusive play by the decedent’s older siblings’ (See USCPSC 
Settlement Agreement Mega/Rose 2009: 3).  
In the interim, while the Regulator was negotiating with the company 
regarding a recall, another little boy became a victim to Magnetix. On 3 
March, four year old Kyle Booke had a section of his intestines removed 
after swallowing dislodged magnets from a Magnetix™ construction 
set (Callahan, The Chicago Tribune, 7/5/2007b).Then on 28 March, just 
two days before the recall, the USCPSC received some long-awaited 
complaint and incident data from Rose Art/Mega, in the form of a 
Consumer Calls/Warranty Claims Chart. CPSC staff described this 
information, in the ‘staff allegations’ section of a Settlement Agreement 
with the company as ‘lacking detail and critical information, rendering 
it effectively useless’. In response to a request for the source documents 
that informed the incident data, USCPSC staff were told that ‘the 
company did not retain any source documents’ (USCPSC Settlement 
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Mega/Rose 2009:4), but this was untrue. Regulatory staff would later 
discover – during further investigations in September 2006 - that Rose 
Art did in fact ‘retain records of consumer complaints, with some level 
of detail’ (USCPSC Settlement Rose/Mega 2009: 4). Even worse, the 
company had been collecting incident data since approximately January 
2004 (USCPSC Settlement Agreement Mega/Rose 2009: 6). 
Between February 2005 and Kenny’s death on 24 November 2005, there 
were a series of incidents that ought to have acted as precautionary 
milestones, but seemed to go largely unacknowledged by both the 
company and the USCPSC.  
Kiegan Willis (5 yrs) - May 2005 
‘In May 2005, Indiana play school owner, Sharon Grigsby phoned the 
USCPSC hotline to report that five year old Kiegan Willis required 
surgery to remove magnets that dislodged from a building set which he 
picked up and swallowed off the floor at the day care centre. She told 
reporters at the time that she had urged the Commission to ‚please do 
something‛ and warned ‚if this product is not recalled, children will 
die‛ (Callahan, The Chicago Tribune, 2007a). Approximately a week after 
that call a form letter arrived from the USCPSC, stating in part: 
Because of limited resources and the volume of incidents 
reported to us, only a few complaints may be selected for follow-
up investigation at this time‛ (Callahan, The Chicago Tribune, 
6/5/2007a ). 
Then as Callahan (2007a), notes ‘Sixty days elapsed without any further 
word and no from the USCPSC and no recall announcement. According 
to a media report, ‘the magnets that doctors removed from the pre-
schooler’s intestines – corroded globs in a hospital specimen jar – sat in 
a drawer in Grigsby's office waiting for an investigator to examine 
them. 
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"I felt like I was pushed aside," Grigsby said. "I thought I was 
helping the next family." (Grigsby quoted in Callahan, The 
Chicago Tribune, 6/5/2007a). 
Sadly, just six months after Sharon Grigsby’s call to the USCPSC hotline, 
Kenny Sweet died and as Grigsby lamented at the time: 
"If they would have taken me seriously, that little boy [Kenny 
Sweet] would be alive." (Grigsby quoted in Callahan, The Chicago 
Tribune, 6/5/2007a). 
Marcell McNeil: (age 3 years) May 2005 
3 year old Marcell McNeil began complaining of flu-like symptoms on 1 
May. Over the next 2 days his stomach ache became more severe and he 
vomited violently Doctors at Madigan Army Medical Center performed 
an emergency surgery to remove three magnets that had bonded across 
the walls of his intestine. They also repaired eight holes in his stomach, 
small intestine and colon that had been caused by the magnets rubbing 
together, and removed his appendix to guard against infection (as 
reported by KOMO News, 29/3/2006). 
Then in July 2005, an event occurred that should have been a further 
wake-up call for the toy industry more widely, about the trouble with 
magnets. Mattel was also experiencing problems with the same 
magnets dislodging from their toys, resulting in the same injuries to 
children (as the Magnetix™ toys), but this would not become public 
knowledge for a further two years.  
Paige Kostrzewski - (7 year old girl), July 2005 
In July 2005 seven year old Paige Kostrzewski reportedly suffered 
intestinal injuries after swallowing the same types of magnets (as those 
in Magnetix™ building sets) that dislodged from a Mattel Polly 
Pocket™ play set. Apparently ‘Paige placed two of the magnets 
between her lips so that her hands would be free to affix the rest of the 
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doll’s clothes’ *just as adults routinely do with nails or sewing pins+ 
(CNN.com/US 15/8/2007). Paige’s mother, Misty May describes what 
happened: 
 Monday 11 July 2005 was payday for Misty May and right after 
work she went to the store and bought Polly Pocket Quik-Clik 
Boutique for her daughter Paige’s collection. Two days later, 
Paige’s mother notes ‘she just started running around and not 
acting herself and by the next day she didn’t want to eat’ (Misty 
May quoted in Oppenheimer 2009: 228). 
On the following Sunday Misty May took Paige to the emergency room 
of a local hospital, where an x-ray ‘showed metal foreign objects in her 
body’ (Oppenheimer 2009: 229), and she was transferred to Riley 
Children’s Hospital for further tests. There it was discovered that ‘the 
child’s intestines had been punctured, causing toxins from her bowels 
to seep through her body<’ (Oppenheimer 2009: 229).  
Misty May contacted Gordon Tabor, an Indianapolis Attorney 
specialising in product liability cases and after a meeting he decided to 
take on the case (See Case Study 2 this series). Oppenheimer (2009: 232) 
says that ‘shortly after the secret settlement with Paige Kostrzewski was 
finalised, just before Thanksgiving [November] 2006, Mattel and the 
USCPSC recalled 4.4 million Polly Pocket™ products after at least three 
children, including Paige suffered serious injuries. By then they knew of 
some 170 cases of these small magnets dislodging. 
But Mattel settled this case behind closed doors, effectively waiving the 
victim’s right to speak about the incident in the public domain. 
Awareness of this incident did not become public until two years later, 
at the time of Mattel’s second (expanded) recall for Polly Pocket™ in 
August 2007 when the child’s mother broke her silence out of a sense of 
frustration that the same toy that had injured her daughter two years 
earlier was still injuring children. 
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"It *the recall for Polly Pocket™+ should have been done two 
years ago, when my daughter almost died," she said (CNN 
15/8/2007). 
It is unclear whether Mattel shared information about this common 
hazard (rare earth magnets dislodging from toys) with competitor, 
Mega Brands (or vice versa), or indeed with the toy industry more 
widely, but it would be a good future strategy to consider such an early 
alert system between companies. It also begs the question as to when 
(or whether) the USCPSC knew about the July 2005 incident.  
Information sharing of like hazards between companies in the toy 
industry sector is a must as a potential strategy for preventing these 
types of injuries to children. Companies must be more aware of what 
literature (especially medical) is out there on the nature of and dangers 
posed by the components they are using in children’s toys. These early 
warnings and near misses (many of which were documented in the 
medical literature dating back several decades) could have acted as a 
precautionary milestone, triggering an alert to the industry more 
broadly and perhaps initiating a design response that could have 
minimised the problem. It would be disappointing if Rose/Mega 
Brand’s trouble with magnets was seen as an opportunity for a 
competitive edge, rather than a moral obligation to prevent harm to 
children everywhere. 
In an interview with CNN on 22 January, 2008, Mattel CEO Robert 
Eckert spoke about the Mega Brand’s incident: 
 Around Thanksgiving 2005, a child ingested a magnet from one 
of our competitors’ toys and then ingested a second magnet. 
Unfortunately those magnets tried to find each other in the 
child’s intestines, and that changed how the entire toy industry 
viewed these magnets. If they become dislodged, they can cause 
a real problem’ (Eckert, quoted in Yang, CNN Money, 22/2/2008). 
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Following the first Polly Pocket™ recall by Mattel, after the Paige 
Kostrzewski case was settled, Oppenheimer (2009: 242) notes that ‘Sim 
Osborn, representing the Bowmans [another child who ingested 
magnets that came loose from a sibling’s Polly Pocket™ toy+, filed a 
personal injury lawsuit against Mattel on 21 November, 2006, seeking 
damages for medical bills and for the emotional harm caused to the 
family from Devlin’s ordeal’. Oppenheimer (2009 243) also relates how 
Osborn closely followed the recalls and how he observed, in hindsight 
that: 
 Mattel kind of hid the second Polly Pocket recall in with the lead 
paint, and the media jumped on the lead paint. Looking at it in 
the abstract, it was pretty good PR on Mattel’s part. 
The above examples indicate that Rose Art/Mega Brands were not the 
only company for whom these magnets were a problem, although the 
Magnetix™ case did attract the most media attention, whereas the 
media focus for Mattel was more on lead-contaminated toys.  
In the intervening months before their first recall the incidents 
continued to mount up for Rose Art/Mega Brands and the Magnetix™ 
brand: 
William Finley: (4 years), August 2005 
Media reports suggest that the dangerous relationship between 
magnets and toys was evident well before the Magnetix™ recall in 
March 2006.  Morgenson, in The New York Times, 15/7/2007 reports that 
‘William Finley was almost four years old when he received a 
Magnetix™ building set for Christmas in 2004, but a few months later 
some of the magnets dislodged and William ingested them 
(Morgenson, The New York Times, 15/7/2007). Similarly, Callahan 
Callahan in The Chicago Tribune, 6/5/2007, reports that ‘four year old 
William Finley underwent surgery after swallowing parts of his 
Magnetix™ building set in August 2005, four months prior to Kenny’s 
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death in November 2005. After dismissing a burst appendix as the 
cause, Doctors discovered three tiny magnets in William’s intestines. 
He suffered intestinal and abdominal scarring and injuries to other 
internal organs as well as his nervous system. Despite a letter from 
William’s family to the manufacturer, warning of the problem, the 
company (Rose Art Industries) reportedly took no action, according to a 
KOMO4 News report, Seattle (Esteban 27/4/2006) which describes the 
events. 
 On 31 October 2005, *the Finley’s+ sent Rose Art a letter telling 
them their son ‚ingested a magnet‛.  The company signed for the 
letter three days later [in November], but the Finleys say Rose Art 
‘never responded’  
Adam Finley, William’s father, told KOMO4 News: 
 ‚It made us feel a lot like my son didn’t matter‛  
 Mega Bloks told me: ‚There was nothing in this letter that raised a 
red flag < only one magnet was swallowed < it was a minor 
incident‛  
Rose Art allegedly received the Finley’s letter in November 2005, and 
Kenny died three weeks later. But Rose Art claimed that prior to 
Kenny’s death they had no record of ‚a similar occurrence involving 
Magnetix™‛ (Esteban, KOMO4 News, 27/4/2006). But according to 
KOMO News, ‘Rose Art insists the injuries were unavoidable< nothing 
they [Rose Art] can do replaces the need for adult supervision.  
In fact, according to another source, the company (Rose Art Industries) 
allegedly denied ever receiving the Finley’s letter: 
 ‚After our son was terribly injured, we alerted the company by 
certified letter. They received our letter on 3 November 2005. 
Then, just a few weeks later, a family in Richmond Washington 
*Kenny Sweet’s family+ lost their son after he swallowed these 
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magnets as well. We were astounded that the company later 
claimed on national television that they had no prior knowledge 
of these incidents, when in fact, they had our letter‛ (Sara Finley 
quoted in PR Newswire 10/4/2008 citing Original Source: Reiner, 
Simpson, Timmons & Slaughter). 
According to an Online Lawyer Source (2008), ‘In May 2008 the Finley’s 
agreed to a settlement of US$1 million. This is not a large amount of 
money, given the potential costs of William’s ongoing health care. The 
same source notes that ‘according to the lawsuit filed by William’s 
family, he will suffer constant intestinal problems and abdominal pain 
[and] will also need to be on a special diet for the rest of his life, the 
lawsuit claimed’ (Online Lawyer Source 2008). 
Rose Art Industries (now Mega Brands), the manufacturer of the 
Magnetix toy set, was accused of failing to provide adequate warnings 
regarding the dangers of its product. The label warned of a ‚choking 
hazard‛ but not the risk of intestinal perforations and blockages and 
even death if ingested.  As noted by Beasley, The Beasley Report, 8/8/2007, 
it was alleged in the lawsuit brought by the Finley’s that: 
‚Even after being notified of the potential dangers of the toy, 
Rose Art failed to institute any clearer warning or a recall of the 
Magnetix toys. This inaction led to the serious injury of over 20 
children nationwide and resulted in one death,‛ the lawsuit 
stated. The money from William’s settlement will be invested in 
an annuity, but Rose Art has agreed to pay the family $20,000 
immediately to help them recover from the financial devastation 
caused by his injury (Beasley 2008: See also  Online Lawyer 
Source 2008 at: 
<http://www.onlinelawyersource.com/news/magnetix-toy-
injury.html>). 
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Then in November 2005, the unthinkable happened, and Kenny Sweet 
died. 
Kenny Sweet – (22 mths), November 2005 
‘When Penny Sweet purchased two boxes of Magnetix™ toys from a 
supermarket for her son’s tenth birthday in June [2005] she could never 
have imagined that six months later those toys would kill her 22 month 
old son’ (American Association for Justice 2009: 16). This is how 
Kenny’s Mom, Penny described the circumstances surrounding his 
death to consumer advocate ‘Kids in Danger’ , two years after his death 
in 2007: 
Kenny must have found the magnets in the carpet and 
swallowed them on two separate occasions. One group was 
about to pass through his bowel and the second group was 
entering in the beginning of his intestine. The first group had 
already been corroding, slowly releasing poisonous chemicals 
into his body. The second group magnetized to the first group 
causing a bulbous to form and gangrene to set in. The 
Emergency Room x-ray technician thought the metal object 
showing up on the x-ray was outside Kenny’s body. If they had 
used a Magnetic Resolution Test or M.R.I., consequences would 
have been deadly causing him instant death and possibly 
blowing up the machine and harming people in the immediate 
area (Penny Sweet, as told to ‘Kids in Danger’ (2007) at: 
http://www.kidsindanger.org/family-voices/kenny/  
But the warning on the toy that killed Kenny belied the true nature of 
deadly hazard lurking within: 
 ‚It does say there is a choking hazard on here.‛ Penny said. 
‚Unfortunately they don’t say it causes serious injury or death, 
which is the kind of warning they need to have on here‛ (Penny 
Sweet quoted in Esteban, KOMO News 2005). 
234 
One of the most disconcerting aspects of this case is what Penny Sweet 
was unaware of when Kenny died on 24 November 2005. She did not 
know that Marcell McNeil (May 2005), William Finley (August 2005) 
had suffered life-threatening injuries from Magnetix™ toys and that the 
company knew about these injuries before Kenny died (See Callahan, 
Investigative Journalism Series, The Chicago Tribune, 6/5/2007a).In May 
2005, there were two further incidents when Timothy Kroell suffered 
injuries from a knock-off Magnetix™ toy (as far as the author can 
determine these toys were never recalled) and in the same month 
Indiana play school owner, Sharon Grigsby phoned the USCPSC 
hotline to report that ‘a popular new toy, Magnetix™, nearly killed one 
of her pre-schoolers’ exhorting the agency to ‚please do something‛ 
and warning ‚if this product is not recalled, children will die‛ 
(Callahan, The Chicago Tribune, 6/5/2007a).  
Discovery and Detection 
The trouble with magnets in Magnetix™ construction sets was first 
detected in early 2004 and became a serious issue for Rose Art/Mega 
Brands when Kenny Sweet died on 24 November 2005. Despite this, the 
company did not report to the USCPSC as they were required to do 
under a 24 hour reporting rule for product hazards. Instead of notifying 
the USCPSC of Kenny’s death immediately, Rose Art/Mega Brands 
waited twenty one days advising the agency in an Interim Report on 15 
December, later described by USCPSC staff as ‘inadequate’ (See 
USCPSC Settlement Agreement Mega Brands). On 20 December, 
KOMO4 News in America (Esteban 2005) broke the news of Kenny’s 
death. But even as the story emerged, the injuries would continue to 
mount up as would the delays, with the first official recall not being 
announced until approximately three months later, on 31 March 2006.  
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Apologies and Regrets 
Although the company expressed regret, their sincerity was tarnished 
by the insinuation that the fault somehow lay with the parents/carers of 
the victims, rather than with a poorly designed product. 
We were deeply saddened to learn of reports of children being 
harmed by ingesting small parts, as the father of four children and 
as a member of the family that helped build this business, I am 
personally committed to safe and creative play experiences for 
children who use our products. Magnetix™ products will remain 
on store shelves and we will continue to market the toys to 
families with appropriately aged children.‛ (Vic Bertrand, Chief 
Operating Officer, Rose Art’s parent company *Mega Bloks+ cited 
in Press Release with no Mega Bloks letterhead, 30 March, 2006). 
In their public statement the company also harnessed the comments of 
an ‘expert’ to support this view, noting that ‘Professor Kimberly 
Thompson, Director of the Kids Risk Project at the Harvard School of 
Public Health and an expert on children's risks said: 
Parents and caregivers hold the keys to children’s health and 
safety. Manufacturers provide warning labels on the boxes to 
help parents make informed choices when buying toys with and 
for children, but it is up to adults to use these warnings. She 
reminded adults that "toys offer many fun and educational 
opportunities when used properly but they are never a substitute 
for adult supervision‛ (Thompson quoted in Mega Brands Press 
Release 30/3/2006). 
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However, a Release issued by Reiner, Simpson, Timmons & Slaughter, 
Attorneys, through PR Newswire.com on 10 April 2006 took a different 
view: 
 "We're concerned that RoseArt has not fully recognized the 
seriousness of this danger to children. Blaming the families for 
these tragedies is reprehensible. The fact is, the magnets in these 
toys too easily come loose and fall out, and will get into the 
hands of young children under the best parental supervision. 
(PR Newswire.com 2006 at http://www.prnewswire.com/news-
releases/injured-calif-childs-family-alerted-toy-maker-before-
death-of-another-child-according-to-reiner-simpson-timmons--
slaughter-llp-69932352.html 
The insinuations also extended to the company suggesting misuse of 
the toys: 
 ‘Today’s report on the U.S. Consumer Product Safety 
Commission’s (CPSC) announcement affirms our commitment to 
child safety by ensuring that our toys are used in a safe and 
proper manner. This Replacement Program provides households 
with children under the age of six the option to exchange 
Magnetix products for ones that are more suitable for young 
children. It does not involve products on retail shelves. There is 
no required action for retailers from the CPSC as part of this 
program’ (Rose Art Media Release 31/3/2006 at PRNewswire 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/rose-art-industries-
explains-replacement-program-for-magnetix-toys-outlines-
commitment-to-child-safety-55608977.html . 
Aside from being unfair, the wording ‘it does not involve products on 
retail shelves’ created confusion for retailers and consumers alike, and 
the question arose as to which toys? 
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The Recalls 
Between 31 March 2006 and 17 March 2008, Mega Brands/Rose Art 
recalled approximately 9.6 million toys in total, including 8 million 
Magnetix™ building sets, and 2 million MagnaMan™ magnetic toy 
figures and Magtastik™ and Magnetix Jr. pre-school magnetic toys 
because of loosely attached magnets. The three recalls occurred almost 
a year apart, the first on 31 March 2006, the second on 2 April 2007 and 
the third on 3 March 2008 (See Table 8.1). 
Table 8.1: Mega Brands Recalls  
31 March 2006 First Recall 3.8 million boxes of Magnetix™ building 
sets recalled globally. 
17 April 2007 Second 
Recall 
Expanded recall of a further 4 million 
boxes of Magnetix™ building sets 
globally. 
3 March 2008 Third Recall Recall of 1.8 million MagnaMan™  
magnetic action figures. 
Source: USCPSC Release Notices 06-127 (31/3/2006); 07- (2/4/2007); 08- 
(3/3/2008). 
Morgenson, in The New York Times, 15/7/2007, reports that ‘even as the 
company’s products were the subject of two voluntary recalls prompted 
by the US CPSC — one in March 2006 and another on April 17, 2007 — 
MEGA Brands allegedly delayed answering the government’s requests 
for information, was uncooperative with the Commission and violated 
the terms of one of the recalls, the records show. Problematic or 
improperly labelled toys also remained on sale at major retailers well 
after they were supposed to have been off the shelves 
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Harold Chizick, director of promotional marketing and public relations 
at MEGA Brands, says the company has done right by consumers and 
regulators.  
‚Obviously, the company wanted to make sure this was handled 
swiftly and properly. We did everything we were instructed to 
do‛, (Harold Chizick, Director of Promotional Marketing and 
Public Relations, MEGA Brands, quoted in Morgenson, The New 
York Times, 15/7/2007). 
In the four months between Kenny Sweet’s death on 24 November 2005, 
and Kyle Booke’s hospitalisation for serious injuries in early 2006, ‘more 
than three million Magnetix™ sets sat on store shelves and by the time 
the USCPSC announced a voluntary recall on 31 March 2006, the 
agency had received notice of 34 injuries to children caused by the toy, 
including one death and four series injuries (USCPSC Release 06-127, 31 
March 2006). According to the American Association for Justice (AAJ 
2009: 11), at least 15 of those injuries occurred after Kenny died.  
But first let me return to the circumstances of the recalls and to the 
incidents and events that occurred in the intervening months between 
three successive recalls (Recall 1 - 31 March 2006; Recall 2 - 2 April 2007; 
and Recall 3 – 3 March 2008). The delays would continue, with the first 
recall not being announced until 31 March 2006, almost four months 
after Kenny’s death. 
The First Recall 
On 31 March 2006, Rose Art Industries (by now a division of Mega 
Brands Canada) voluntarily recalled 3.8 million Magnetix™ building 
sets for children under the age of six, because magnets that dislodged 
from certain toys had killed one child and were injuring others. The 
recalled sets ‘contained 20 to 200 plastic building pieces and 20 to 200 
½-inch diameter steel balls. The building pieces were red, yellow, blue 
and green, and shaped in 1.1/2-inch squares, 1-inch triangles and 
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cylinder rods. Some plastic building pieces had ‘Magnetix’ imprinted 
on them’ (USCPSC Release 06127, 31/3/2006). Sold in a three year 
window of harm between September 2003 and March 2006, the toys 
were sold through a range of outlets including ‘Wal-Mart, Target, Toys 
R Us, Fred Meyer, Design Science Toys Ltd, and other toy and arts and 
crafts stores for between US$20 and US$60 (USCPSC Release 06-127 
31/3/2006). Consumers were advised to ‘stop using the magnetic sets 
and return them, to Rose Art for a ‘free replacement product suitable 
for young children under the age of six’ (USCPSC Release 06-127 
31/3/2006). But as Patricia Callahan reported in The Chicago Tribune 
(7/5/2007c), the recall confused retailers and consumers alike 
When Rose Art Industries announced this recall, the USCPSC also 
noted that ‘three children age 3-8 suffered intestinal perforations 
requiring surgery and hospitalisation and a five year old child had 
aspirated two magnets that were surgically removed from his lung’ 
(USCPSC Release 06-127 31/3/2006). But as the USCPSC would discover 
during an investigation in the months following the March recall, this 
was only the tip of the iceberg. What lay hidden in Rose Art’s archives 
told a different story about the trouble with magnets in Magnetix™ 
building sets. The issue of what Rose Art told Mega Brands and when, 
remains a point of contention between the Rosen brothers (Rose Art 
America) and the Bertrand brothers (Mega Brands Canada). Callahan 
(6/5/2007a) in The Chicago Tribune, reports that ‘Before a rival company, 
Mega Brands, bought Rose Art in July 2005, Rose Art executives 
disclosed those complaints to its soon-to-be parent company, court 
records show’. However I have been unable to find the supporting 
documents to corroborate this.  
A more recent chronology of events (the USUSCPSC Settlement 
Agreement with the company in 2009), reveals that by the time Sharon 
Grigsby phoned the USCPSC hotline in May 2005, USCPC staff allege 
‘Rose Art had a trail of incident reports dating back as far as late 
2003/early January 2004’ (See USCPSC Settlement Agreement Mega 
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2009: 3). In addition, Callahan, The Chicago Tribune, 6/5/2007a) reports 
that shortly after Mega Brands acquired Rose Art [in July 2005], the 
USCPSC sent Grigsby’s complaint to Mega Brand’s Rose Art Division 
President and in a form letter accompanying the complaint, the 
USCPSC wrote that it forwards these types of complaints to 
manufacturers ‚because they often provide an early warning of 
potential safety problems‛’. 
‘In a written response to questions from the Tribune, Mega 
Brands said it was unaware of the extent of the problem and 
didn't know that swallowed magnets could injure children until 
it learned of Kenny's death’ (Callahan, Chicago Tribune, 
6/5/2007a).  
Nevertheless, had Mega Brands Canada undertaken rigorous due 
diligence during the acquisition process, they may have discovered that 
in acquiring Rose Art Industries they were also inheriting a potential 
product liability risk. At the very least, it can be said that Rose Art 
downplayed the hazard and at worst that they hid it from their 
potential buyers and also from the regulator. 
In September 2006, the USCPSC would discover that the 34 incidents 
they knew about significantly understated the scale of the problem. 
Documents subsequently provided by Mega Brands Canada to the 
USCPSC on 1 December 2006 (on behalf of Rose Art) revealed the true 
extent of incidents and injuries. Received by the USCPSC a year after 
Kenny’s death and nine months after the first recall (March 2006) these 
documents would reveal that Rose Art had been less than honest with 
the USCPSC. The company had, in fact, collected thousands of incident 
reports about Magnetix™ well prior to Kenny’s death. 
Between January 2004 and 14 December 2005 (the date the 
company reported Kenny’s death to the Regulator), Rose Art had 
received over 1100 complaints of magnets falling out or 
otherwise liberating from Magnetix™ and by the time the first 
241 
recall was announced in March 2006 Rose Art had received over 
1500 complaints about magnets falling out of Magnetix pieces 
(USCPSC Settlement Agreement Mega/Rose 2009: 6). 
This was a shock to the regulator, and apparently also to Mega Brands 
Canada, who have consistently denied that Rose Art ever told them 
about the trouble with magnets. 
Mega Brands, which bought Magnetix-maker Rose Art in July 2005, 
said it had to scour Rose Art's archives to find the information the CPSC 
was seeking 
We were astonished to learn that there had been 1,500 reports of 
magnets falling out of the product," Jennifer Zerczy, a Mega 
Brands attorney, said in a statement << She added, "We have 
always acted in good faith and have sought to responsibly follow 
the terms of the recall and the expanded recall." (Callihan 
19/6/2007) 
During the March 2006 recall, the USCPSC took the opportunity to 
caution consumers to ‘be sure to keep all small magnet parts out of the 
hands of children who mouth objects, especially children under three’ 
(USCPSC Release 06-127 31/3/2006).  But the recall notice was so 
awkwardly worded, that it became confusing for retailers and 
consumers alike. For instance, the reference to ‚All” Magnetix ™ 
magnetic building sets, when only certain sets were involved (e.g. X-
treme Combo, Micro and Extreme sets). This was compounded by a 
statement in the recall notice that said ‘the replacement program does 
not include sets at retail’ (USCPSC Release 06-127, 31/3/2006). 
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As noted by Callahan, in The Chicago Tribune in May 2007: 
At issue is a confusing recall in which government regulators and 
the toy's manufacturer gave conflicting instructions on which 
versions of Magnetix were hazardous. The retailers decided to halt 
sales until the government and the company can clarify which 
boxes are safe (Callahan, The Chicago Tribune, 7/5/2007b). 
Despite the fact that the toys were initially marketed to children under 
three, the company would continue to insist on labelling the recall as a 
‘replacement program’ and inferring that the toys were always 
marketed to children over six years of age: 
 Magnetix building sets are for children 6 years and up. There is a 
potential risk of magnets coming loose from some of the older 
sets. Please click on the link below for a list of product numbers 
that are affected by the recall and take part in our Product 
Replacement program. 
http://support.megabrands.com/en/customerservice/recallinfo/ 
The company (and sometimes also the media) continued to frame the 
issue of magnets dislodging as a ‘choking’ or ‘small parts hazard’. The 
reality is that these toys are an intestinal perforation hazard (much 
more serious) and choking may be largely absent as an early warning 
signal (they are small, shiny and slide down easily).  Nor was the issue 
misuse or abuse of the toy or its use by children under six (they were 
originally marketed to children 3+).  Above all, this was not about lax 
parental supervision. At the time these magnets began dislodging from 
toys (e.g. in 2005) there would have been no expectation on the part of 
parents/cares to look out for these foreign objects and even if they did, 
they were so unlike foreign objects of the past (e.g. buttons, coins that 
passed through a child’s system) that they could not know that these 
foreign objects harboured a deadly magnetic flux that could cause 
intestinal perforations and even death. This was a case of magnets 
243 
dislodging from poorly designed toys, which no amount of parental 
supervision could prevent.  
In all probability Rose Art may have passed on knowledge about some 
of these incidents, but given the apparent scale of their non-disclosure 
to the USCPSC (revealed in September 2006), it is conceivable they 
never fully disclosed to Mega Brands the true scale of the problem. 
After all, this would likely have jeopardised the acquisition process, 
which began in June 2005, was settled in July 2005, and became fully 
operational in December 2005 (just a month after Kenny’s death in 
November 2005). Nevertheless, as already noted, had MEGA Brands 
undertaken a rigorous due diligence process during the acquisition 
process, they may have discovered this potential product liability risk. 
At the very least it can be said that Rose Art downplayed the hazard. 
Getting to the bottom of what really happened is impossible, but the 
chronological timeline contained in the USCPSC staff allegations of the 
Settlement Agreement (USCPSC Settlement Agreement Mega 2009,) 
does provide some evidence from the regulator’s perspective as to who 
knew and when and what was going on in the private domain between 
the Regulator and the company. (See Appendix 1 for full Time Line). 
The recall became confusing for consumers and retailers alike, with the 
company insisting products currently on store shelves were not 
affected, as reported by Mayer, in The Washington Post, 1/4/2006: 
"We believe these products meet all federal and international 
safety standards and are safe and fun for kids age 6 and older," 
said company spokeswoman Jennifer Zerczy. "If you look at the 
package, it very clearly is labelled for children 6 and over, and 
there is a small parts warning *for under 3’s+ on the package as 
well." 
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Inherent in this message is the notion that the warning label on this toy 
satisfactorily communicates the age-appropriateness of the toy [6+] and 
the hazard within *e.g. labelled as a ‘choking’ or small parts hazard for 
children under 3]. It also shifts the onus of responsibility from the 
manufacturer to parents, which in this case is unjustified. The 
responsibility for poor design lies with the manufacturer (the parent 
company headquartered in the west rather than the manufacturer in 
China).  
These toys do not represent a typical choking hazard (e.g., lodge in the 
windpipe and obstruct the airway). They represent a far more serious 
threat – they are more likely to slide down a child’s throat without 
choking, traverse the oesophagus, and transfer into the deeper recesses 
of the body, there attaching to one another and pinching the human 
tissue between them, causing bowel obstruction, twisting and 
perforation of the intestines, releasing toxins into the body. Children 
swallowed magnets from domestic and community play settings, 
mostly ‘eating’ them unobserved. In many instances, the typical 
choking alert for parents was absent. As noted previously, this is 
compounded by delayed, often non-specific symptoms (flu-like, a 
stomach-ache) that can lead to misdiagnosis and delays in treatment 
(See Chapter 5, the trouble with magnets). 
Between the first recall (March 2006) and the second (April 2007), other 
children suffered serious injuries from magnets dislodging from 
Magnetix™ toys, as reported by Callahan, in The Chicago Tribune: 
 In the summer of 2006, seven year old D.J. Hyman from Illinois 
suffered life-threatening injuries after swallowing Magnetix 
magnets 
 In the fall of 2006, six year old Owen Howman of Ashland Ohio 
suffered serious intestinal injuries after Magnetix perforated his 
bowel and spilled deadly bacterial into his abdomen  
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By April 2007, the USCPSC was warning the public about the growing 
problem posed by small magnets in toys (American Association for 
Justice 2009: 10). The Agency reported it had received hundreds of 
complaints and knew of more than 30 cases in which children required 
emergency surgery. Then in mid April 2007, Mega Brands and the 
USCPSC expanded the early recall. 
Second Recall: April 2007 
On 19 April 2007, Mega Brands recalled a further 4 million boxes of 
Magnetix™ after more than 25 children suffered intestinal injuries 
requiring surgery. This recall included ‘users of all ages’. According to a 
USCPSC Recall Alert, ‘the toys were sold by ‘mass merchants and other 
toy and arts and crafts stores<’ (USCPSC Release 07-164 19/4/2007) 
As with the earlier recall, consumers were advised to ‘stop using the 
recalled magnetic sets immediately and contact MEGA Brands for a 
comparable replacement toy (USCPSC Release 07-164 19/4/2007). In 
addition to the dangers to children under six, this recall notice also 
warned consumers that ‘although the hazard was initially thought to be 
a problem primarily for children younger than six, it had since learned 
that at least ten injuries involved children between the ages of 6 and 11 
years old (USCPSC Release 07-164 19/4/2007). 
Once again the recall notice created confusion stating as it did that ‘The 
recall includes all sets, except newer Magnetix sets sold since March 31, 
2006 that are age-labelled 6+ and sets that contain the following caution 
label: 
CAUTION: Do not ingest or inhale magnets. Attraction of 
magnets in the body may cause serious injury and require 
immediate medical care. 
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Further, the recall notice stated that ‘MEGA Brands advises that sets 
currently at retail better retain magnets due to improved quality 
control, material and design changes. These products are not included 
in the recall’ (USCPSC Release 07-164 19/04/07). 
At the time the Acting Chair of the USCPSC expressed concern about 
both the scale of the hazard and the reactionary nature of the recall: 
 <the Commission is ‘deeply concerned about the dangers that 
small, powerful magnets can pose to children if swallowed. In 
order for any product recall to be effective in protecting 
consumers, we must significantly reduce incidents and injuries 
from occurring after the recall is announced’ (USCPSC Release -
07-164 19/4/2007). 
The recall alert also noted ‘Mega Brands has been co-operative in this 
expanded recall’ (USCPSC Release 07-164 19/4/2007), implying that this 
may not have been the situation with the earlier recall. But the fact that 
the USCPSC had to subpoena the company for detailed incident and 
injury data would cast doubt over this assertion, however this would 
not become public until almost two years later, when the USCPSC 
announced a civil penalty and the company incurred a fine of US$1.25m 
for importing unsafe toys into the stream of commerce.  Commenting 
on the recall events,  Callahan and Falk , in The Chicago Tribune in 
19/7/2007) report that ‘the two recalls that followed Kenny’s death, one 
on 31 March 2006 and a second expanded recall on 19 April 2007 ‘were 
so confusing that consumers and retailers could not tell which versions 
of the toy were potentially deadly’. 
Also, far from being voluntary, the USCPSC ‘had to go through a 
lengthy court process to force a recall’ 
To describe Mega Brand’s first two recalls as voluntary as that 
term is understood by the reading public (the main audience for 
recall notices) is at the very least misleading. Given that the 
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USCPSC had to subpoena the incident information critical to 
assessing the true scale of the harm and go through a lengthy 
court process to force a recall, it is at the very least misleading to 
then label those recalls voluntary (Callahan and Falk, The Chicago 
Tribune, 19/7/2007). 
In the same article, Callahan and Falk, in The Chicago Tribune, 19/7/2007 
report that during a U.S. Senate investigation the USCPSC told Senator 
Durbin that  
after the USCPSC expanded the Magnetix™ recall in April to 
cover another 4 million boxes, Mega Brands immediately 
violated the terms of the recall – relabelling older boxes to 
suggest they weren’t the recalled versions and rewriting recall 
posters for stores in ways that strayed from the agreed upon 
message.  
In its report on unsafe products, the American Association for Justice 
(2009: 10) captures the trouble with magnets, a concern that still 
resonates today: 
 ‘...experts and physicians worry that regulators are still not up to 
speed with regard to the dangers magnets can pose. For instance, 
magnetic jewellery has caused more than two dozen injuries in 
recent years, yet has not been subject to any further regulation 
from the USCPSC’ (American Association for Justice 2009: 10). 
Mega Bloks announced it had strengthened the toy and it was now safe 
to sell once again, but there was no way for consumers to tell which sets 
of Magnetix were improved. Retailers were confused and the unsafe 
toys often remained on store shelves with magnets apparently falling 
out of both old and ‘improved’ versions. 
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Following the April recall, Mega Brands advised that sets currently at 
retail (i.e. post March 2007), ‚better retain magnets due to improved 
quality control, material and design changes‛ and that these products 
were not included in the expanded recall of Magnetix Magnetic 
building sets on April 19, 2007. (USCPSC Release 07-164, 19/4/07). Then 
in June 2007, MEGA Brands CEO, Marc Bertrand told shareholders at 
the company’s annual meeting: 
 The product is 100% secure," "We took definitive action so 
Magnetix would be a long-term brand in the market." (National 
Post Canada, 8/6/2007). 
Mattel too, was letting consumers know how they were addressing the 
trouble with magnets dislodging. In Mattel’s case, Jim Walter, Senior 
Vice President for worldwide Quality Assurance explained 
modifications to the way in which Mattel now attaches magnets in its 
toys: 
Since our November 2006 magnet-related recall we have 
implemented more robust magnet retention systems and more 
rigorous testing. We are exercising caution and have expanded 
the list of recalled magnetic toys due to potential safety risks 
associated with toys that might have loose magnets‛ (Mattel Inc 
Press Release 14/8/2007). 
The Chinese response to the recalls (especially lead) was to revoke the 
licences of over 600 toy companies and promise that ‚the overall quality 
of Chinese-made toys [would] be further improved and safety fully 
guaranteed‛ (Xinhua News, 14/1/2008). However, as Pu Changcheng, 
Deputy Director of the State Administration for Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) rightly noted ‘several toy recalls in 
2007 were either due to design flaws or change of standards by foreign 
importers’ (Pu Changcheng, quoted in Guodong, Xinhua News, 
14/1/2008).  
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To assist in clarifying which toys, MEGA Brands Inc Canada and the 
staff of the USCPSC developed a guide to assist consumers to identify 
Magnetix™ buildings sets that had been recalled. Consumers who did 
have the original box were advised to look for a Magnet Caution Label 
(not to be confused with the Small Parts Warning Label) also on the box. 
Consumers were advised ‘If you no longer have the box that your Magnetix 
set came in, look closely at the rods included in your set(s). Disregard the 
colour of the rod – it is not an indicator as to recall status’ (Source: 
USCPSC (Undated). A Consumer’s Guide to the Magnetix Building Set 
Recall). 
Consumers were instructed not to use Magnetix™ sets included in the 
recall and to contact MEGA Brands for a replacement toy on a hotline 
number provided. The USCPSC further warned, in the Consumer’s 
Guide, that ‘even if you have newer Magnetix™ sets that are not subject 
to recall, be on guard against the possibility of magnets falling out, 
noting the following important points: 
 children under six should not be playing with these sets, 
 make sure your children know about the hazard of swallowing 
magnets, 
 have them use a play area where any magnets that fall out can 
be found easily and swept up so that younger children do not 
swallow them, 
 Loose magnets should be taken away from children 
immediately. 
Consumers were also asked to report incidents of loose magnets to the 
USCPSC hotline number, provided on the website. Overall this seemed 
a lot of information for consumers to assimilate and act upon, and again 
it was a source of confusion. 
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In talking to the media about the issue, ‘Toymaker Rose Art and parent 
company Mega Bloks said they didn't think there was a problem with 
the original toy. But KOMO News asked the toy manufacturer to show 
them the difference [between the recalled and new versions of the toy] 
however reportedly, ‘Rose Art turned them down’ and according to 
KOMO News: 
The company added glue to the toys and enhanced what they 
called ‘magnet welding’ They also changed the recommended 
age for the toy from 3 and up to 6 and up. (Esteban, KOMO 
News, 2006). 
In the intervening months between the second recall (in April 2007) and 
the third recall (in March 2008), two more children sustained injuries 
from Magnetix™ building sets, once again, reported by Callahan, in The 
Chicago Tribune:: 
 Shorn Thornsberry, author of the blog Magnets can Kill 
purchased a Sir Lancelot Magna Man Action figure Two of her 
children noticed that magnets fell out of the neck of the toy 
within minutes of opening the package [this toy is finally 
recalled in March 2008] 
 Three year old Tegan Leisy had eight inches of his intestine 
removed after swallowing magnets from a Magnetix set. All the 
Magnetix™ in the Leisy home were purchased after the March 
2006 recall, the family’s attorney said  
Despite the initiatives to make sure these magnets did not dislodge 
from their products, the company suffered a third and final recall in 
March 2008, this time for a different product in the company’s range. 
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The Third Recall – 17 March 2008 
On 17 March 2008, Mega Brands announced a third global recall, this 
time for MagnaMan™ Action Figures and Magtastik™ and Magnetix ™ 
Jr. Pre-School Magnetic toys, due to the aspiration and intestinal 
hazards posed by ingested magnets (Mega Brands Press Release 17 
March, 2008). A Mega Brand’s media release (Mega Brands 17/3/ 2008: 
1) notes that at the time of this recall the company and the regulator 
were ‘aware of 44 reports in the United States of magnets coming loose, 
including one report of a three year old boy receiving medical 
treatment to remove a magnet from his nose and one report of an 18 
month old found with a single magnet in his mouth, which was not 
swallowed’ (Mega Brands Press Release 2008: 1).  
The process of return was the same, ‘stop using the recalled toys and 
return them to MEGA Brands for a free replacement toy’ (Mega Brands 
Press Release 2008: 1). Again, the company labelled the process as 
‘<this voluntary recall and ‘replacement program’, adding the 
following paragraph which was confusing for consumers and again 
raised the question which toys? 
The design of the product lines affected by these recalls predates 
the redesign of the Magnetix™ building system by MEGA 
brands in 2006. MagnaMan™ and Magnetix™ Jr. sets are no 
longer in production’ (MEGA Brands Press Release 2008: 1). 
Even after MEGA Brands announced they had strengthened the toy in 
December 2005 and that it was now safe to sell once again, unsafe toys 
often remained on stores shelves.  
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Toys Still on Shelves 
In her testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee Illinois Attorney-
General, Lisa Madigan, said she alerted the USCPSC to the hazards of 
Magnetix™ knock-off toys in May 2005, but despite Timothy Kroell’s 
injuries these toys were never recalled.  
As we visited stores to check for recalled Magnetix, we quickly 
found knockoff Magnetix toys at several dollar stores. These 
knockoffs are the same toys. The only difference is that they are 
manufactured by a different manufacturer, so it stands to reason 
that these same small, powerful magnets in virtually identical 
toys may pose the same threats to children. We sent a number of 
these toys to CPSC on May 24, and we asked them to consider 
recalling these products as well (US Senate Committee on 
Appropriations 2008: 8) 
As well, three consumers were so concerned about defective 
Magnetix™ toys that they sent pieces of their defective sets to the 
USCPSC, even before Sharon Grigsby, the owner of an Indiana play 
centre, alerted the Commission to the problem. On 10 May 2008, Record 
investigators in Glasgow ‘found a 70-piece set of Magnetix on sale at a 
Toys R Us store, the set dates back to 2006 and is of the old design  
(Stewart 2008) 
Remedies and Solutions 
Both Mega Brands and Mattel described how they enhanced the safety 
of their toys. For instance, Mega Brands officials said ‘the company 
added glue and increased factory inspections shortly after it learned of 
Kenny's death *in November 2005+ and later redesigned the toy’ 
(Callahan, The Chicago Tribune, 7/5/2007d) In a written statement in 
response to KOMO News questions regarding the safety of new toy 
versions on shelves, Rose Art said: 
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the new product ‘has been enhanced three separate times; the 
first time in late summer, that was right after Mega Bloks 
acquired Rose Art. The company says quality enhancements are 
standard procedure for them after acquisitions’ (Esteban, 
KOMONews 4, 2006).  
In a 2008 interview with CNN, Mattel’s CEO said the company *Mattel+ 
began improving the way in which they attached magnets to their toys, 
in January 2006, following the death of Kenny Sweet (see Yang, 
CNNMoney, 22/1/2008). However, he made no mention of the fact that 
Mattel knew they had a problem with the same type of magnets falling 
out of their toys, the first incident occurring in July 2005 (four months 
before Kenny’s death in November) and the second in December 2005 
(just a month later. The inference here is that Kenny’s death was the 
reason Mattel improved the way in which they attached magnets to 
their toys, but it begs the question as to why the injuries sustained by a 
seven year old girl in July 2005 from one of their own toys was not 
sufficient to trigger this action.  
Despite the solutions (by Mega Brands and Mattel) whilst these 
powerful magnets are incorporated in children’s toys, the risks remains 
for them to potentially dislodge. Oestreich (2009: 146) sums up what 
that risk looks like for children: 
 These magnets often (I believe usually) attract each other across 
bowel walls, especially once they are beyond the stomach. Many 
abdominal complications have been found surgically (or 
occasionally endoscopically) often severe, despite relatively mild 
clinical symptoms, which often have delayed seeking medical 
help and then delayed radiographing or ultrasound imaging 
(Oestreich 2009: 146) 
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Timelines and Time Lags 
On 1 February 2006, Mega Brands submitted a full report to the 
USCPSC, but according to the USCPSC Settlement Agreement, this 
‘lacked incident data and product specificity’. At the time Rose Art told 
the USCPSC that the company did not retain detailed complaint or 
incident records. But this was untrue. The company had in fact 
collected extensive incident and injury data, but this was not declared 
in the company’s initial report on 14 December. This made it virtually 
impossible for the USCPSC to assess the true nature and scale of the 
problem. When Rose Art eventually filed its initial report of Kenny’s 
death with the USCPSC on 14 December 2005, in a particularly 
repugnant example of blame-shifting the company allegedly ‘attributed 
the release of magnets from the plastic pieces to unusually abusive play 
by the decedent’s older siblings (See USCPSC Settlement Agreement 
Mega/Rose 2009: 3).  
Around Christmas 2005, ‘Jonathon Midgett the self-described ‚toy 
scientist‛ at the USCPSC urged the agency to recall the toy. According 
to a media report, ‘the staff of the USCPSC first met formally to discuss 
the possibility of a recall more than two months after Midgett’s 
recommendation (Callahan, The Chicago Tribune, 7/5/2007a). Behind the 
scenes, the USCPSC continued to work hard to obtain incident data 
from Rose Art, data the company initially claimed it did not have. In 
the meantime the injuries continued to mount up. 
Whilst the U.S. regulator continued to press Mega Brands/Rose Art for 
incident and injury data, another child became a victim to Magnetix™.  
On 3 March 2006 ‘four year old Kyle Booke had a section of his 
intestines removed after swallowing dislodged magnets from a 
Magnetix™ construction set’ (Callahan, The Chicago Tribune. 
7/5/2007b;American Association Of Justice 2009:11). On the other side of 
the world, in Australia, in April 2006, ‘a nine year old boy swallowed 
magnets from a Magnetix™ building set, causing perforation and 
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twisting of his intestines, blockage of his bowel and internal bleeding, 
resulting in four hours of surgery and follow-up treatment that was still 
ongoing four months later (New South Wales Fair Trading 2007).  
Then on 28 March 2006, just two days before the first official recall, the 
USCPSC received some long-awaited complaint and incident data from 
the company, ‘ in the form of a Consumer Calls/Warranty Claims Chart’ 
that USCPSC staff would later describe as ‘lacking detail and critical 
information, rendering it effectively useless’ (USCPSC Settlement 
Agreement Mega/Rose 2009:4). When USCPSC requested the 
documents that informed the incident data, they were told ‘the 
company did not retain any source documents’ (USCPSC Settlement 
Mega Brands America 2009:4). This would prove to be untrue and 
nearly six months after the first recall, USPSC investigators would 
discover a volume of incident and injury data that would shock them.  
What this data revealed was that Rose Art had allegedly been collecting 
incident data since approximately late 2003/ January 2004 (USCPSC 
Settlement Agreement Mega Brands America 2009:6). The USCPSC also 
learned that the company had received at least one report of an injury 
due to magnet ingestion prior to Kenny’s death on 24 November 2005. 
In actual fact by the time Mega Brands/Rose Art announced the first 
recall on 31 March 2006, the company had received ‘more than 1,500 
complaints of magnets falling out of plastic pieces in more than 65 
different models of Magnetix™.’ (USCPSC Media Release 14/4/2009). 
Despite the recall, and the corrective action taken to improve the way in 
which magnets were attached, the incidents and injuries continued to 
mount up, leading up to further recalls (April 2007; March 2008) as 
noted above. 
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Political and Legal Influences 
Enquiries and Inquisitions 
An investigation by the Chicago Tribune, which led to a U.S. Senate 
Hearing in May 2007, ‘uncovered red flags the federal safety agency 
missed about popular Magnetix™ toys shedding dangerous magnets – 
warnings that presaged the death of a suburban Seattle toddler and the 
serious intestinal injuries of more than two dozen other children’ 
(Callahan and Falks, Chicago Tribune 19/6/2007). 
In between the second (April 2007), and third recalls (March 2008), a 
series of US Senate Committee Hearings were held on the topic of toy 
safety. On 18 June 2007, Senator Robert Durbin referring to the trouble 
with magnets in Magnetix™ building sets highlighted the company’s 
non-compliance with the USCPSC. 
 The company did everything in its power to derail the 
Commission’s effort to take the product off the shelf. 
 When a company is selling dangerous products in America and 
refuses to co-operate with the USCPSC, we have few laws and 
few tools to use to protect consumers‛ (Senator Durbin quoted in 
US Senate Committee on Appropriations 2008). 
Reporting in the Chicago Tribune, Callahan and Falk 19/6/2007, allege 
that ‘Durbin’s subsequent investigation found that the company 
repeatedly fought the government’s attempts to recall the toy, issued a 
tardy response to a safety commission subpoena and violated the terms 
of the recall agreement when it was finally struck’. 
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Law Suits and Class Actions 
According to a report in The Chicago Tribune (Callahan 7/5/2007c), ‘Mega 
Brands officials alleged in a lawsuit that Jeffrey and Lawrence Rosen - 
the brothers who sold them Rose Art, then led that division after the 
merger - didn't fix the problems with the dangerous toy in part because 
they didn't want to jeopardize personal multimillion-dollar payouts 
tied to profit targets. As well, according to Callahan: 
in a statement, the Rosen family denied Mega Brands' allegations, 
saying that "prior to its acquisition by Mega Brands" the family 
"acted in a thorough and responsible manner with regard to the 
manufacture, safety, quality control and sale of its Magnetix toy 
products."  
The Rosens in a court filing pointed to a May 2005 letter from Timothy 
Kroell’s attorney regarding the intestinal injuries he received after 
swallowing Magnetix pieces and their disclosure of customer 
complaints as evidence that Mega Brands knew of these issues before 
the merger yet "never made any suggestions for changes in the way the 
business operated." (Callahan, The Chicago Tribune, 7/5/2007c). 
In relation to a class action lawsuit, in its Report to Shareholders (Mega 
Brands Q2 2011:25), the company declared that: 
 In April 2008, a class action lawsuit was filed against the 
Corporation in the U.S. District Court <. on behalf of all persons 
who purchased and/or received magnetic toys in the United 
States that were the subject of product recalls by the Corporation 
in March 2006, April 2007 and March 2008. While the 
Corporation believes it has meritorious defences against this 
claim, it nevertheless has agreed to settle the case without 
admitting any liability in order to avoid further litigation 
expense. 
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Casey and Zamisak, in an article in The Wall Street Journal, 15/8/2007 
note that in October 2006: 
MEGA Brands (which had inherited the problem of Magnetix 
when it purchased Rose Art Industries Inc) agreed to an out-of-
court settlement of US$13.5 million for 14 families of young 
children harmed by the building sets. Among the settled cases 
were those of a four year old whose injuries required the removal 
of a portion of his intestine and a three year old who had 
undergone surgery to repair holes in his stomach, intestine and 
colon.  The case of the toddler Kenny was also settled  
Aftermath 
Penalties and Prosecutions 
In 2009, the USCPSC and Mega Brands America (formerly Rose Art 
Industries Inc) agreed to a fine of US$1.1 million to settle allegations 
that Mega Brands America and Rose Art failed to provide the 
government with timely information about the dangers to children of 
Magnetix™ magnetic building sets, as required under federal law. In 
agreeing to settle the matter Mega Brands America (formerly Rose Art 
Industries) and parent company, Mega Brands Inc of Montreal Canada 
contended that: 
 Mega Brands Inc Canada did not know of the Magnetix™ defect 
at the time if acquired Rose Art, and 
 Rose Art’s prior owners never advised Mega Brands Canada of 
the problems associated with Magnetix™. 
As noted in the USCPSC Settlement Agreement with the company, ‘all 
of the products subject to the Settlement were made by Rose Art 
between 2003 and 2005. Although ‘Magnetix sets continued to be 
manufactured after 2005, due to manufacturing and design 
improvements instituted by Mega Brands America, these sets were not 
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the subject of the allegations set forth in the USCPSC Settlement 
Agreement’ (USCPSC SA 2009: 18696, Note 1). 
When the toys were first introduced by Rose Art in 2003 they were 
labelled as appropriate for children aged 3+ (Callahan 2007a). Later, as 
the nature and scale of the problem became more apparent in the form 
of a series of serious incidents, injuries and one known death, the 
company increased this age recommendation to 6+, adding a small 
parts ingestion warning for children under the age of three years old. 
Tougher Standards 
Following the magnet-related toy recalls tougher standards were 
introduced for magnets in children’s toys. This typically took the form 
of a warning label. It also left the issue of magnets in jewellery, loosely 
attached magnets in desk toys and non-magnetic hazards (e.g. button 
cell batteries) largely unaddressed: 
Some advocates expressed concern about the ‘them’ and ‘us’ approach 
to securing greater protection from magnets for children. For instance, 
as reported by Callahan, in The Chicago Tribune (7/5/2007a) 
 Nancy Cowles (Executive Director of the Chicago-based non-
profit Kids in Danger, is among the advocates pressing for 
tougher safety standards for toys with magnets. Commenting on 
the manufacturer-dominated process of negotiating the safety 
requirements, Cowles said: ‚It’s that tension of us trying to make 
the safety standard as strong as possible and them trying to 
make it as weak as possible (Nancy Cowles, Executive Director, 
Kids in Danger, quoted in Callahan, Chicago Tribune, 7/5/2007 
Not Until a Boy Died). 
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In Australia, the Queensland Injury Surveillance Unit (Swaminathan, 
Baker and Scott 2010) were critical of the warning label approach to 
prevention: 
 ‘Currently, the ACCC *Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission] is relying on warning labels to inform parents at 
point of purchase and act accordingly to protect children. 
Warnings of this nature have potentially little impact because 
once the toy is removed from the packaging, the warning is no 
longer apparent. Whilst parents may read a warning message at 
point of purchase, there is little to suggest that this will translate 
into preventative behaviour once the product is in the home. 
Parents with children of different ages may purchase the product 
for an older child, but not consider that their younger child could 
access the toy and ingest it or misuse it’ (Swaminathan, Baker 
and Scott 2010). 
The Queensland Industry Surveillance Unit (QISU) made some very 
good recommendations regarding magnetic foreign bodies that have 
currency for other jurisdictions too and are worth reiterating here: 
1. The ACCC consider broadening their current focus to address 
risk of injury due to non-toy magnets as well as toy magnets.  
2. Consideration be given to limiting the availability of strong 
magnets in all products likely to be used in a domestic setting.  
3.  Warning labels for ingestion of small parts be revised to include 
children 5 years and under 
4.  Industry, consumers and clinicians be educated regarding the 
risk of magnet related injury  
5. Development of a national reporting and standardised data 
collection system for product related injury to enable accurate 
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understanding of risk factors, incidence and prevalence of 
product related injury 
6. Consumers, clinicians and industry be encouraged to report an 
injury or incident associated with a consumer product to the 
relevant product safety unit in their state or territory or the 
ACCC.  
Counting the Cost 
In its 2010 Report to Shareholders (Mega Brands 2010: 29), the company 
notes the significant costs associated with the recall of Magnetix™: 
As a result of the voluntary recall and replacement campaign 
with the CPSC announced on March 31 2006 and expanded on 
April 19 2007 in connection with Magnetix™ building sets and 
the ensuing publicity and product liability lawsuits and claims 
against the Corporation, the cost of insurance coverage for these 
products manufactured before 1 May 2006 was prohibitive and 
as such, the Corporation is not insured for incidents occurring 
after December 1, 2006 for Magnetix™ products manufactured 
before May 1 2006. Consequently, the unfavourable disposition 
of any self-insured Magnetix related litigation could have a 
material adverse effect on the financial condition and results of 
operations of the Corporation (Mega Brands 2010: 29). 
In addition, the company also noted how it was ‘primarily self-insured 
for Magnetix products manufactured before May 1 2006 and against 
certain product-related incidents occurring on or after December 1, 
2006’ (Mega Brands Q3 2010: 27). 
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Posturing and Repositioning 
In 2007, Mega Brands re-designed the toys, enlarging the size of the toy 
pieces, so although magnets were still embedded in the plastic pieces, 
their increased size meant the pieces themselves could not be 
swallowed intact. However this will not prevent the magnets from 
dislodging. As reported in The Wall Street Journal (Casey 31/10/2008), ‘by 
Christmas 2008 Mega Brands had relaunched Magnetix™ construction 
sets under a new name, MagNext™, opting to mark their packaging 
with the brand Mega Bloks, the company building blocks brand that 
had no previous association with its magnet toys’. 
As Harold Chizick, Vice President of Marketing explained at the time: 
 ‚We needed to rebrand‛. Obviously with the recalls and what 
was happening in the marketplace, we changed the name to 
MagNext‛. (Mr. Chizick, Vice President Marketing, Mega 
Brands, quoted in Casey, The Wall Street Journal, 31/10/ 2008). 
By June 2011, Canadian Industry Magazine Toys & Games (20/3/2011) 
was reporting that  ‘Mega Brands was back in the black’ after enduring 
several years of debt stemming from and dating back to recalls of its 
Magnetix™ toys’. 
Ironically, in 2012, Mega Brands and Mattel Inc (the two companies 
involved in magnet-related recalls) have joined forces under what has 
been described as ‘a new worldwide multi-year licensing partnership< 
to develop Mega Bloks construction toy collections featuring Barbie™ 
and Hot Wheels™, two of Mattel’s (and the world’s) most iconic 
brands’ (cited in Toys and Games Magazine, 29/3/2012 Available at: 
http://toysandgamesmagazine.ca/17670/mega-brands-to-develop-
barbie-and-hot-wheels-collections/).  
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Conclusion 
This case reveals how time lags played a big part in exposing children 
to hazardous magnetic toys for much longer periods than necessary. 
Slow disclosure, partial disclosure and non-disclosure were all aspects 
of this case. Despite narratives to the contrary in the public domain, this 
company did not co-operate with the Regulator. Instead they concealed 
the true nature of the hazard, by hiding significant incident and injury 
data, or by drip-feeding data to the regulator information that was 
critical for assessing the true nature and scale of the hazard, thereby 
protecting children. 
By the time of the first recall, Rose Art (the American company who 
originally manufactured the toys) was incorporated under the flagship 
of Canadian toy giant Mega Brands who have continued to maintain 
that during the acquisition process Rose Art did not reveal to them the 
incident and injury data that Mega Brands (Canada) subsequently 
provided to the USCPSC, under subpoena, months after the first official 
recall. The information was proffered to the USCPSC in various forms, 
all of which were inadequate and when it was finally obtained by 
subpoena, both Mega Brands (the parent company of Rose Art) and the 
USCPSC were shocked by the number of incidents, some of which 
dated back to the year in which the toys were first released (2003). 
Despite the rhetoric that somehow lax parental supervision was a factor 
in children being injured by these magnets, and in one case that rough 
play by siblings may have caused the magnets to dislodge, the problem 
of magnets migrating from Magnetix™ building sets (and Mattel’s 
Polly Pocket™ play sets) was eventually attributed to poorly designed 
toys. The majority of children swallowed loose magnets they found on 
the floor in domestic and community play settings and a few 
swallowed Magnetix™ plastic pieces intact, with the magnets 
embedded in them.  
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What this case reveals is a process by which companies, throughout 
different stages of the crisis, resorted to slow disclosure, non-disclosure, 
partial disclosure, stonewalling and outright denial about the 
‘knowledge’  of their actions. These time lags had serious repercussions 
for the end-users of toys (children everywhere), who were ultimately 
exposed to this hazard for longer than necessary. Chapter 9 critiques 
how different companies responded to the global recalls by critiquing 
the product recall process through the lens of corporate social 
responsibility and environmental citizenship. 
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Chapter 10: Denying and Mitigating Toxic Toys 
Introduction 
This chapter draws upon deviancy theory, techniques of neutralisation, 
corporate crisis response strategies, image restoration strategies, and 
strategies of conflict resolution, to explore how toy companies and their 
supply chain partners rationalised their actions, and ‘neutralised’ the 
harms they caused in producing and distributing unsafe toys. These 
strategies were deployed in the context of global toy-related recalls that 
played out between 2006 and 2008, peaking in 2007 and in the cultural 
milieu of east-west relations, particularly between China and the 
United States.  
It was therefore important to me, as far as possible, to also try and 
understand the issues from a Chinese perspective, drawing upon the 
limited literature I could find, as most studies and publicly available 
reports focus on media, political and corporate responses to crises.  I 
was also limited to journal articles and media accounts in English. This 
chapter touches on the links between techniques of neutralisation and 
corporate social responsibility and whether these techniques can be 
applied across cultural divides. It includes a summary of strategies of 
denial and techniques of neutralisation evident in these cases and in the 
context of a particular type of offending identified by Croall (2009: 128) 
as ‘crimes against consumers’. 
The first part of this thesis has focussed on different forms of harm and 
levels of harm; whereas the focus of this chapter is on the denials. 
Neutralisation theory is well-suited to the task of analysing the 
behaviour (what they said and did) of business actors (in global 
markets), or in this case, in the midst of a crisis of their own creation, 
that is designing, producing and distributing unsafe toys. 
Neutralisation theory, as Maruna and Copes (2005: 226) point out ‘can 
be as relevant to criminological research today as it ever was’, yet 
according to these authors ‘to have relevancy it needs to catch up with 
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the times, be more flexible, admit to its shortcomings, and accept that it 
cannot explain all of the deviance phenomenon by itself’. Essentially 
this chapter examines accounts of wrongdoing by toy companies and 
their supply chain partners, as they played out in the public domain. 
Maruna and Copes (2005: 227) also argue ‘that there is little empirical 
evidence that individuals ascribe to neutralisations in advance of 
behaving criminally, and it is difficult to imagine how evidence of this 
could be reliably collected’. However, there is a case, in the white-collar 
context for arguing that companies do ascribe to neutralisations in 
advance. Certainly, a window of opportunity exists, where companies, 
in the case of crises such as these product recalls (who know about a 
product defect before the regulator or consumers) begin to formulate 
neutralisation strategies (aimed at anticipating the reactions of their key 
stakeholders). These windows lie between when the company discovers 
the hazard, when the regulator is told about the hazard, and when the 
public finds out about the hazard, and this can be anything from days 
to years (as the case of Schylling Inc demonstrates, where the company 
had known about the trouble with lead on the knobs of spinning tops 
and pails since 2002, but failed to alert the regulator; at that time.  
Although it eventually reported about these toys to CPSC in 2007, 
Schylling knew or should have known by 2002 that most of the 
toys did not comply with the lead paint ban, and it failed to 
report this information to the government in a timely manner. 
Instead of notifying CPSC immediately, in 2002 Schylling 
conducted a unilateral recall of the distributed pails by seeking 
their return from affected retail business customers (USCPSC 
Media Release No: 10133, 4/2/2010. 
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Instead the company was forced to acknowledge what had occurred in 
2002, when an investigation into toy safety by The Chicago Tribune, some 
five years later, in August 2007,  turned up a lead-contaminated knob 
on a spinning top being sold on the internet (Possley and Oneal 
9/8/2007). 
Martin et al (2008 :117), citing Fritsche (2002) note that ‘the techniques 
of neutralisation are not the only way to study transgressors accounts of 
wrongdoing, particularly in relation to violations of environmental 
law’. This is consistent with Howard and Levinson (1985: 191) 
observation that such unawareness of the work of other scholars, has 
led to a ‘wasteful duplication of effort that follows from mutual 
interdisciplinary ignorance’ (cited in Maruna and Copes 2005: 226). 
Even before I read these words, I had approached this chapter with a 
mind to considering both academically familiar and unfamiliar ways of 
examining the issues, as well as culturally familiar and unfamiliar 
points of view (e.g. Guanxi and a Chinese approach to crisis 
management), building upon anecdotal knowledge of the damage 
control process. The privilege of drawing upon other disciplines 
(sociology, psychology, political science, business communications and 
ethics) is, for me, one of the most inviting aspects of study in the field of 
criminology, although the danger is that one loses ones compass in the 
milieu of ideas. Nonetheless, it occurred to me that the strategies 
companies use to defend themselves during a crisis (e.g. product recall, 
toxic spill, mass poisoning) bear a striking resemblance to Sykes and 
Matza (1957: 667-699) techniques of neutralisation. It serves as a starting 
point for the analysis in this chapter. 
Techniques of Neutralisation 
This section deals with the general methods whereby the corporate 
actors involved in toxic toy issues engaged in the politics of denial. It 
provides a preliminary account of the narratives of denial, the types of 
techniques mobilised by these actors, and the purposes of denial. 
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Fundamentally, the use of such techniques relates to attempts by 
corporations to evade responsibility and blame for harms and crimes 
associated with their products. 
Sykes and Matza (1957: 667-669) proposed a set of techniques by which 
delinquents justify their illegitimate actions. 
 Denial of responsibility – offender believes he/she was the victim 
of circumstances or forced into a situation beyond their control, 
 Denial of injury – offender believes their actions did not cause 
harm or damage, 
 Denial of the victim – offender believes the victim somehow 
deserved victimisation, Condemnation of the condemners – 
offender believes those condemning his/her actions are 
hypocrites, 
 Condemn the condemners – offender accusers have done the 
same or worse themselves, which somehow constitutes and 
excuse for their own action and therefore abdication of 
responsibility 
 Appeal to higher loyalties – offender believes the offence was 
committed for the greater good of someone (e.g. a friend) or 
something (e.g. an organisation) else. 
In the case of juveniles, techniques of neutralisation are typically 
learned by copying the behaviour of peers. Similarly, in the 
corporate context, techniques of neutralisation are learned by 
copying (or modelling) the behaviour of other organisations such as 
those known to have successfully weathered a similar crisis. 
Companies do this by drawing upon a toolbox of scripted responses 
called crisis response strategies. The idea is to ‘spin’ a particular 
narrative in the public domain, designed to both persuade those 
most affected by the harm (e.g. consumers) and to influence those 
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most likely to offer resistance (e.g. politicians) that what occurred is 
a hiccup, beyond their control (in these cases) and that something is 
being done to make sure it does not happen again.  
Just as juvenile delinquents seek to avoid guilt whilst simultaneously 
protecting their self-esteem, companies seek to avoid guilt 
[wrongdoing] whilst simultaneously protecting their corporate self-
esteem [reputational assets such as corporate image, brand reputation 
and consumer trust]. In the case of a corporation this ‘self-esteem’ 
might translate into protecting their corporate image and brand 
reputation in the public domain. 
It could be argued that producing unsafe products is an act of corporate 
delinquency (or as discussed in Chapter 9 corporate social 
irresponsibility). When an organisation does this their response is not 
dissimilar to that of a juvenile after being ‘caught out’. Both are intent 
on justifying and excusing their conduct, whilst seeking to preserve 
some part of their ‘reputation’ intact, at a time when what they say and 
do is under scrutiny by key stakeholders, especially those with the 
power to influence how an organisation is perceived in the public 
domain. 
Again, like the juvenile delinquent, the corporate delinquent is 
motivated by a desire to avoid the ‘criminal label’ and to somehow 
render what they have done less offensive to: those who have the 
authority to shape what happens to them as a result of wrongdoing 
(e.g. regulator), key stakeholders who have the capacity to influence 
how they are perceived publicly (e.g. investors, politicians, advocacy 
groups and angry parents and carers) and therefore to damage 
reputation (corporate image, brand integrity, consumer trust). These 
key stakeholders have the capacity to construct an opposing narrative 
(to that of the company) in the public domain, usually expressing 
outrage and demanding something is done about the issue.  
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These demands typically escalate into focussed ‘Hearings’ of some sort, 
often politically instigated and emotively charged (as the U.S. Senate 
Hearings on toy safety were). Nevertheless the transcripts from these 
Hearings provide a source of verbatim statements reflecting how key 
stakeholders were thinking and assessing the issues at the time. In 
addition, the ‘staff allegations’ section of USCPSC Settlement 
Agreements with the companies concerned (sometimes settled up to 
two years after the recall events) provide the regulator’s view of a 
chronology of events as they played out (sometimes different to the 
narrative playing out in the media, for instance).  Ultimately for the 
company, the objective is to return to business-as-usual as quickly as 
possible, having sustained minimal reputational and economic damage. 
Two voices of disapproval, that Collins (1989::2) identifies in a typology 
of organisational harm - ‘stakeholder retaliation and justice system 
condemnation’ (whether criminal, civil or administrative) - do have an 
effect on organisations. These formal processes of disapproval 
(stakeholder retaliation and justice system condemnation) can be 
damaging to a company’s reputation especially when the details of 
what occurred emerge over time in the public domain (e.g. through the 
outcome of law suits. 
One group of stakeholders increasingly taking an interest in the 
production of corporate toxic harms are shareholders (shareholder 
proxies in relation to the production of toxic harms are on the increase). 
During 2008, the Investor Environmental Health Network (IEHN) 
describes how there has been a ‘toxic product recall backlash as 
investors file a record 21 resolutions on a wide range of chemical 
product safety concerns’  
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For instance: 
 At Mattel, a resolution filed by stockholder Marie-Claude 
Hessler-Grisel asks the company to report on product safety and 
occupational health issues. A related resolution filed by the New 
York City Pension Funds was withdrawn when the company 
agreed to produce reports related to its supply chain and 
product safety (IEHN 2008 
ahttp://iehn.org/news.press.toxicproductrecall.php). 
Although it is extremely difficult for companies to totally deny the 
harm caused by the manufacture of unsafe toys, they can deploy 
strategies to contain the damage as well as rationalise their conduct and 
neutralise the harm. They may accept there is a problem (the toys are 
unsafe), but as in these cases, they may initially deny it is their problem 
(typically someone else is to blame and increasingly this is a third 
party). Sometimes, evidence comes to light over time that contests these 
claims (e.g. USCPSC staff allegations in Settlement Agreements with the 
companies concerned; the outcome of product liability cases), that may 
present a different chronology of events or reveal issues such as 
stonewalling or tension rather than co-operation between the company 
and the regulator.  
For instance, during the Mattel recalls it was reported in the media that 
that the relationship between the company and the regulator was 
‘tense’ (see Casey and Pasztor, Safety Agency, Mattel Clash Over 
Disclosures, The Wall Street Journal, 4/9/2007). But just like traditional 
offenders, companies may continue to deny critical elements of their 
offending (e.g. denial of wrongdoing, denial of breaking the 24 hour 
reporting rule, denial of ‘knowingly’ producing and importing unsafe 
toys and so forth) despite allegations and civil penalties imposed by the 
regulator (in these cases the US Consumer Product Safety Commission). 
The rule of thumb seems to be to pay the fine, avoid any further 
litigation and return to business as usual as soon as possible. 
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Heath (2008: 605), in an analysis of business methods and moral 
motivation from a criminological perspective notes that ‘when white-
collar crime is viewed from the perspective of techniques of 
neutralization you can see why bureaucratic organizations such as large 
companies and the market, might constitute peculiarly criminogenic 
environments’, which he describes this way: 
These are institutional contexts that generate a very steady 
stream of rather plausible (or plausible-sounding) excuses for 
misconduct. This is the result of a confluence of factors: first, 
corporations are typically large, impersonal bureaucracies; 
second, the market allows individuals to act only on the basis of 
local information (Hayek 1945), leaving them in many cases 
unaware of the full consequences of their actions; third, 
widespread ideological hostility to government, and to 
regulation of the market in particular, results in diminished 
respect for the law; and finally, the fact that firms are engaged in 
adversarial (or competitive) interactions gives them broader 
license to adopt what would otherwise be regarded as anti-social 
strategies (Heath 2007 cited in Heath 2008: 605). 
As MacDonald (2010) notes on the Business Ethics Blog, in a critique of 
Heath’s article, ‘Sutherland (1968), Punch (1996) and Braithwaite (1989: 
128-129) have all variously described the corporation as an institutional 
environment that is in many cases demonstrably criminogenic’ and 
further: 
Business seems to be in Heath’s words, a ‘criminogenic’ setting 
(i.e. a setting that seems to generate criminal behaviour, along 
with other forms of wrongdoing). If we want to improve ethical 
conduct in business, we need to understand what characteristics 
of the world of business are responsible for that pattern’ 
(MacDonald 2010 at: 
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<http://businessethicsblog.com/2010/11/16/mba-ethics-education-
avoiding-excuses/>. 
Heath (2008: 611) imagines ‘an ethics curriculum that would bring to 
conscious awareness certain patterns of self-exculpatory reasoning’, the 
goal as he puts it ‘would be to neutralise the neutralisations’. McDonald 
(2010) on The Business Ethics Blog makes some interesting observations 
about how business actors utilise neutralisation techniques to redefine 
their behaviour: 
 <the existing criminological literature points to the fact that 
wrongdoers exhibit patterns of ‘neutralisation’ with regards to 
their crimes. That is, they describe their behaviour differently 
than an observer would. They define words differently, in order 
to attempt to rationalise their behaviour. In essence, what this 
allows them to do is to ‘admit that they did the thing, without 
admitting that it was actually wrong (MacDonald 2010 at 
http://businessethicsblog.com/2010/11/16/mba-ethics-education-
avoiding-excuses). 
This is precisely what companies do (and what they did in these cases) 
– they admitted that they did the thing (produced and distributed 
unsafe products) but mitigated their wrongdoing. Heath (2008) suggests 
that Sykes and Matza (1957) techniques of neutralisation may be more 
effective in addressing business ethics and corporate crime than 
theories of ‘moral motivation’. Perhaps, but companies are motivated by 
a set of values. In a large corporation these are distilled from the top 
down in various forms - in mission and value statements; induction 
materials; codes of conduct; policy manuals, or embedded in corporate 
social responsibility statements, to name a few. These form the 
philosophical underpinnings of the company’s public disclosure of how 
it does what it does although they may not necessarily be equally 
applied across an organisation. Companies are also motivated by profit 
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making which takes place in a fiercely competitive environment in the 
global toy sector. 
A culture of acceptance of the product recall as a business-as-usual 
‘norm’ in the toy industry (e.g. two or three recalls a year are normal) 
and in the wider community (e.g. a colleague’s comment that ‘so what, 
product recalls happen every day’), allows companies to give 
themselves permission for occasional lapses. It constitutes a form of 
self-deception (it is OK once in a while to produce dangerous products) 
and this notion of the unsafe product as the norm becomes the basis for 
seeking consumer forgiveness, on the understanding that we are all 
human and we all sometimes make mistakes. This is used as a basis to 
seek empathy from consumers 
 ‘We are not perfect, we have holes’ (Jim Walter, Senior Vice 
President at Mattel), but ‘But we’re doing more than anyone else 
(Barboza and Story, The New York Times, 26/7/2007). 
This belief that product recalls are an expected ‘norm’ in the toy 
industry enables companies to give themselves permission to produce 
unsafe products. In response to a second round of recalls, Mattel’s CEO 
said: 
 ‚We have had recalls every year since I’ve been here‛ (Mattel 
CEO, quoted in Story, New York Times, 29/8/2007). 
Strategies of denial and techniques of neutralisation are then drawn 
upon to defend this perceived ‘right’ There are also narratives of denial 
surrounding the substances and components that were found in these 
toys, historical (in the case of lead) and more contemporary (in the case 
of magnets). 
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Narratives of denial 
As noted by Maruna and Copes (2005), citing Sykes and Matza (1957),’ 
transgressors use neutralisation techniques to make distortions and 
rationalisations that allow them to reinterpret their behaviour as 
socially acceptable, or even pro-social. In this way, they avoid guilt and 
protect their self-esteem (see Maruna and Copes 2005). In similar vein, 
companies use neutralisation techniques to make distortions and 
rationalisations that allow them to reinterpret their behaviour as 
socially acceptable (redefining events as a crisis, a mistake, an isolated 
incident, a tragedy 
In this way they avoid guilt and protect their reputational assets 
(corporate image, brand reputation, trustworthy company). Scott and 
Lyman (1968: 46) suggest that ‘neutralisations’ are used ‘when 
describing verbalisations designed to relieve the speaker of culpability 
[responsibility, guilt, fault, blameworthiness] or censure [official 
condemnation] and the more generic “account‛ [written or spoken 
report of something] to describe a statement made by a social actor to 
explain unanticipated or untoward behaviour (cited in Maruna and 
Copes 2005: Note 4, pp 9-10)  
There are narratives of denial (e.g. corporate spin), processes of denial 
(e.g. the product recall process), structures of denial (e.g. corporate 
hierarchy of decision makers; multiple supply chain organisations) and 
practices of denial (e.g. misleading or fraudulent labelling, falsification 
of safety certificates; failing to disclose incident and injury data in one 
case). The first spins a particular narrative in the public domain, the 
second (recall process) functions to perpetuate the harm (e.g. as 
unreturned toxic toys and sometimes unrecalled knock-off toys such as 
Magnetix™ construction sets continue to circulate in formal and 
informal markets).  
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Other means by which harm was perpetuated in these cases included 
systemic practices by supply chain partners (in China) in outsourcing 
and sub-contracting the supply of raw materials and the painting of 
toys/components of toys; denial (by western toy companies) of known 
risks in the supply chain (e.g. lead paint) or in the case of Mattel and 
Mega Brands denying responsibility for poorly designed magnetic toys 
by prematurely blaming China. Toy companies routinely denied or 
minimised the known risk of lead paint in their extended supply chains. 
Mattel, after initially denying responsibility for poorly designed 
magnetic toys and shifting blame to China, were subsequently forced to 
make a public apology when it became obvious that poor design (in the 
west) was the problem rather than a manufacturing fault (in China).  
Several narratives played out in the public domain during these recalls. 
(1) Between the company and the media (sometimes oppositional, 
sometimes supportive). In these cases the media acted as both 
whistle blower (exposing toxic toys) and also assisted in 
scapegoating China; 
(2) Between the company and the regulator often setting the tone 
for either a co-operative or tense relationships 
(3) Between the company and consumer advocates (usually 
oppositional and demanding change); 
(4) Between the company and politicians (usually expressing 
outrage, seeking ‘the facts’ about what happened and why, who 
knew and when, as well as demanding change); 
(5)  Between the company and consumers (usually expressing 
outrage and betrayal at what happened and demanding 
something be done about it) 
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Studying what company representatives say and do may not 
necessarily provide an explanation of why they did it – the why often 
remains elusive, as Maruna and Copes (2005: 222) note: 
the study of ‘offender verbalisations as ‚data‛ in criminology 
might have originated with Cressey’s (1953) study of embezzlers’ 
excuses, but has since become primarily associated with Sykes 
and Matza’s (1957) techniques of neutralisation. However, just as 
Cressy noted ‘Listening to people tell you why they did does not 
give you explanations of why they did it’ (quoted in Maruna and 
Copes 2005: 222).  
Like the juvenile delinquent, ‘it is by learning a set of scripted response 
strategies that the corporation too learns the art of rationalising its 
offending (Sykes and Matza 1957: 667).  
Apologies, for instance, were commonplace and prolific (often being 
issued more than once throughout the different stages of the crises). But 
what actually constitutes an apology? To effectively restore their 
reputation, companies used apologies (labelled as rebuild strategies or 
bolstering strategies by some scholars) rather than deny or diminish 
strategies (justifications or excuses). Throughout the stages of a crisis a 
company’s reputation and the public perception of that reputation may 
shift over time, particularly as new evidence emerges (e.g. such as when 
the public learned that companies knew about the trouble with lead 
and magnets well in advance of consumers and sometimes even the 
regulator). 
Choi and Chung (2012: 7, 9) in an analysis of the Toyota recalls, 
describe the function of the apology in the context of corporate crisis 
communication: 
Apology is a critical crisis communication strategy for a company 
to use in order to defend its reputation and protect its image  
[e.g. defence strategy]  
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Apology can also be used as a critical crisis communication 
strategy in order to separate itself from the negative impact of a crisis 
[e.g distancing strategy] 
However, as the authors also note, an ‘apology was an effective strategy 
only when the participants perceived the strategy as appropriate, 
sincere and candid’ (Choi and Chung 2012: 22). Further, Choi and 
Chung (2012: 9) explain, citing Benoit & Drew (1997) that ‘In a crisis, an 
apology can be implemented by an organisation accepting 
responsibility for the crisis and asking for forgiveness. In the process of 
apologising companies often also communicate that their actions were 
not intentional.  
When managing a crisis, the critical issue is not so much altering the 
reality of the crisis but changing the public’s perception of it. This is 
most effectively achieved by redefining it as something else (as an 
isolated incident, a mistake, unintentional etc), thus attracting public 
empathy for the company’s plight, although this is more difficult to 
achieve with unsafe products, particularly when they are children’s 
toys. The public is less inclined to forgive a company even when 
coupled with claims that it was unintentional, due to unforeseen 
circumstances or beyond their control. 
"We're very disappointed this happened," Stoelting said, "and 
we're very serious about the steps we're taking to prevent it from 
happening again." (Stoelting, RC2 CEO quoted in Possley, The 
Chicago Tribune, 27/7/2007 
"We had a laser focus on getting the unsafe products out of the 
hands of children," he said. "I make no apologies for that." 
(Stoelting, RC2 CEO quoted in Possley, The Chicago Tribune, 
27/7/2007). 
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However when a company apologises, this ‘effectively requires an 
organisation to publicly accept responsibility for a crisis, thereby 
weakening its legal position in the event of a lawsuit’ (Tyler 1997 cited 
in Coombs & Holladay 2002: 166). Apologies and statements of regret 
are designed to garner empathy from key stakeholders. Given that 
product recalls are accepted as a business as usual norm in the toy 
sector and the manufacturing sector more widely and that consumers 
are becoming more inured to them (because of their frequency), this 
creates an environment where companies can excuse themselves from 
such a lapse (after all everyone makes mistakes).  
But some of these mistakes are becoming more lethal (especially in the 
area of adulterated food – e.g. melamine in infant formula, heavy 
metals leaching from certain metal-on-metal hip implants, pathogens in 
food and industrial gel in  breast implants). If the public accepts the 
notion that recalls happen every day and companies and the toy sector 
more broadly continue to spin the idea that recalls are a ‘norm’ then this 
creates an environment where excusing themselves for a lapse increases 
the plausibility of this excuse. Some companies issued apologies 
(statements of regret asking the public to pardon them for producing 
unsafe products).  
For some companies the cost of producing harmful products is 
mitigated by product liability insurance, by which they can recover 
some or all of the costs involved (at least the sum of the civil penalty 
and more). As such, companies may need to be careful how they 
express an apology in the public domain. In some countries, admissions 
of liability, for example, could result in a loss of insurance coverage. 
Statements of regret (e.g. we sincerely regret this has happened to you) 
may be preferable to an apology (e.g. we are sorry our mistake has 
caused harm) because the latter may constitute an admission of liability, 
whereas, the former constitutes an apology but does not acknowledge 
fault. In other cases, companies (like RC2) discovered that despite 
having both domestic and international insurance, they were not 
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covered for the substance (lead) in the United States, nor at the site of 
the origin of the harm (China). Due to the volume of toys involved 
Mega Brands had to self-insure towards the end of their product recall 
in relation to Magnetix™ building sets. 
Misleading labelling can also be seen as a narrative or form of denial. 
No labelling denies the consumer the information necessary to know 
what at toy is made of, what is inside a toy and what could potentially 
migrate from a toy. Labelling items as toxic-free, BPA-free or lead-free 
when this is subsequently found to be inaccurate, or using these types 
of labels to reveal the presence of one toxin but conceal the presence of 
others, is deceptive. Just because a product is labelled lead-free may not 
mean that it is free of all heavy metals (e.g. cadmium may be present). 
An emerging trend is the blanket labelling of children’s products with a 
small parts choking hazard for children under three, even products that 
do not contain small parts.  
Strategies of Denial 
Denial of the Harm and the Victim 
These toys are now safe said Mega Brands about the Magnetix™ 
building sets, but they were not and the company suffered a further 
recall (where consumers claimed the magnets were falling out of both 
new and redesigned toys). Mattel and Mega Brands both redesigned 
toys to more securely retain magnets after their initial recalls, but both 
companies were forced to issue repeat (expanded recalls) for the same 
products with the same problems. The understanding was that toys on 
stores shelves after a certain date were now safe. Mattel had declared 
on at least two separate occasions in the public arena that they were 
now attaching these magnets more securely.  
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In an interview with CNN in January 2008, Mattel’s CEO said they had 
begun doing so in January 2006 after they learned about the death of 
Kenny Sweet. But the question is why did they wait so long when they 
knew the same magnets were dislodging from one of their toys (Polly 
Pocket™ in July 2005), four months before Kenny died? Another 
question that arises here is that if magnets were falling out of new boxes 
of Magnetix™ and Polly Pocket™, surely this might also have been 
noticeable to those assembling the toys in China.  What procedures are 
in place for factory workers (without punitive repercussions) to advise 
factory management about anomalies in products? If magnets were 
falling out during the assembly and packaging process, then this 
presents an opportunity for an early warning system that could alert 
foreign toy companies to emerging problems. 
Denial of injury (and the victim) occurred through assertions of ‘no 
injuries’, particularly in relation to lead-contaminated toys. The 
assertion of ‘no injuries’ (especially in relation to lead recalls) implies 
that children were not harmed by lead-contaminated toys, but this 
claim is problematic given what is now known about the health impacts 
of lead (even in small doses over time) and the  as well as the latency 
period between exposure and presenting symptoms. The assertion that 
no child was injured as a result of this particular toy or these particular 
toys, denies the fact that children were harmed by the same toys 
(subject to a previous recall) or similar toys (made by competitors). 
As noted elsewhere in this thesis, compounding this denial is a paucity 
of global statistics on toy-related deaths and injuries more broadly and 
lead-related deaths and injuries in particular. We simply do not know 
with any reliability exactly how many children around the world died 
or were injured by lead or magnets migrating from their toys. What we 
do know is that the focus of statistics was on the victimisation of 
children in the developed world, but largely silent on children in the 
developing world. Not systematically counting incidents and injuries 
represents a failure to capture the true costs of toxic toys (e.g. measured 
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in deaths, injuries, emergency treatment, short/long-term health care 
and education costs, loss of quality of life and altered futures). Statistics 
(counting numbers) also fail to reflect the true extent of suffering, which 
is more adequately captured in case reports (e.g. medical accounts of 
suffering) and case vignettes (media, advocacy and parent/carer 
accounts of suffering). 
The notion of victimhood is more transparent when the causal links 
between exposure and health impact are obvious (e.g. magnets 
dislodged from certain toys and children sustained identifiable and 
verifiable injuries that are impossible to deny). The same is true for 
foreign objects such as button cell batteries (where serial numbers have 
been visible on these objects found inside children’s bodies and are 
therefore traceable). Similarly, if a child dies of lead poisoning from 
swallowing a specific object (where the lead by weight is measurable) 
the causal links are obvious (as in the case of a child who died after 
swallowing a lead-contaminated charm).  
However, the causal links between exposure and injury in relation to 
lead are much more obscure, for instance, when a child lives in an 
environment where lead is already present from other sources (e.g. 
peeling lead paint on an old house or in the soil of a community play 
setting), or where a child chewed on a toy, over time .  Proving the links 
between exposure and elevated lead levels is much more difficult to 
substantiate in these instances. Should a child develop symptoms over 
time (e.g. behavioural problems; learning difficulties) and is 
subsequently found to have elevated blood lead levels, the links 
between cause and effect are clouded by the passing of time. 
Denial of Environmental Harm by Avoidance 
The issue of the disposal of recalled toys was typically avoided by toy 
companies who were not keen to provide specific details regarding the 
fate of contaminated toys. For instance, ‘Asked what the company 
[Mattel] plans to do with the recalled toys, Jules Andres, said it [the 
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company] was working on a ‚responsible approach‛ but could not 
provide further details’ (D’Innocenzio, Associated Press 16/8/2007). A 
spokeswoman for RC2 Corporation said: 
‚We are still working with the USCPSC to determine the best 
method of disposal for the recalled products‛ she said. ‚Once 
that is determined, the company will dispose of the potentially 
unsafe toys‛ (RC2 spokeswoman quoted in D’Innocenzio, 
Associated Press 16/8/2007) 
A spokesman for the USCPSC advised the Associated Press that 
‘recalled products cannot be exported for re-sale, that disposal is 
sometimes determined as part of a company’s recall negotiations with 
the agency, but ultimately must be in accordance with state and federal 
environmental laws’ (D’Innocenzio, Associated Press 16/8/2007). 
However, the USPSC’s spokesman ‘said he could not discuss whether 
the agency entered into any specific arrangements with Mattel on how 
it should handle its inventory of recalled products’ (D’Innocenzio, 
Associated Press 16/8/2007). For toys that don’t pose an environmental 
hazard such as the recalled magnetic toys [I would dispute this 
perception – See Chapter 5) reportedly, ‘a manufacturer has more 
leeway, but still needs to obtain USCPSC approval..  
In its 2009 Global Citizenship Report (Mattel CSR 2009: 18), Mattel said 
of the toys recalled in 2006/2007: 
 We are committed to the proper management of recalled 
products, including those that were returned to the company or 
quarantined prior to distribution. In the United States, all 
returned products are being held in warehouses until we are 
sure they are no longer needed for our own investigation or for 
legal reasons. We are exploring ways to separate and recycle 
parts of the products, including plastic resins, batteries and 
paper packaging. In some cases the sorting of these materials for 
recycling is required – for example battery recycling in 
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California. Outside of the U.S., Canada and Venezuela, all 
affected products have been disposed of in accordance with 
applicable laws. 
Denial by Minimisation 
Stressing the importance or priority of child safety was a recurring 
strategy used by companies to ingratiate themselves with consumers, as 
was ‘I am a father too’; over-inclusiveness was a minimisation or 
diminishment strategy used by companies to deflect attention from the 
scale of the problem as were statements about the tiny percentage of 
toys affected by the recalls (e.g. only 4% of all the toys we sell). A 
typical strategy was to downplay the scale of the harm (e.g. only a little 
bit of lead) or downplay information about the dangers of products. 
Out of an abundance of caution’ was a recurring theme in product 
recall notices, as was these recalls were ‘overly-inclusive’. Companies 
regularly claimed product recalls were ‘overly-inclusive’ (we recalled 
more toys than we needed to) or the official recall announcement (put 
out by the USCPSC) used the phrase ‘out of an abundance of caution’ 
such and such a company recalled (we recalled them just in case they 
were toxic). Minimisation in these case studies takes the form of 
diminishment strategies that minimised both the nature and scale of the 
harm as well as claiming ‘precautionary’ measures were taken. Mattel 
said the recalled toys represented only 2.5 per cent of the 800 million 
toys the company manufactures each year and RC2 (quoted in 
D’Innocenzio, The Associated Press, 16/8/2007) said a spokeswoman for 
RC2, said that ‘As of last week *8 August 2007+they had recovered 56 
per cent of the toys included in its 13 June recall’. 
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Denial of Responsibility 
In nearly every case there was an ‘oops’ factor – we seem to have 
overlooked some toys or further toys have come to our attention and 
this will require an expanded recall (same problem, same toys or same 
problem different toys). It is someone else’s fault was a recurring theme 
in both lead and magnet-related recalls. In these cases, the ‘someone 
else’ was typically elsewhere in the extended product supply chain. 
Chinese contract manufacturers (the manufacturing partners in toy 
companies extended supply chains) were blamed prematurely for all 
the recalls, but were only implicated in the lead-related recalls. Magnets 
were a design fault, the responsibility for which lay further up the 
supply chain with toy companies headquartered in the west. 
This was despite the fact that Mattel, for example, had over 200 people 
on the ground in Hong Kong and China (Mattel Asia Pacific Sourcing 
or MAPS staff) engaged in assisting with sourcing raw materials and 
testing among other responsibilities - they were apparently completely 
in the dark about the systemic practice of outsourcing and sub-
contracting going on in the manufacturing sector of the off-shore 
supply chain in China. RC2 also had hundreds of staff on the ground 
with similar responsibilities. 
The language used to condemn ‘the other’ was typically strong and 
emotive ‘we were let down and so we let you down’; they didn’t follow 
the rules, they violated their agreements.  For example 
Lee Der’s use of an unregistered facility to produce Mattel 
product was a violation of its manufacturing and procurement 
agreement with MAPS [Mattel Asia Pacific Sourcing], as was its 
failure to test every batch of paint received from its paint 
supplier for use on Mattel product’ (Eckert, CEO Mattel Inc 2007: 
7).  
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But nothing was said about what MAPS (over 200 employees) were 
doing whilst these systemic breaches were occurring. Toy companies 
excused the harms they caused whilst simultaneously presenting their 
organisations in the best possible light. 
‘We’ve always required our suppliers to follow our safety 
specifications‛ Mr Stoelting said. ‚In this incident those 
requirements were not met‛ (Stoelting, CEO RC2, quoted in 
Story, New York Times, 26/7/2007). 
Common to all of these toy companies was a failure to satisfactorily 
manage a known risk (e.g. paint containing lead) in the manufacturing 
sector of their supply chains in China or to contain a risk (e.g. magnets 
in toys). Toy companies failed in their duty of care by neglecting to 
monitor and verify the specifications and standards outlined in their 
agreements with Chinese contract vendors. Where was the paper work 
(e.g. Certification of safety, authenticity, quality) supporting the toy’s 
safety and quality and if there was paper work, was it misleading or 
fraudulent? Instead of enforcing, testing and verifying, companies 
appear to have relied on relationships of trust in the supply chain, some 
of which had been in place for many years. Why were toys not tested 
for the potential for magnets to migrate, especially in light of the 
medical literature on ingestion of these foreign objects (dating back 
almost two decades), documenting the lethal nature of these magnets 
and the  specific injuries sustained by the children who swallowed 
them. 
As Schneider and Wright (2004: 4) note in relation to individual 
offenders: 
Denial is almost always characterised as an obstacle, whereas 
acceptance of responsibility is typically considered a desirable 
outcome. Focussing on denial tends to view offenders in terms of 
egregious behaviour, whereas focussing on responsibility 
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focuses on intervention strategies, opportunities and motivations 
for deviant behaviour. 
The focus here was very much on denying responsibility by shifting the 
blame elsewhere in the supply chain. 
Denial of wrongdoing 
At the time of the recalls the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Act defined 
‘knowingly’ to mean: 
 The ‘having of actual knowledge’ (which is fine), but also ‘the 
presumed having of knowledge deemed to be possessed by a 
reasonable man [sic] who acts in the circumstances, including 
knowledge obtainable upon the exercise of due care to ascertain 
the truth of representations‛. 
Most companies admitted responsibility but denied wrongdoing. 
Similar to what Heath (2008) observed, , the companies in this study 
admitted they did the thing (in this case producing and distributing 
unsafe toys) but when it came to formally responding to the allegations 
by USCPSC staff in Settlement Agreements, they responded by denying 
any wrongdoing or ‘knowingly’ introducing toxic toys into the stream 
of commerce. 
Examples of denial of wrongdoing following from these cases, in 
response to USCPSC staff allegations include: 
RC2 denies that it violated section 19(a)(1) of the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 
2068(a)(1), [toys in violation of the lead paint ban] and further 
denies that it did so ‘knowingly’ as defined in section 20 (d) of 
the CPSA, 15 U.S.C. 2069(d).  
Mattel denies the *USCPSC+ staff’s allegations set forth above 
that it ‘knowingly’ violated the Consumer Product Safety Act 
(CPSA) (USCPSC Settlement Agreement 2009: 6) 
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Fisher-Price denies the *USCPSC+ staff’s allegations that it 
‘knowingly’ violated the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSCA) 
(USCPSC Settlement Agreement Mattel 2009: 6). 
Sometimes companies not only denied they did the thing, but they also 
hid the thing (by concealing incident and injury data as in the case of 
Rose Art/Mega Brands). 
Denial by Blame-Shifting 
Blame-shifting was a recurring theme in these case studies, where the 
hierarchical nature of organisations and their key decision-makers and 
the fragmented and trans-world nature of the supply chain provided 
ample opportunities to shift blame up and down the chain. Blame was 
shifted from one company to another (e.g. parent company in the West 
to contract manufacturers in China; from Chinese contractors to local 
vendors and sub-contractors); from one country to another (United 
States to China and vice versa), from company to regulator (and vice 
versa) and from company to consumer in some cases (lax parental 
supervision; toys used by under age children, rough play by siblings).  
Mostly, western toy companies blamed China (the nation state), Made-
in-China (the brand) and Chinese contract factories (the companies). 
For instance, by the time Mattel apologised to the Chinese after 
prematurely blaming them for all the recalls (including the magnet-
related toys), the damage was already done and China’s reputation as a 
safe manufacturing hub was being questioned around the world. Mattel 
came to the realisation (in September 2007), months after their first 
magnet-related recall (in November 2006) that the Chinese were not 
responsible for faulty magnetic toys – they were. So they had to send a 
senior representative to China to apologise (however there was 
confusion over who he was apologising to, whether that was the 
Chinese authorities, the Chinese people or Chinese manufacturers who 
had been erroneously and prematurely accused of manufacturing the 
defective magnetic toys).  
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But the damage had already been done to China (the nation state), 
Made-In-China (the brand) and Chinese contract vendors (the 
companies) thereby obscuring America, Canada and Australia (nation 
states of the toy companies), Thomas™, Polly Pocket™, Dora the 
Explorer™ Magnetix™, Bindeez™ (the toy brands) and toy companies 
in the west (Mattel/Fisher-Price, RC2 Corporation, Schylling Inc, Mega 
Brands Moose Enterprises).‘The other’ had been successfully tarnished 
and as we know – mud sticks.  In the case of magnetic toys, instead of 
America/Canada (the countries in which the toys were designed); 
instead of Magnetix and Polly Pocket (the faulty toy brands); instead of 
toy companies (Mattel, Rose Art/Megabrands), the public focussed on 
China, Made in China and Chinese factories. In fact by far the greatest 
numbers of toys were recalled for the problem of magnets (rather than 
lead). In Mattel’s case, this was something like 20 odd million (for 
magnets) compared to 4 million (for lead) and Mattel was an offender 
in both cases (lead and magnets). 
Blame-shifting occurred up and down the supply chain and was most 
effectively achieved by toy companies using the ‘them and us scenario’.  
Some toy companies blamed parents. Mattel was an exception to this, 
having learned this lesson from a previous recall (during the 1990s) In 
one case (RC2) there was a second round of apologies because the toy 
sent out as a ‘gift’ (toad) was also contaminated with lead and had to be 
returned. Rose Art/Mega Brands, on the other hand, did imply that 
parental supervision was a factor, as did Moose Enterprises, in the case 
of Bindeez™ beads. 
Denial by Distancing 
Companies sought to distance themselves from the harm in a number 
of ways be that at a geographical, organisational or ideological level. As 
far as lead was concerned, for example, they could effectively distance 
themselves geographically from the origins of the harm (e.g. lead was 
introduced to the supply chain in China) but ethically these were 
309 
dedicated contract factories in an holistic supply chain that began with 
design and development in America, manufacturing in China, export 
logistics out of Hong Kong, and consumption and disposal in the 
countries of import. In the early stages of the recalls all of the 
companies (RC2, Schylling, Mattel/Fisher-Price) blamed China (the 
country, Chinese manufacturers and the Made-In-China brand). This 
effectively deflected attention away from the countries where these toy 
companies were headquartered (e.g. the United States); the companies 
involved (e.g. RC2, Schylling, Fisher-Price) and to a lesser extent the toy 
brands (e.g. Thomas, Curious George, Barbie, Dora).  
Denial by Withholding Information 
Partial disclosure, non-disclosure, delayed disclosure, concealing 
information, drip-feeding information to the regulator, stonewalling 
were all characteristics of actions by different companies. In the months 
following the magnet recalls, one company in particular withheld vital 
information from the regulator, data that was critical to assessing the 
true nature and scale of the hazard. In doing so, they compromised the 
health and safety of thousands of children. 
The most surprising aspect of this study has been the realisation that 
‘sometimes those who are responsible for these dangers know about the 
problem’ (American Association for Justice 2009: 3) but fail to act. 
Delaying disclosure to the regulator, thereby delayed disclosure to the 
public, in these cases exposing children to lead, cadmium, toxic 
chemicals and rare earth magnets in windows of harm that could have 
been shortened, had some of these companies disclosed much earlier 
what they knew about their products, what they contained and the 
harm they could cause. One CEO has maintained that it is easy to apply 
‘could’ backwards, but the fact is that this company knew in July 2005 
that a child had been seriously injured by magnets that dislodged from 
one of their Playsets, negotiated a settlement with the child’s mother, 
but did not recall those toys until November 2006. What these 
310 
industries knew and when they knew it, has now become public 
through the outcome of law suits and the publication of civil settlement 
agreements. 
In these case studies evidence suggests that the toy industry well 
understood the risk of lead paint in the China sector of their supply 
chains. They all had procedures in place to test for lead (and other 
heavy metals) at input (raw materials like paint and paint pigment), 
throughput (random batches of toys) and output (finished toys). There 
was also an acknowledgement that lead in paint was a risk for 
companies manufacturing in China. Toy companies may not have 
foreseen how the lead would unlawfully enter the supply chain 
(through the systemic outsourcing and subcontracting practices of their 
dedicated or preferred Chinese contract factories), but they were aware 
of the risk.  
For those companies with staff on the ground responsible for sourcing 
safe raw materials, it is difficult to understand how they were not 
aware of what was going on in Guangdong since these case studies 
reveal that these practices were not recent (e.g. Mattel contract vendor 
Lee Der Industrial had been sourcing paint from one supplier for over 
three years and Mattel had been doing business with Lee Der and Early 
Light (their preferred contractors for 15 and 20 years respectively). Even 
if testing was only occurring at input (raw material) and output 
(finished toys) but not throughput (batch testing) the processes that 
were supposed to be in place apparently failed to detect lead in these 
toys (nor for that matter, did the issue of magnets dislodging arise as an 
observation in the supply chain either during design and development 
In the west) or during assembly and packaging (in China) 
Like the toxic toy that triggered this study, these toys (and what they 
contained and subsequently released into bodies, places and nature) 
were able to transfer undetected from China to the world. Despite their 
denial, there is evidence to suggest (see in particular Liroff et al 2008) 
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that the toy sector and individual companies were aware of the risk of 
heavy metals in the China supply chain, particularly lead in paint. That 
is why, as a matter of course, they were routinely testing raw materials 
(e.g. paint and paint pigments) for lead and other heavy metals. 
In certain cases (e.g. Schylling Inc tops and pails), the lead hazard was 
never reported to the regulator at the time of its initial occurrence 
(2002). It was only when a U.S. newspaper found lead on one of 
Schylling’s spinning tops in 2007 that this issue came to light. When 
Schylling found out about lead-contaminated knobs on their spinning 
tops and pails in 2002, the company launched an internal investigation, 
initiated a recall directly from retailers (without involving the USCPSC) 
and instructed their Chinese contract vendor to replace the wooden 
knobs with plastic ones to alleviate the problem. Unfortunately, as came 
to light in 2007, the Chinese vendor had not followed these instructions 
and apparently, Schylling Inc had not followed up, so that in a five year 
retail window of harm between 2002 and 2007, these tops and pails 
continued to be sold through stores and over the internet, and also 
likely through charity stores, second-hand stores, swap meets, garage 
sales, street markets and so forth. 
Crisis Management 
This section deals with the specific processes associated with particular 
events in which the relevant corporations mobilise their resources to 
minimise the negative ramifications of a crisis. It is therefore concerned 
with how the strategies of neutralisation are actuated in concrete 
circumstances. This generally takes the form of a specific type of 
corporate script, one that involves recurring strategies of denial. Here 
the main concern is with protecting the overall reputation of the 
company, rather than denial of harm per se.  
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Companies respond to a crisis in particular ways, using crisis response 
strategies that have their origins in strategic crisis communication 
theory (SCCT). First, they identify the crisis type using as a defining 
tool ‘the frame key publics used to interpret the event’ (Coombs and 
Holladay 2002: 167). The objective is to evaluate the organisation’s 
ability to control the event and how much the organisation is to blame 
for the event, but ‘the central focus of SCCT is how to manage 
organisational reputation during a crisis’ (Coombs and Holladay 2002: 
167).  
For companies, ‘SCCT offers a set of principles that guide the selection 
of crisis response strategies in order to maximise reputational 
protection’ (Coombs and Holladay 2002: 179). In a crisis, these 
‘response strategies function to mitigate reputational damage in the 
case of organisational misdeeds by demonstrating that the organisation 
cares for the victims and knows the proper way to behave, thereby 
meeting public expectations’ (Coombs and Holladay 2002: 168). Crises 
with strong attributions of crisis responsibility (attributed to the 
company by key stakeholders) such as organisational misdeeds, require 
strongly accommodative responses such as corrective action and full 
apologies. (For a detailed discussion of the process see Coombs and 
Holladay 2002: 169-172). Therefore, ‘as crisis responsibility increases so 
does the reputational damage inflicted by a crisis’ (Coombs and 
Holladay 2002: 173). 
Organisations can use crisis clusters to construct a crisis management 
plan for each cluster to which the organisation is vulnerable (see Table 
10.1). The rationale for clustering is that ‘if an organisation prepares a 
crisis plan for one crisis in the cluster, it is reasonably well prepared for 
all crisis types in that cluster’ (Coombs and Holladay 2002: 173). 
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Table 10.1: Crisis Types by Cluster 
Victim Cluster 
Harm is inflicted on the organisation as well as stakeholders. 
Crisis produces minimal attributions of crisis responsibility. 
1 Rumour Circulation of false information to harm an 
organisation. 
2 Natural disaster A naturally occurring event (an act of God) that 
damages an organisation. 
3 Malevolence/product 
tampering 
Damage by an external agent against an 
organisation. 
4 Workplace violence An attack by an employee or former employee on 
current employees on the job. 
Accidental Cluster 
Unintentional actions by an organisation, that is, the organisations did not intend to 
create the crisis. 
Crisis produces moderate attributions of crisis responsibility. 
5 Challenges Confrontation by disgruntled stakeholders claiming 
an organisation is operating in an inappropriate 
manner. 
6 Technical breakdown 
accident 
An industrial accident caused by technology or 
equipment failure. 
7 Technical breakdown 
product recalls 
The recall of a product because of technology or 
equipment failure [e.g. magnetic toys recalled 
because of design defect] 
8 Mega damage A technical breakdown that produces significant 
environmental harm (the environmental damage is 
the defining factor). 
Preventable Cluster 
Intentionally placing stakeholders at risk, knowingly violating laws or regulations, not 
doing enough to prevent an accident or defective product from reaching the market. 
Crisis produces strong attributions of crisis responsibility. 
9 Human breakdown accident An industrial accident caused by human error 
(the human breakdown aspect is the defining 
factor) 
10 Human breakdown product 
recall 
A product recall because of human error (e.g. 
beef contaminated by e-coli because of human 
error). 
11 Organisational misdeeds with 
no injuries (to external 
stakeholders) 
Management knowingly deceives stakeholders 
but without causing injury. 
12 Organisational misdeed 
management misconduct 
Management knowingly violates laws or 
regulations. 
13 Organisational misdeeds with 
injuries (to external 
stakeholders) 
Management knowingly places stakeholders at 
risk and some are injured. 
Source: Tabulated from Coombs (1999b), as refined by Coombs and Holladay 
(2002). 
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The recalls of lead-contaminated toys fit into the ‘Preventable Cluster’ 
(in particular No. 10) and the magnet-related toy recalls fit into the 
‘Accidental Cluster’ (in particular No. 7). The lead recalls were the 
outcome of human intervention (on the part of those who used the lead 
paint, human oversight (on the part of those who were supposed to test 
the paint) and poor governance on the part of those responsible for 
overseeing that specifications and testing procedures were being 
followed. The magnet recalls were put down to a design defect, but 
they could also be attributed to a lack of foresight as to the nature of 
and potential mobility of what was in the toy (e.g. the most powerful 
magnets in the world today) and what might happen if those 
components dislodged and were swallowed by children.  
The crisis response strategies above can be ordered along a continuum 
ranging from defensive (putting organisational interests first) to 
accommodative (putting victim concerns first) (See Coombs and 
Holladay 2002). The corporate ideal is to draw from this ‘toolbox’ of 
crisis response strategies, according to the type of crisis and the 
company’s perception of the level of responsibility attributed to it by 
key stakeholders (e.g. those who can influence how the company is 
perceived in the public domain) and then to deploy a predetermined set 
of crisis response strategies in response to the evolving crisis (in this 
case the product recall). They bear a striking resemblance to, and fit 
broadly within, Sykes and Matza’s techniques of neutralisation.  
As the crisis escalates, at different stages, the company positions itself 
on this continuum between an accommodative stance and a defensive 
stance, utilising the crisis response strategies most suited to the 
evolving situation.  
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Some companies, like Mattel, delivered a double-defence, as reported 
by Palmeri (2007) in Bloomsberg Businessweek: 
In a press teleconference on Aug. 14, Eckert and Jim Walter, 
Mattel's senior vice-president for worldwide quality assurance, 
announced a number of steps they were taking to prevent 
further recalls. Mattel said the lead paint on the latest products 
resulted from malfeasance in the company's supply chain. 
Mattel's main supplier of the Cars products, Early Light 
Industrial, had subcontracted out the painting to another 
company, Hong Li Da. While the subcontractor was supposed to 
use paint supplied by Early Light, it instead used paint that 
contained potentially poisonous lead.  
"Early Light, the vendor, is every much a victim as Mattel 
is," Eckert said. "The subcontractor [rather than Early 
Light] chose to violate the rules." 
The techniques of neutralisation deployed by juvenile delinquents to 
rationalise their behaviour, avoid the ‘criminal’ label, mitigate the harm 
and preserve personal reputation bear a striking resemblance to the 
crisis response strategies deployed by companies to rationalise their 
behaviour, mitigate the harm, avoid the ‘criminal’ label and preserve 
organisational reputation. The individual offender wants, as far as 
possible, to preserve his or her personal ‘reputation’ and the company 
wants as far as possible, to preserve its reputational assets. Despite 
‘egregious behaviour’ (Lynch and Stretesky 2001) both juvenile 
delinquent and company seek to emerge with some degree of 
reputational integrity still intact. 
The respectability and high social status of modern-day international 
CEO’s stems more from their position (status) in the company rather 
than their personal socio-economic class (which may precede or follow 
their career). As Beder (2006) notes, ‘the corporate class’ occupy a 
privileged position that not only provides a certain social status but also 
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access to networks of influence at elite levels politically, economically, 
legally and socially. The larger the company the greater the distance 
between executive, enterprise and the harm inflicted. A small business 
owner might be named and prosecuted for making unsafe toys, but a 
larger enterprise or transnational can successfully hide behind the 
corporate veil and has more opportunities to transfer blame elsewhere 
(to another organisation within the group or to an outside organisation 
they have contracted with to do the work).  
When companies go into damage control they effectively go into denial. 
Throughout the crisis they deploy strategies designed to at one and the 
same time contain the damage whilst restoring image. Sometimes a 
CEO may take advice from another company in the same sector that has 
gone through a similar crisis. For instance, Mattel’s CEO consulted with 
a retired Johnson & Johnson executive because of J & J’s perceived 
success with the Tylenol recall. However these were two different types 
of crises – Tylenol was a case of tampering with a ‘safe’ product by a 
third party after it reached toy shelves. Mattel’s crisis was for unsafe 
products containing poorly secured magnets and surface paint 
contaminated with lead, for which there would likely be a higher 
attribution of blame for system failures (poor design and lead 
contamination) in their supply chain, events that delivered unsafe 
products to store shelves, rather than less attribution in Tylenol’s case.  
One fundamental difference between the two cases is that Tylenol 
delivered a safe produce to store shelves (it was a case of tampering by 
an unknown third party after the event). Mattel delivered unsafe 
products to store shelves (magnetic toys poorly designed in America 
and lead adulterated toys contaminated during production in China). 
Both were created in different phases (magnets at design and 
development; lead at manufacturing) of an integrated supply chain that 
produced branded toys for Mattel and for which the company is 
ultimately responsible. For Mattel the attribution of blame by external 
stakeholders was likely to be much greater (supply chain insiders 
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created or facilitated production of an unsafe product) whereas for 
Tylenol the attribution of responsibility was likely to be lower (an 
outsider tampered with finished product). 
If the company is large, they typically assemble a team of insiders (key 
executives and corporate communications staff) who might begin by 
assessing the type of crisis, hypothesising best to worst-case scenarios, 
preparing answers to anticipated questions by key stakeholders, 
especially those who can influence public perceptions about the 
company (media, politicians,  consumer watchdogs, regulators and 
grassroots advocacy groups). Sometimes they may also harness the 
collaboration of outsiders (public relations agencies, lawyers) to prepare 
and vet the wording of announcements and statements for public 
release. Usually a crisis management team is appointed consisting of a 
senior spokesperson (e.g. CEO), members of the senior executive team 
(with divisional responsibilities) who may also take advice 
surreptitiously from the Board (both executive and non-executive 
Directors). 
The public domain narrative usually put together by corporate 
communications and public relations people is the way in which 
consumers find out what is going on directly through company web 
sites (e.g. corporate media releases), but more likely through the mass 
media (especially Newspapers and Television, but increasingly also 
social media). It is these public domain narratives that shape public 
opinion about the company and its actions. In a headline on 14 August 
2007, the Wall Street Journal declared ‘Mattel does damage control after 
new recall’ (Casey and Zamiska 14/8/2007). 
  
318 
 Damage control refers to the process of offsetting or minimising 
damage to public image, reputation and credibility. In Mattel’s case this 
was battled on several fronts: 
 containing the fallout from a widening recall of toys, 
 moving to quickly revamp safety measures at Chinese 
manufacturing plants, 
 protecting the company’s reputation among consumers and 
investors ahead of the 2007 holiday season (Casey and Zamiska, 
The Wall Street Journal, 14/8/2007). 
Mattel also ran full-page advertisements in the New York Times and the 
Wall Street Journal. 
‚Parents want to know what’s going on‛ Mr Eckert said in an 
interview yesterday < But no system is perfect‛ (Mattel CEO 
quoted in Casey and Zamiska, The Wall Street Journal, 14/8/2007). 
They also attempted to combat the bad news by assuring parents they 
understood what was at stake: 
In his video posted on the Mattel website and Yahoo on 14 
August, Mattel’s CEO said ‚absolutely nothing is more 
important than the safety and well-being of our children‛ 
(quoted in Casey and Zamiska 14/8/2007). 
Unlike their first recall on 2 August, Mattel also quickly identified their 
authorised Chinese vendor (Early Light Industrial) who made the toys 
as well as well as the paint supplier (Hong Li Da). 
The product recall threatens how a toy company is perceived in the 
public domain and in that context is perceived by the company as a 
public relations crisis. In response to this, a set of strategies are deployed 
to match the crisis situation, designed to simultaneously contain 
damage and restore reputation (e.g. corporate image, brand reputation). 
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The process begins with what is colloquially known as ‘damage control’ 
where: 
(a) the objectives are to contain the damage (whether that is an 
unsafe product or a toxic environmental spill);  
(b) to restore the company image and reputation (e.g. brand 
reputation or social responsibility image); and  
(c) to regain public trust (whether that is consumers victimised by 
unsafe products or communities victimised by environmental 
toxins). 
As noted by Ettenson and Knowles (2008), ’corporate image and brand 
reputation, although different, are interconnected where damage to one 
can weaken the other’  
A ‘good’ reputation can garner the goodwill of politicians and 
the community in which companies operate. But a company’s 
reputation can be affected by a variety of factors, including but 
not limited to executive leadership, financial performance, 
innovativeness, treatment of employees, workplace diversity 
policies, handling of ethical issues and commitment to the 
environment. The strength of a brand, on the other hand, 
depends on how well it has fulfilled its promise to customers 
over time (Ettenson and Knowles at 
http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/dont-confuse-reputation-with-
brand/  
In these cases strategies were deployed during different phases of the 
crisis –before (to neutralise anticipated responses), during (to neutralise 
responses to the crisis by key stakeholders) and after (to neutralise the 
effects of penalties and prosecutions). Action taken prior to the crisis 
included preparation of Question and Answer pro-forma anticipating 
stakeholder questions and scenarios that may arise in response to the 
crisis. Action taken during the crisis included public statements and 
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press releases: messages of apology and regret paired with messages of 
reassurance to affected groups. These were interspersed with messages 
about the company’s past or present achievements in business 
excellence, philanthropy or as a socially responsible corporate actor, 
whilst at the same time deflecting attention away from themselves to 
others. Afterwards, there were public statements defending the 
company’s position on a particular topic and/or reputation, denying 
past events, denying ‘knowingly’ committing offences, denying 
wrongdoing,  and wherever possible deflecting blame and therefore 
responsibility.  
Table 10.2 presents these processes of crisis management as a series of 
stages. Stages 1 to 4 may repeat themselves if there is a recurrence of the 
same or a similar problem, leading to a repeat (or extended recall). 
Table: 10.2: Stages of the Product Recall Crisis and Responses: This 
Study 
Stage Events Description Response Strategies 
Stage 1 Precursor After discovery but 
before disclosure to the 
regulator 
Assess the crisis 
Concealment 
Avoidance 
Delay 
Internal investigation 
Stage 2 Post disclosure Following disclosure to 
the public 
Apologies 
Statements of Regret 
Assurances 
Stage 3 Recall Following official recall 
announcement 
Instructions 
Reassurance 
Regret 
Stage 4 Remedial Responses to unsafe 
toys 
Corrective Action 
Public Hearings 
(Event) 
 
Stage 5 Aftermath Accusations made and 
penalties imposed 
Allegations 
Denials 
  Posturing and 
repositioning 
Redesigning 
Rebranding 
Repositioning 
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Managing reputational assets as Coombs (2002) note is what strategic 
communication is all about. Mattel for instance, worked hard to both 
defend and restore their image as ‘the trustworthy company’ (Woo 
2008: 3). Others might work to defend and restore an image as ‘the 
ethical company’, ‘the socially responsible company’, the responsible 
employer’, the ‘leader in their sector’ and so forth. Companies pull out 
‘the goods’ (ethical accolades, no history of previous recalls, good 
corporate citizen) at a time of public crisis, to balance the ‘bads’ (in 
these cases poorly designed or adulterated products). 
For RC2 Corporation it was the image of a company that sold 
intergenerational favourites and the reputation of one of its most high-
profile brands, Thomas™ and Friends. For Schylling Inc. it was the 
image of a company renowned for making good quality ‘classic toys’, 
the old favourites like spinning tops and the reputation of one of its 
most high-profile brand, Thomas™ as well as Curious George™. For 
Mattel Inc/Fisher-Price it was the image of the ‘trustworthy company’ 
(Woo 2008), and the reputation of some of its most high-profile brands 
including Polly Pocket™ (for magnets) and Dora the Explorer™ (for 
lead). For Australian company, Moose Enterprises, it was protecting the 
image of the innovative company and the reputation of one of its most 
successful toys, Bindeez™ beads, named toy of the year in 2007. For 
Rose Art/Mega Brands it was protecting the image and reputation of 
one of the world’s most popular toys, Magnetix™ building sets. 
But in the wake of the recalls what will stick in people’s minds is not 
Thomas™ or Magnetix™, or Bindeez™ or Dora the Explorer™ or Polly 
Pocket™, but China, Made-in-China and Chinese manufacturers. This 
is despite the fact that two transnational corporations, Mega 
Brands/Rose Art and Mattel Inc were responsible for poorly designed 
toys from which magnets dislodged. For instance of the total toys 
recalled by Mattel approximately 18 million involved loosely attached 
magnets and only 3 million involved lead contamination. As Bapuji and 
Beamish (2007) note in a study on the 2007 recalls, the majority of 
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recalled toys were for a design fault (in America) rather than a 
manufacturing defect (in China). 
Mattel Inc was widely praised by some ‘experts’ for its handling of the 
crisis and was generally self-congratulatory about its own performance 
and to their credit was the only toy company to provide oral testimony 
at U.S. Senate Hearings. However, as Woo (2008:2) notes in an analysis 
of the Mattel recalls, ‘the USCPSC’s subsequent revelation that Mattel 
first suspected lead contamination in early June, a good two months 
before it announced the first of four recalls on August 4 [2007] has 
overshadowed much of what the company claims it did right’.  
Mattel’s track record, although not well-publicised, was also tarnished 
by the events leading up to the magnet-related recalls. The company 
first learned a child had been injured by magnets in July 2005, four 
months before a rival company’s (Mega Brands) product (Magnetix) 
killed a child in November 2005 and well before Mattel’s first recall for 
Polly Pocket in November 2006. In fact, this incident did not emerge in 
the public domain until August 2007, when the child’s mother broke 
her silence. She lamented that Mattel had not  recalled the toy two years 
earlier (in 2005) when her child was injured, telling the media at the 
time of the expanded recall for Polly Pocket™, that she had sued Mattel 
so other children could avoid the pain and suffering her daughter 
experienced. 
 ‚How many other kids could have not made it because of this 
toy? And it’s hard because you don’t want to see somebody else 
go through what you had to go through‛ said May (mother of 
Paige quoted in Brilliant, Eyewitness News, 2007). 
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With the benefit of hindsight, her lawyer felt a similar level of betrayal 
by the company: 
 ‚I thought that I’d been hoodwinked by Mattel‛ said Gordon 
Tabor, the attorney who represented Paige’s family. He says he 
was shocked to learn of this week’s recall *in August 2007+ for 
the same problem that existed two years ago [in 2005]: deficient 
adhesive on the magnets (Tabor quoted in Brilliant, EyeWitness 
News 2009) 
 ‚We had assumed that the recall of November 21st of 2006 
solved the issue of safety with children using this product‛, 
Tabor said (Tabor quoted in Brilliant, Eye Witness News 2009; See 
also Oppenheimer 2009: 292) 
Had this revelation been publicly known at the time of Mattel’s first 
recall in November 2006, the company’s trustworthy image would have 
been severely dinted, because their actions certainly did not live up to 
their corporate values, their rhetoric in the public domain, or their 
corporate social responsibility agenda. 
But Mattel’s reputation as an experienced manufacturer of safe toys 
through its China supply network was hailed as exemplary in the 
months before the recalls. In an article published in the New York Times 
on 26 July 2007 ‘Mattel was one of only two toy companies to allow the 
New York Times to visit its China plants. The New York Times article 
commended Mattel’s product safety inspection procedures, which it 
maintained had improved since the Power Wheels™ recall’. (Woo 2008: 
6). Yet Mattel Asia Pacific (MAPs) found out about lead on certain of 
Mattel’s toys on 7 June 2007 and senior executives in head office learned 
about the trouble with lead on 12 July 2007. So when Mattel gave its 
interview on 26 July (hailing them as an example of safe manufacturing 
in China) they knew their product safety inspection procedures were 
not above reproach and perhaps that is why they said at the time ‘we 
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have holes’. As Woo (2008: 6) points out, ‘some toy analysts were 
reluctant to blame the company for the lead paint crisis: 
 ‚If something like this can happen to Mattel, which has some of 
the most stringent standards in the industry, what does that 
mean for the other manufacturers of such products?‛ argues 
Richard Welford of CSR Asia Weekly.  
 The recall is particularly alarming since Mattel, known for its 
strict quality controls, is considered a role model in the toy 
industry for how it operates in China‛ (cited in Woo 2008: 6) 
At the time RC2 recalled lead-contaminated Thomas & Friends ™ in 
June 2007, Mattel was being congratulated for its safe history of 
production in China. But these accolades would come back to haunt the 
world’s largest toy company, who as well as having recalled millions of 
faulty magnetic toys in November 2006 was also faced with the recall of 
millions of lead-contaminated toys in 2007, as well as massive recalls 
for magnetic toys. This constituted the largest recall in the company’s 
history since 10 million Power Wheels™ toys were pulled off store 
shelves during the 1990s due to a potential fire hazard. 
Companies will attempt to balance their reputational assets (goods) and 
liabilities (bads). Balancing the ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ involves pulling out 
the ‘goods’ (e.g. ethical accolades or a blemish-free record of safety) to 
balance the ‘bads’ (unethical practices, unsafe procedures). As Lin 
2007:210) suggests: 
Inherent in the ‘metaphor of the ledger’ as a neutralisation 
technique (Klockers 1974) is the idea that individuals are entitled 
to indulge in deviant behaviours insofar as they have accrued 
good credits in the past that can be ‚cashed in‛ later, to excuse 
the misbehaviours they engaged in. The individuals’ guilt 
would, thus, be assuaged since good credits are cashed in for bad 
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ones, leading to an equilibrium between good and evil acts 
(Hollinger, 1990; Minor, 1981 cited in Lin 2007: 210).  
For instance, a corporation, in times of crisis, might draw upon 
accolades for ethics, or little or no history of producing unsafe products, 
as ‘goods’ to be ‚cashed in‛ during a crisis.  
Denial and Crisis Management Scripts  
What this study found is that companies typically engaged in responses 
that routinely relied upon virtually the same ‘denial scripts’. These 
crisis management strategies unfolded as follows: 
 A problem is discovered, often by a third party and reported to 
the company concerned (e.g. lead in toys) or an incident occurs 
that is so serious that it simply cannot be ignored (e.g. a fatality or 
serious injury from magnets dislodging from toys); 
 The company either chooses to notify the relevant regulator 
immediately (24 hour reporting rule in the United States, 48 hours 
in Australia) or chooses to delay notifying the regulator and 
conducts an internal investigation to get to the bottom of what 
happened and who did it (why they did it is rarely answered); 
 In the company’s time, the regulator is notified of the hazard and 
incident/injury data is either declared (or not). In one case in 
particular,  the nature of the hazard and the true scale of the 
problem was hidden from authorities; 
 The events become public knowledge, either through the media 
acting as a whistle blower or a public announcement by the 
relevant regulator (e.g. official recall); 
 Apologies or statements of regret are made by the company and 
messages of assurance are offered to those affected, often 
accompanied by surprise at what has been found or what has 
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occurred and a promise that everything will be done to make sure 
that whatever it is does not happen again, and that an internal 
investigation has been launched to determine what happened and 
who is at fault; 
 In the meantime, a plan of corrective action is rolled out by the 
company, sometimes a revamping or strengthening of procedures 
that are already in place in some form, or ought to have been in 
place as part of a rigorous risk management program. Sometimes 
that corrective action is modelled directly on a similar crisis, 
considered to be an industry sector exemplar; 
 The company’s internal investigation subsequently reveals that 
what occurred was somebody else’s fault, usually an intermediary 
– a contractor or sub-contractor of some type – either conveniently 
headquartered in a different jurisdiction or country or operating a 
facility in a different country (e.g. Chinese contract 
manufacturers); 
 What follows is a series of announcements from the company and 
the regulator as the crisis moves through several different stages. 
From the company the messages are primarily ones of reassurance 
(to consumers) and messages of condemnation for the 
scapegoat(s) – in these cases China (the nation state), Chinese 
contract factories (the companies) and ‘Made In China’ (the 
brand); 
 Experts of various kinds (academic, global consultants, business 
ethicists) are drawn upon by both the media and companies to 
validate the tone of public messages, also playing a part in 
shaping public perception; 
 Meanwhile behind closed doors the company goes into damage 
control, once the regulator is advised the company and the 
regulator (together) thrash out the wording of the recall notice in 
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the context of an accommodative or retaliatory relationship 
between the two organisations which sometimes sets the tone for 
the ensuing crisis; 
 A set of strategic announcements from the company and the 
regulator evolve as the crisis moves through several different 
stages to its final resolution. These are typically messages of 
reassurance for affected publics; 
 Sometimes the event recurs (e.g. expanded recalls for same 
products, same problems) or the corrective action implemented 
fails to prevent a recurrence or resolve the issues; 
 A second round of apologies and more promises that the situation 
is under control and in some cases an acknowledgement that ‘we 
found the problem ourselves this time’, as if that is somehow 
reassuring; 
 A message of reassurance to affected publics that everything is 
under control and that the company is co-operating with all the 
relevant authorities; 
 What becomes apparent to bystanders (public, advocates, 
politicians) is that although the events are a business as usual risk, 
there appears to be no pre-determined contingency plan(s) in 
place to deal with the unfolding crisis; 
 In the interim: 
o  the media, politicians and others ‘bag’ the company, and 
some also assist in scapegoating the scapegoat (in this case 
China); 
o  the regulator comes under close scrutiny because of the way 
in which it has been allowed to ‘run down’ and has been 
rendered toothless by underfunding, under-resourcing and 
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redundant technologies (in these cases antiquated testing 
laboratory); 
o The companies concerned ‘empathise’ with the regulator’s 
demise and at industry body level make noises about 
supporting the strengthening of legislation to ensure public 
safety. In other cases, industry groups may resist 
strengthening of the legislation; 
o Official enquiries are held in highly political and emotive 
environments, with politicians demanding to know what 
happened, what took so long, who was to blame, at the same 
time providing a necessary forum and a ‘voice’ for consumer 
advocates and the families of those killed or injured. 
 New or improved legislation is introduced, more frequent and 
rigorous testing, new thresholds for toxic substances, improved 
technologies for attaching magnets and greater co-operation 
between Chinese, American and European regulators to make 
sure these things don’t recur; 
 The crisis moves out of the global media and companies, albeit 
sometimes suffering economic and reputational losses, return to 
business as usual or in some instances are swallowed up by 
competitors; 
 Usually one or two years later, the regulator makes certain 
allegations in a civil settlement agreement and imposes a fine and 
the perpetrators deny any wrongdoing, until the next time. 
This crisis management strategy is basically a Western business model, 
however. In the context of global production processes and the 
transference of toxic toys around the world, things can get more 
complicated once ‘China’ is brought back into the equation. 
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Conflicting Cultures 
In trying to understand the techniques of neutralisation used by both 
Western and Chinese companies to defend their actions, I drew 
extensively upon two studies in the Chinese context. The First, a study 
by Ye and Pang (2011), on ‘the Chinese approach to crisis management’ 
in the context of the Sanlu milk scandal and the second a study by 
Peijuan, Lee and Augstine (2009) examining the Chinese government’s 
image repair efforts during the Made in China controversy. 
The West is quick to point the finger at the East concerning corruption 
and other practices, but slower to recognise that western companies 
exhibit behaviour that is not so different, albeit, less visible, and 
attracting a different label. This also raises the question of how sensitive 
the techniques of neutralisation are to cultural nuances and differences 
in approaches to establishing and sustaining commercial relationships, 
such as those that sustain supply chains, in these particular cases, the 
relationship between toy companies and their Chinese contract factories 
or vendors.  This represents a substantive area for further research. 
In their study of how Sanlu (a Chinese company) managed the 
melamine-contaminated milk scandal, Ye and Pang (2011: 247) provide 
insight into the Chinese approach to crisis management, which they 
argue ‘remains mired in values that differ from best practices of 
effective crisis management’. The types of strategies observed by Ye 
and Pang during the contaminated milk crisis are summarised in Table 
10.3. 
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Table 10.3: Chinese Crisis Management Strategies 
Cover-up and 
denial 
When encountering a crisis where an organization 
could be culpable, Chinese organizations usually 
choose ‘‘not to publicly communicate the full extent of 
crises and are deceptive in their reporting of various 
incidents’’ (Yu & Wen, 2003: 51, cited in Ye and Pang 
(2011: 262) 
Taking the ‚upper 
level line‛ 
For the organization, it means to have problems, or 
crises, solved with the help of the government. Chinese 
organizations in crisis usually ‘‘spend much more time 
taking the ‘upper level line’ than dealing with the 
media’’ (Liang, 2005:15) as they believed the 
government could protect organizations from the 
media siege by controlling the media or keeping silent  
The Third Party organizations often use the prestige of experts to boost 
their credibility, or ask experts to speak on behalf of the 
organization 
Silence Keeping silent is one of of the golden rules in Chinese 
crisis management During a crisis, Chinese 
organizations believe that if the organization is not sure 
what comments should be made or if there is no better 
way to put the organization in a position of agreement 
with public opinions, keeping silent is better than 
‘‘making blatant comments’’ (Xu, 2006:21 cited in Ye 
and Pang 2011: 263) 
Source: Tabulated from Ye and Pang (2011: 262-263). 
The Chinese response to a spate of recalls for toys and food was to 
‘launch a four month crackdown on product safety, resulting in more 
than 600 Chinese toy makers having their export licenses revoked to 
ensure product quality 
The State Administration for Quality Supervision and Inspection and 
Quarantine (AQSIQ) announced: 
 "We have thoroughly inspected all 3,000-plus toy makers for 
export during the rectification work that began last August 
[2007]," said AQSIQ Deputy Director Pu Changcheng at a press 
conference in Beijing "We have also set a complete quality test 
system. All toys, even those that are made based on designs and 
standards by importers, are subjected to safety checks," he told 
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reporters."The overall quality of Chinese-made toys will be 
further improved and safety will be fully guaranteed," said the 
official (Xinhua News Agency 14/1/2008 cited in Peijuan et al 
2009). 
‘While acknowledging problems in some domestic manufacturers, Pu 
noted several toy recalls in 2007 were due to design flaws or change of 
standards by foreign importers (Xinhua News Agency 14/1/2008). In 
response, Chinese product safety authorities said at the time that the 
latest lab tests in China have shown that toys recalled by Mattel Inc. for 
a third time are up to the Chinese and European standards and are safe 
for children around the world (Xinhua News Agency 12/09/2009 cited 
in Peijuan et al 2009). 
At one stage it was argued that the problem was that the United States 
imposes a different measurement of lead content from other countries, 
according to the General Administration for Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine (GAQSIQ) (Xinhua News Agency 
12/09/2009 cited in Peijuan et al 2009: 215) 
The GAQSIQ said that China and most other countries 
determine the safety of toy based on the lead release, or the 
amount of lead dissolvable out of toy paint, which may be 
harmful to human health. China requires the lead release should 
be kept under 90 mg per kilogram, which is in line with the 
international standard (ISO8124-3) and the European standard 
(EN 71-3). But the United States adds an extra standard to limit 
the lead content to 600 mg per kilogram, the administration said.  
Difference in standards was a main reason why the country's exports to 
some countries were frequently alleged to be problematic in quality, 
said the watchdog (Xinhua News Agency 12/09/2009 cited in Peijuan et 
al 2009 
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Pejuian et al (2009:215-216), in a critique of the Made-In China’ crisis, 
outline the key strategies deployed by China to diffuse criticism: 
Stage 1: Initial Response  
Denial and bolstering were common strategies used by China to diffuse 
criticism. When high levels of lead were found in Chinese made toys, 
‘even as China engaged in denial, it used the strategy of bolstering to 
argue for the safety of the toys (China says toys recalled by Mattel safe, 
despite some failing U.S. standards 2007) (Xinhua News Agency 
18/9/2007 cited in Peijuan et al 2009: 215). Subsequently China promised 
corrective action, to crack down on counterfeit certification symbols. 
Stage 2: Intermediate action 
‘To protect its reputation, China used strategies that helped to reduce 
offensiveness. For instance, the strategy of bolstering was evident when 
China argued its quality of toys was of high quality (Blanchard and Lin 
2007 cited in Peijuan et al 2009: 215). Apart from bolstering strategies, 
the Chinese government also employed the strategy of denial, 
specifically shifting blame to isolate the ‚bad apples‛ <mistakes made 
by certain companies should not tar the overall image of the 
government’ (Xinhua News Agency 2/8/2007, cited in Peijuan et al 2009: 
215). 
‘Attack the accuser was another strategy China used to fend off 
accusations of product failures, like how it warned the US not to 
exacerbate the problem. At the same time it argued that it was ‚unfair 
and irresponsible‛ for the US media to single China out‛(Peijuan et al 
2009: 215). 
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Stage 3: Remedial Action 
As China faced mounting international backlash over unsafe product, it 
began to engage in the strategy of corrective action. To rectify the crisis, 
China revoked the licenses of over 700 toy companies and guilty 
officials were also detained (Four Chinese detained for involvement in 
Mattel toy recall 2007) (cited in Peijuan et al 2009: 215). 
China’s strategies in the initial and intermediate stages appeared 
confusing because of the mixed signals it sent. It generated the 
image of a country that was hurried and harried; its responses 
appeared piecemeal. On the one hand China attempted to 
defend itself by engaging in strategies of denial and bolstering. 
On the other hand, it wanted to avoid escalation of the crisis by 
attempting to assuage its accusers that it would correct the 
problems. However, over time, as it became acquainted with the 
extent and nature of the crisis, it unequivocally promised to 
correct the problems. (Peijuan et al 2009: 216). 
‘Face-saving is an important communication device in Chinese culture. 
Protecting one’s face helps to preserve one’s dignity and empower 
oneself, especially if the audience is an important one (Lu 1994 cited in 
Peijuan et al 2009: 216). ‘Thus when a nation admits guilt, embedded in 
corrective action could be an implicit mortification to save face’.(Peijuan 
et al 2009: 216). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the types of strategies used by toy 
companies (in the west) and their supply chain partners (in China) to 
neutralise the harms they caused by producing and distributing toxic 
toys containing lead and magnets into the stream of commerce. 
Companies typically deployed strategies aimed at containing the 
damage, whilst simultaneously deploying countervailing strategies to 
bolster corporate image, restore brand reputation and regain consumer 
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trust. Although these companies may not have set out to ‘knowingly’ 
manufacture toxic toys, empirical data (e.g. USCPSC Settlement 
Agreements, litigation outcomes) suggests that most of these companies 
did have ‘knowledge’ of specific hazards in their supply chains (e.g. 
lead in paint) in their own toys and/or competitor’s toys (e.g. rare earth 
magnets), sometimes well in advance of the regulator and certainly well 
before the public were abreast of this knowledge. In some instances, 
information critical to assessing the nature and scale of the hazard to 
protect consumers was withheld from the U.S. regulator (e.g. Mega 
Brands case). All in all, consumers were the very last to find out about 
toxic toys. Sometimes the media were the informants, sometimes third-
party testers, sometimes mega retailers conducting their own tests, and 
tragically sometimes children died or were seriously injured. 
To address the politics of denial, we must begin with the politics of 
knowing (See Cohen 1997). Denial relies on being in possession of some 
measure of knowledge of having done something (White, 2008). In this 
study who knew and when and what they did with that knowledge are 
important questions, because the answers to those questions help to 
explain why companies (and sometimes also the regulator) took so long 
to respond to the issues in the form of an official recall. Sometimes 
revelations by the regulator (e.g. in Settlement Agreements agreed by 
offenders up to three years after the actual events) provide new insights 
into corporate misconduct (e.g. delay in disclosure, deception, 
stonewalling). What the offending parties (e.g. toy companies, supply 
chain partners and sometimes also the regulator) knew is crucial to 
understanding what they denied however this occurred (e.g. through 
concealment, outright denial or denial by omission). 
In the case of product recalls for unsafe toys, companies typically had 
knowledge of incidents and injuries related to a particular hazard (lead, 
magnets) either in their own products or a competitor’s products 
months before they declared those hazards to the regulatory authority.  
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What is at issue here is the timing of that knowledge – who knew, when 
did they know – and the actions taken in response to that knowledge – 
what they said and did that is at the heart of this analysis. These types 
of corporate harms fall between criminal and tort law, but result in 
harm(s) of significant magnitude. By the time the symptoms show, the 
effects can be irreversible and the ongoing suffering of children (and 
their carers) in terms of health and special education costs caused by 
toxic toys can be considerable. What is most disconcerting is that there 
seems to be a ‘recipe’ as to how narratives of rationalisation and denial 
play out in the public domain, across wide-ranging crises. 
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Conclusion 
This study found that toxic harms are on the move across geographical 
and jurisdictional borders. It has sought to conceptualise these flows in 
a particular way, through the lens of transference, where this refers to 
the movement of something from one person (entity) or place to 
another, and where toxicity refers to the degree to which something is 
‘poisonous’ to someone or something. Moreover, the concept of 
transference constitutes the original contribution this research has made 
to the field of green criminology. In particular, this study raises 
questions about the invisibility and potential mobility of certain types 
of harm, around the globe. 
This thesis began with a carcinogenic toxin inside a children’s toy, well 
before the issue of toxic toys was on the horizon. That toy was the 
catalyst for thinking about harm as dynamic rather than static, and toxic 
harms as inherently mobile and therefore, subject to transference. It 
prompted me to think about the potential mobility of different forms of 
harm, their trajectory across the world, and the consequences for bodies 
(all species), places of habitation (where species live and move and have 
their being) and nature (air, water and soil) those elements that sustain 
life on planet earth.  
The hazards found in children’s toys are representative of just some of 
the toxic harms that are flowing across borders and the global supply 
chain and distribution network is only one conduit for the transfer of 
toxic harms. In this particular instance, companies large and small were 
implicated in lead and magnet-related recalls which came as a wake-up 
call for the toy industry, and a reminder that off-shore manufacturing 
does carry risks.  
The thesis began by conceptualising and mapping the movement of 
different toxic harms across the world, not only propelled by the 
mechanisms of globalisation (e.g. globalisation of trade and the vehicle 
of the product supply chain), but also by the forces of nature (air and 
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sea currents). The concept of harm transference is an emerging theme in 
green criminology and a key argument throughout this thesis. There is 
an emphasis on how the actions and activities of individuals and 
companies in one part of the world can have serious consequences for 
local bodies, places and natural landscapes in other parts of the world, 
often geographically and morally distant from the means of production. 
This study has exposed what appears to be a scripted set of responses 
and strategies on the part of those doing the harm. At one level toy 
companies may have been unaware of the systemic outsourcing and 
sub-contracting practices occurring in the manufacturing sector of their 
supply chains in China. However, the ‘sameness’ of their responses (e.g. 
corrective action that revamped or strengthened existing processes 
rather than introducing new innovations) is symptomatic of protecting 
the corporate bank balance and company reputation as key priorities, 
rather than dealing with harm or victims per se.  
In the case of leaded paint a Guanxi approach to business may have 
facilitated the ‘admission’ of local Chinese contract factories into the 
extended toy supply chain. Nonetheless, Western toy companies took 
their eye off risk management and quality assurance in their extended 
supply chains, relying instead on relationships of ‘trust’ rather than 
rigorous processes of enforcement, monitoring and verification. It is as 
much about arms-length governance and, perhaps about western toy 
companies as ‘outsiders’ in the microcosms of capitalism and 
democracy that artificially exist in special economic zones like 
Guangdong province ,than about procedures and processes.  
In this context toy companies became ‘outsiders’ in a network of 
‘insiders’ who unofficially became a part of their supply chains, 
apparently without their knowledge. Perhaps they always were 
‘outsiders’ and it is relationships across oceans, continents and cultures 
that require re-working as much as the systems and processes that 
failed children everywhere who were exposed to toxic toys. 
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This study demonstrates the downside of ‘globalisation in action’ (e.g. 
the supply chain and distribution network), particularly a world in the 
grip of grim economic, military and social conflict. As well, the effects 
of extreme weather-related conditions can cause significant disruption 
to the off-shore (or international) components of a supply chain. No 
amount of border surveillance or increased regulation will prevent 
adulterated products from transferring across borders. Surveillance can 
only hope to catch a tiny proportion of contaminated products and 
regulation can only protect consumers if companies are willing to 
divulge product hazards to the regulator in a timely way, and the 
regulator to consumers. 
In this type of business and production context, only certain types of 
regulation will prevent these types of incidents from recurring. What is 
required is a holistic approach to supply chain management, one that 
not only focuses on ‘relationship building’ across continents, oceans 
and cultures, but also involves enforcement, monitoring and 
verification of specifications and standards. A supporting strategy 
might consider a fairer system of profit-sharing that does not penalise 
developing countries and that acknowledges and pays for the export 
emissions (pollution by foreign companies) of local people and their 
environments. 
What these cases have demonstrated is just how difficult it is to manage 
not only the hazards themselves, but also the ‘relationships’ (political, 
economic, corporate and jurisdictional) that arise when something goes 
wrong in a part of the world over which a company has no real 
jurisdiction. Questions that emerged over the toxic toys included: Who 
is responsible? Who will pay? Who will insure the harm? For example, 
lead paint originated in China, but injured children in multiple 
countries where the toys were imported. Poorly designed magnetic toys 
by certain Western toy companies were responsible for magnets 
dislodging into children’s domestic and community play settings and 
injuring unknown numbers of children across the world. Ultimately, 
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the toy company (headquartered in the west in these cases) is 
responsible for risk management, security and governance in its 
extended supply chain (typically built into the price of a toy) and for 
the safety of the toys produced.  
What off-shoring does is provide a buffer between the company (on-
shore in the West) and the hazard produced (off-shore in the East). 
What this also demonstrates is that transnational corporations only 
have so much influence when something goes wrong in another 
country (where they have facilities), but where there are differing 
political, philosophical, and economic views of the world and where 
business cultures (e.g. Western versus Guanxi) are quite different. 
When harm occurs beyond geographical, cultural and jurisdictional 
boundaries, new strategies need to be developed to address both the 
global and local dimensions of the harm. This involves governments, 
corporations and regulators, with sometimes very different views of 
what has happened, who knew and when, and what they did with that 
knowledge, being forced together under crisis circumstances, to try and 
resolve the issues.  
Blame-shifting was commonplace up and down the supply chain, but 
toy companies (in the west) cannot so easily absolve themselves of their 
responsibility for producing unsafe toys. This is about shoddy (poor 
design) by toy companies in the West (magnets not secured) and shady 
(using lead paint) practices by their supply partners in China 
respectively. Regulators, too, should not dismiss the role of mega 
retailers and large discount chains (who also directly import own-brand 
toys in huge volumes) in the production of lead contaminated toys, 
especially the denial of a known risk (lead paint) in the manufacturing 
sector of their supply chains, in these cases in China. The issue needs to 
be addressed at the source of the flow (in other words rigorous testing 
of raw materials like paint and paint pigment, monitoring of same and 
documentary evidence), random batch testing and finished product 
testing. This provides potential points of intervention for the detection 
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of adulterated products before they are distributed to consumers. In the 
case of magnetic toys the potential points of intervention are at design 
and development (especially testing stage), but also noticing and 
reporting anomalies (e.g. magnets dislodging) during assembly and 
packaging. 
The focus on China, Made-in-China and Chinese manufacturers, 
obscured the wider issues that may underlie the adulteration of 
products (e.g. open/closed networks and different styles of doing 
business between China and the West), and poorly designed toys 
(speed to market, tunnel vision in testing e.g. too much emphasis on the 
durability of a toy, sharp parts or small parts, rather than the potential 
for contaminants and components to migrate from toys. Hence, this 
study’s suggestion that the concept of horizon scanning (forecasting 
future harms) and transference (the potential mobility of harms) might 
be useful to add to the risk assessment toolbox not only for toys and 
their constituents, but also for the risks associated with supply chain 
activities wherever they occur. In the context of transference, risk 
assessment might include questions such as: Can whatever is being 
produced, consumed or disposed of gain mobility? If so what might be 
the mode (e.g. supply chain) or media (e.g. water, air, soil) of 
transference, how far might that harm travel? (e.g migrate from a toy; 
ooze or seep across borders) and if it does, what are the likely 
consequences for bodies, places and nature? Horizon harms for toys 
include liquids, powders and gels of unknown origin, the prolific use of 
button cell batteries in everyday products and nano materials (already 
incorporated into some plush toys). All of the above are potentially 
mobile and subject to transference. 
The production of toxic toys and the strategies deployed by corporate 
actors to mitigate those hazards represents a substantive area for 
further research by green criminologists (perhaps under the rubric of 
green criminology and new deviancy). In the cases presented here, not 
only did companies produce and distribute toxic toys, they also 
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deployed specific denial and mitigation strategies to rationalise their 
behaviour and moderate the harms they caused. These actions 
(inactions and reactions) had significant flow-on effects for people, 
places and nature: 
 the pollution of bodies (e.g. foreign factory workers exposed to 
supply chain toxins like lead, where this was localised to 
Guangdong Province, China where the toys were made 
 the potential poisoning of children who mouthed the toys in the 
countries of import (e.g. mostly in the developed world) but also 
Chinese children in the country of export 
 serious and sometimes lasting injuries to the intestines of 
children who ingested multiple magnets that dislodged from 
certain poorly designed toys 
 emissions to air, water and soil (in these cases localised to 
Guangdong Province, China), not only from normal 
manufacturing processes (e.g. export emissions), but also from 
the spraying of lead paint on toys (lead dust) and the likely 
release of contaminated wastewater (to soil) 
 emissions associated with en masse disposal of contaminated 
raw materials (e.g. lead-contaminated paint in China) and 
contaminated products (e.g. lead-contaminated toys) was an 
overlooked and under-researched ecological concern in these 
cases 
 emissions associated with individual household disposal of toys 
(e.g. recalled toys to household trash) and en masse disposal of 
contaminated toys containing both lead and magnets (in the 
countries of import) either to landfill (emitting greenhouse gases) 
or incineration (emitting dioxins to air), ultimately contributing 
to climate change 
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A number of recurring questions arose throughout the toy recalls, 
which sum up the key issues addressed in this thesis: 
What took so long? This question was raised by politicians, the media, 
advocacy groups and consumers alike. Typically this question related 
to the disclosure of critical information between the company and the 
regulator (e.g. disclosure of a product hazard within the 24 hour 
reporting timeframe); and between the regulator and the public 
(timeliness of official recall announcements). As more and more 
information came into the public domain, people became frustrated by 
these time lags, particularly since they exposed children to toxic toys for 
a greater period of time. 
Which toys? Many of the recall alerts contained ambiguous or 
confusing wording, so that consumers and retailers found themselves 
continually asking, ‘which toys’? In some instances, toxic and non-toxic 
toys were packaged together (e.g. RC2’s Thomas toys), in other 
instances, consumers were unsure which toys were being recalled due 
to issues surrounding differentiating new improved versions from old 
versions (in the case of Magnetix™ building sets) . 
Why are the toys still out there? Reports of toys still on retail store 
shelves in the aftermath of the recalls were not uncommon, with toys 
being found on internet sites sometimes well after the recall date. In the 
case of Magnetix™ knock-off toys also became an issue. There were 
fears too, that recalled toys may turn up in informal markets like 
second-hand and charity outlets as well as market stalls. 
How many incidents and injuries? Issues of delayed disclosure, non-
disclosure and partial disclosure compromised the safety of children 
and made it more difficult for the regulator to assess the true nature 
and scale of hazards. This was particularly relevant in the case of 
magnets where both Mega Brands (for Magnetix™ and Mattel (for Polly 
Pocket™) concealed information in different ways, Rose Art/Mega 
Brands by withholding significant incident and injury data, and Mattel 
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Inc by settling an injury case (that occurred in July 2005) behind closed 
doors, well before a child died from a competitor’s toy (Magnetix™) in 
November 2005. 
Who is to blame? Which country?, which company?, which brands?, 
whose standards? Which thresholds? and whose specifications?, were 
all issues on the table. But, in practice, assigning blame was politically 
fraught and blame-shifting was commonplace. 
Who will compensate the victims? This especially becomes an issue 
when the origins of the adulteration (e.g. lead) occur in one country but 
the harm to consumers (children) occurs in multiple countries. Class 
action law suits seemed to be the order of the day, however the 
communal nature of these actions functions to render the experience of 
individual victimisation less visible and takes no account of ongoing 
suffering or the costs associated with that. 
Where are the toys now? The topic of disposing of contaminated toys 
was raised but not seriously discussed, but the issue of disposal of 
contaminated raw materials (e.g. lead paint and paint pigment in 
China) was not widely discussed, at least not in the Western media. 
Who knew and when? In the face of allegations from the USCPSC, 
companies typically denied that they ‘knowingly’ produced and 
distributed unsafe toys into the stream of commerce. But these cases 
indicate that, although companies may not have ‘knowingly’ done so 
toy companies (like RC2 Corporation, Schylling Inc and Mattel/Fisher-
Price) did have ‘knowledge’ that lead paint was a risk in their extended 
supply chains in China. Likewise, both Rose Art/Mega Brands and 
Mattel were aware of incidents and injuries leading up to their first 
official recalls (March 2006 for Magnetix; November 2006 for Mattel). 
They knew that certain of their toys had seriously harmed children 
(with incidents dating back as far as early January 2004 in Rose 
Art/Mega Brand’s case and at least July in Mattel’s case.  
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What did they do with that knowledge? is critical to understanding 
what happened. What they did was to either delay disclosure (e.g. 
companies routinely breached the 24 hour reporting rule for a product 
hazard), outright deny they had the requested incident and injury data 
and/or drip-feed information to the regulator (in Rose Art/Mega 
Brand’s case), information critical to the regulator being able to 
accurately access the true nature and scale of the harm. The net result 
was that the public was always the last to find out unless the media 
blew the whistle, as they did with Schylling Inc spinning tops and pails 
(although journalists did advise the company of their findings in 
advance). The flow-on effect was that children everywhere were 
exposed to unsafe toys for longer than necessary, with some arguably 
sustaining preventable injuries, had disclosure occurred in a more 
timely fashion. 
How can things be different? Although the shift from voluntary to 
mandatory standards for toys is admirable, no amount of regulation or 
surveillance at the border will prevent further instances of the 
adulteration of toys with lead (or other toxins) or the migration of 
deadly magnets (or button cell batteries) from toys. These issues must 
be dealt with at their source and involve co-operation between toy 
companies and their supply chain partners in the first instance to put in 
place rigorous enforcement, monitoring and verification processes that 
are free from corruption. Greater attention also needs to be paid to what 
is in a toy (at both design and development, manufacturing and 
disposal phases of the supply chain), in terms of what can gain mobility 
and migrate from that toy whether that be toxic contaminants like lead, 
cadmium and phthalates (chemicals to make plastic soft), button cell 
batteries, rare earth magnets or nano particles. 
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Improved communication between toy companies and the 
organisations that comprise their extended supply chains (driven from 
parent company CEO level down) as well as awareness and respect for 
cultural difference (both ideological and commercial) would help 
smooth the flow of non-toxic products. Communicating standards, 
specifications and expectations in the language of the country where 
those products are made (e.g. in this case China) could also assist, as 
would building a shared vision for keeping toys safe for children 
everywhere (not just children in the West), and especially for poor 
children and children living with (and sometimes working with) lead 
and other harmful toxins in their everyday environments. For these 
latter children, a little bit of something in a toy represents another layer 
of poison. Implementing systems of reward (e.g. profit-sharing 
incentives for product quality excellence) might also encourage greater 
commitment to product safety. Western toy companies have the know-
how and resources to continuously improve the safety of their products 
wherever they are made and sold. 
I can’t help wondering that if magnets were dislodging from new toys, 
the same may also have been occurring during assembly and packaging 
by factory workers in China. One way of addressing this would be to 
encourage a culture of transparency throughout the extended supply 
chain. This could be achieved by workers (in China) bringing this type 
of anomaly to local management attention (without incurring a punitive 
response), and by Chinese supply chain contractors being able to 
immediately alert western toy companies (perhaps through an 
electronic notification to someone with decision-making authority) 
without being penalised (e.g. cancellation of their contract). This 
approach might go some way to reducing the ‘them and us’ scenario 
that transpires when things go wrong, thereby fostering a culture of 
‘disclosure’ rather than ‘denial’.  
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Regulatory agencies need sufficient leverage to take the upper hand 
when dealing with corporate misconduct, and fines ought to reflect not 
only the seriousness of the conduct, but also be proportionate to the 
corporate purse. Fining RC2 Corporation (a medium sized company) 
the same amount as a much larger transnational like Mattel/Fisher-Price 
(remembering the fine applied to two companies here) seemed 
disproportionate to both the corporate purse and the lesser level of 
deviancy exhibited by RC2 when compared to some of the other 
companies. Having said that, Schylling Inc’s attempt to influence the 
size of the penalty handed down by the USCPSC was another thing 
altogether. Fines should encourage desistance rather than an attitude of 
deterrence, until the next occasion. 
As already suggested, toy companies might think about building the 
concept of transference into their risk management toolbox (e.g. 
consider the potential mobility of what is in a toy, what a toy is made 
from, and the upstream, midstream and downstream emissions 
associated with the lifecycle of the toy itself). Consumers do have a 
right to be alerted swiftly to product hazards, especially those that have 
the potential to kill. They have a right to know what is in a product and 
what might potentially migrate from that product, so they can make an 
informed choice about whether they want to buy it (or not). 
Returning to the key research question: what ideological and social 
processes facilitate the global transference of toxic harms? The answer is 
a number of different things: systems, processes, institutional 
structures, differing ideologies, mechanisms of globalisation and quite 
simply, wrongful behaviour. Global political economy provides the 
overarching context within which harm to our children occurs. But, in 
the end, it does not excuse those responsible for what is, after all, 
human-induced harm. Toxic toys are an issue that is fundamentally a 
matter of environmental justice. As such, it ought to be studied taking 
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into consideration questions of power, ownership, control – and 
resistance. Exposing the harm and its movement via transnational 
transference and global supply chains, and exposing the harm of 
perpetrators and their techniques of neutralisation, is an important part 
of this process. This, I hope, is a key contribution of the present thesis.  
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Appendix 1: Magnets - The Full Time Line 
2000 
When Who Knew What They Knew 
Mar 2000 USCPSC An 8 year old Atlanta boy undergoes intestinal surgery 
after he swallows small magnets that fall out of a broken 
fast-food meal toy (Callahan 2007a). 
2003 
Jan 2003 Rose Art Rose Art launches Magnetix™ building sets, labelling 
them safe for children as young as three years old 
(Callahan 2007a). 
Oct 2003 USCPSC A six year old Indiana girl suffers intestinal trauma after 
accidentally swallowing powerful magnetic jewellery 
bought at a State Fair, which she used to mimic a tongue 
piercing (Callahan 2007a). 
Nov 2003™ USCPSC The surgeon who attended to the six year old Indiana girl 
(cited in the row above), alerts the USCPSC ‘to expect 
more of these types of injuries if products with such 
magnets are marketed to children’ (Callahan 2007a). 
Late 2003/Jan 2004 Rose Art Rose Art begins receiving complaints about magnets 
falling out or liberating from 26 different types of 
Magnetix™ building sets, but fails to notify the USCPSC 
(USCPSC Settlement Agreement Mega Brands 2009). 
2004 
Apr 2004 USCPSC A Lewisville NC grandmother warns the USCPSC that ‘a 
small child could easily swallow these loose magnets’ 
(Callahan 2007a). 
Oct 2004 Public domain Dr. A.E. Oestreich a U.S. paediatric oncologist publishes 
an article on the dangers of multiple magnet ingestion, 
presenting three known case examples (Oestreich 2004). 
2005 
Feb 2005 USCPSC A Colorado mother tells a USCPSC investigator that 
Magnetix™ toys are ‘particularly dangerous’, describing 
how some magnets fell out of the toy and she feared her 
three year old son may use his teeth to separate them 
(Callahan 2007a). 
May 2005 USCPSC Three different consumers are so concerned these 
magnets could harm children, that they send pieces of 
their defective Magnetix™ toys to the USCPSC (Callahan 
2007a). 
May 2005 USCPSC Indiana play school owner, Sharon Grigsby phones the 
USCPSC hotline to report that five year old Kiegan Willis 
required surgery after ingesting magnets that fell out of a 
Magnetix™ building set that he found on the floor of the 
day care centre (Callahan 2007a) 
3 May 2005 USCPSC Three year old Marcell McNeil complains of flu-like 
symptoms and over the next few days he vomits violently 
and his stomach ache worsens. During emergency 
surgery doctors remove three magnets that have bonded 
across the walls of his intestine (Callahan 2007b) 
May 2005  Ten year old Timothy Kroell suffers life-threatening 
injuries from swallowing magnets that dislodged from a 
Magnetix™ knock-off toy. 
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May 2005 USCPSC Illinois Attorney-General alerts the USCPSC to the 
hazards of knock-off toys, urging the regulator to recall 
the toys (US Senate COA 2008: 3). Despite Timothy 
Kroell’s injuries, these knock-off toys are never recalled. 
June 2005 Canadian Company Mega Brands announces its intended acquisition of Rose 
Art Industries. 
26 July 2005 Canadian company Mega Brands completes the acquisition of American 
company Rose Art Industries (Mega Bloks Q3 Report 2005:3). 
July 2005 Mattel Inc A seven year old girl is severely injured by the same type 
of magnets from a competitor’s toy (Mattel’s Polly 
Pocket™ playset). As this litigation never became public 
until 2007, it is not clear whether the two companies 
shared information about this common hazard. 
Aug 2005  4 year old William Finley swallows parts of a Magnetix™ 
building set. Doctors initially think he has a burst 
appendix, but later discover and remove three magnets 
from his intestines (Callahan 2007a). 
7 Sept 2005 USCPSC A boy aged 2 years six months requires surgery after 
swallowing three magnetic rod-shape pieces from his 
older sibling’s building set (MMWR 2006). 
Oct 2005 Rose/Mega 
USCPSC 
Parents in Highland Illinois tell a customer service 
representative at Rose Art that a magnet popped out of 
their four year old son’s Magnetix™ toy as he opened the 
box (Callahan 2007a). The parents reportedly also 
advised the USCPSC. 
31 Oct 2005 Rose/Mega William Finley’s parents send a certified letter to Rose Art 
advising them of the injuries their son sustained as a 
result of swallowing magnets that dislodged from a 
Magnetix™ building set. 
3 Nov 2005 Rose/Mega Rose Art receives and signs for the Finley’s certified letter 
(sent in Oct 2005), advising them of the injuries sustained 
by William Finley. 
24 Nov 2005 Rose/Mega 
 
Fatality: 21 month old Kenny Sweet dies after ingesting 
multiple magnets from a sibling’s Magnetix™ 
construction toy that he found embedded in the carpet of 
the family home (Esteban 2005; Callahan 2007a). The 
company fails to report the incident to the USCPSC. 
25 Nov 2005 Rose/Mega Deadline for reporting product hazard and Kenny’s 
death to the USCPSC. 
26 Nov 2005 Rose/Mega Reporting deadline passes, Rose Art/Mega Brands fail to 
report to the USCPSC. 
14 Dec 2005 Rose/Mega 
USCPSC 
Twenty days after finding out about Kenny’s death, Rose 
Art/Mega file an Initial Report with the USCPSC, 
advising of Kenny’s death and identifying the toy that 
killed him, but providing no additional incident and 
injury information (US SCOA 2009) 
20 Dec 2005 Media 
USCPSC 
KOMO 4 News in the United States breaks the story of 
Kenny’s death and after discussions with the Coroner the 
USCPSC announces an investigation into the 
circumstances (Esteban 2005). 
31 Dec 2005 Mega/Rose Pursuant to the conditions of the acquisition agreement, 
Canadian company Mega Brands assumes full 
operational control of Rose Art Industries. 
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8 Dec 2005 Mattel Inc Devlin Bowman is admitted to Primary Children’s 
Hospital in Salt Lake City in a critical condition, where 
two magnets are removed from his intestines 
(Oppenheimer 2009: 240). In 2006, the Bowman’s file suit 
against Mattel. 
Dec 2005 USCPSC 
Mega/Rose 
Mega Brands tells federal regulators during recall 
negotiations that since Kenny’s death, the company has 
begun improving Magnetix™ toys, using more glue and 
increasing factory inspections. 
2006 
Jan 2006 USCPSC The USCPSC receives more complaints from consumers 
that magnets are dislodging from children’s Magnetix 
sets (Callahan 2007d). 
1 Feb 2006 Mega Brands 
USCPSC 
Mega Brands submits a Full Report, but this too, lacks 
incident data. 
3 Mar 2006 USCPSC Four year old Kyle Book has a section of his intestines 
removed after swallowing dislodged magnets from a 
Magnetix™ construction set (Callahan 2007c). He and 
three other boys undergo surgery to have the magnets 
removed from their intestines. The USCPSC is notified 
in all four cases (Callahan 2007c). 
28 Mar 2006 USCPSC 
Mega/Rose 
Two days before the first official recall, Mega Brands 
provided the USCPSC with the long-awaited complaint 
and incident data, but it still lacked sufficient detail. 
31 March 2006 Mega/Rose 
USCPSC 
Consumers 
First Recall: 3.8 million boxes of Magnetix™ building 
sets recalled globally (USCPSC Release 06-127, 2006). 
Sept 2006 USCPSC USCPSC Staff discover evidence that leads them to 
believe that despite claims to the contrary, Rose Art did 
keep detailed records of incidents. This leads the 
USCPSC to subpoena the data. 
1 Dec 2006  Mega Brands Canada submits data that includes over 
1,500 incident reports of magnets coming loose from 
Magnetix™ toys 
8 Dec 2006 Morbidity & 
Mortality Weekly 
Report CDC 
Publishes a report on magnet ingestions 
2007 
February 2007  Three year old Tegan Leisy has part of his intestines 
removed after swallowing Magnetix™ magnets 
(Callahan 2007c). 
17 April 2007 Mega/Rose 
USCPSC 
Consumers 
Second Recall: Expanded recall of a further 4 million 
boxes of Magnetix™ building sets globally (USCPSC 
Release 07- 2007). 
May 2007 Retailers Responding to an investigation by the Chicago Tribune, 
some major retailers halt sales of Magnetix™ toys 
(Callahan 2007b). 
2008 
3 March 2008 USCPSC 
Mega 
Consumers 
Third Recall 
Recall of 1.8 million MagnaMan™  magnetic action 
figures. 
April 2008  Class Action Lawsuit  
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2009 
Feb 2009 Published Paper Dr A.E. Oestreich (2009) publishes a rare worldwide 
study on the dangers of multiple magnet ingestion, 
presenting three known case examples. 
2009 USCPSC Mega Mega/Rose incurs a US$1.25 million fine. 
2010 
   
2011 
15 Dec 2011 USCPSC 
Mega Brands 
US District Court (New Jersey) approves settlement of 
class action lawsuit filed against the company in 
August 2008. The corporation denies any and all 
liability but agrees to settle the matter to avoid the 
expense and resources that would be needed for 
further litigation (Mega Brands 2011: 48). 
2012 
2012 Mega Brands 
Mattel 
Mega Brands and Mattel Inc join forces to develop 
Mega Bloks construction toy collections featuring 
Barbie™ and Hot Wheels™, two of Mattel’s (and the 
world’s) most iconic brands’ (Toys & Games March 
2012) providing customizable construction and fashion 
accessory play for girls and construction and vehicle 
play for boys. 
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